# ERA IN TWILIGHT

Psychocultural Situation Under State Terrorism in Latin America

Edited by

Horacio Riquelme U.

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Contents

Introduction

It is known that fear momentarily obfuscates vision and precludes understanding. Little is known, however, about the impact of fear as a coercive force on society in general over a long period.

The existential situation of most of the population affected by state terrorism in South America over the last 20 years can be construed as an "Era in Twilight". This phrase brings together both physical and temporal aspects: the physical aspect, apparently impenetrable, of a human landscape highlighted in gray and opaque shades —living in fear— is also perceived as a period that can be left behind. The title of the German version of this volume, *Zeitlandschaft im Nebel*, alludes to an identical interplay of time and human landscape associated with this chapter of history in South America.

This book documents the effort of one Uruguayan writer and several European and Latin American professionals working in the area of psychosocial health to gain intellectual and emotional understanding of this Era in Twilight they experienced, determined to transcend its virtual opacity and incommunicability.

The essays grew out of discussions at the 1989 annual symposium on "Culture and the Psychosocial Situation in Latin America" held at the University of Hamburg.

The symposium provided the occasion to raise direct questions, define a method accessible to general understanding, and persevere in the effort to obtain some answers that might quell anguish and penetrate this reality that the authors experienced and which they attempt to combat.

The book has two parts, one focused on theory and psychotherapeutic practice in the face of organized violence, and another on culture under state terrorism. In recent South American history a certain simultaneity can be observed in the processes of coercive destruction by state power, on the one hand, and cultural and psychosocial reparation from the grass-roots, on the other.

Five theses are presented below as an introduction. They are intended to induce intimate reflection and arouse the reader's curiosity on the subject of this volume. The tradition of taking the reader by the hand will not be used, so as not to spoil the adventure of discovering the authors and what they have to say for oneself, and so that each reader may interpret the texts in his or her own way.

1. State terrorism has inexorably marked the social climate in South America in recent decades. The objective of subjugating the population has been pursued by using refined methods of social psychology. The status quo has been maintained not only by violent coercion, but also by the sophisticated use of the mass media. The ideological strategy of state terrorism has been manifested not only in the use and abuse of state power. It has also sought to control minds: it has attempted to transcend the limits of formal obedience and implant itself cunningly as a psychological instance of power in the conscience of each member of society. The Southern Cone societies have been subjected to psychological influence and penetration in almost all aspects of daily life, never before seen in terms of its systematic conception and the extent of its influence in the culture and psychosocial situation of this generation. It is not surprising that the various dictatorships have identified artists and professionals who work in the area of psychosocial health as adversaries to be respected, and to be removed from the social scene. The clearest example of the fear of governments in the face of a collective non-violent response is expressed in the treatment afforded the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo (Buenos Aires, Argentina), who were correctly suspected of being capable of withstanding the government's methods of intimidation, and which they tried to denigrate publicly with the epithet "las locas de la Plaza de Mayo" ("the insane women of the Plaza de Mayo").

2. The abuse of human rights has reached an unprecedented scale at all levels of social life in South America. Two hundred years after the Declaration of the Rights of Man, human rights are a necessary point of reference, and insofar as is possible, a cause to be upheld. It is not surprising that the governments of the region have become signatories to the charter repudiating torture and express their unlimited support for human rights, yet continue internal repression in the manner of business as usual. For the repressed, the struggle for human rights is often the only way to recover their own dignity and role in society, while for the governments, formal recognition of such rights is a means of entering the community of "civilized" nations. At this time it appears that cultivating the appearance of respecting ethical values has become very important to the governments, largely because an obvious laxity in upholding them can lead to international sanctions. Nevertheless, it is not possible to forget that for a long time the right to live in peace and in one's country of origin was a mere utopia for many people. Moreover, it appears that the agents of violence have not abdicated their methods; rather, as Brecht said, the womb that begot them is still fecund.

3. Psychotherapeutic activity aimed at dealing with the damages caused by state terrorism in South America has transcended national and professional frontiers. Such psychotherapy actively seeks not only to provide help and support, but also to foster understanding among professionals working in

psychosocial health in the region as well as people from lands as distant as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and Switzerland.

Sensitivity to the issue of human rights has been fostered by the Nazi experience as well as the wars in Algeria and Vietnam. Through reflection upon the psychological damage that those experiences produced, viewed from the perspective of those affected, there are already therapeutic points of reference for psychological suffering such as post-traumatic stress disorder, the profound sequelae in concentration camp survivors, and the effects of the "disappearance" of loved ones on their relatives.

Within this psychotherapeutic praxis, it has been understood that a special approach must be developed to enable the victims of organized violence to overcome the experience of having their basic trust destroyed. Therapy itself can be harmful if it does not explicitly question the myth of the privacy of such widespread experiences and if it does not help those affected to overcome their shame, which makes them unwitting accomplices of their tormentors.

This psychotherapeutic activity is also aimed at gaining insight and understanding of how subordination to state terrorism is established in our minds and in our social interactions, what processes of adaptation make organized violence acceptable and "normal," and the effects on those who experience it in their own flesh.

In general, there is a broad consensus that no specific syndromes can be treated exclusively in a psychotherapeutic realm; it appears much more important to take into account the social interactions of the persons affected and their experiences of suffering, so as to prevent chronic syndromes that are maintained in the psychotherapeutic culture medium, without allowing for the possibility of questioning them from a social perspective. Through this praxis-based approach an effort can be made to avoid a new perversion in the post-dictatorial period, in which the victims of organized violence would be relegated to forgetfulness, marginalized from society, and considered to suffer from a new type of chronic ailment (from torture, imprisonment, "disappearances," etc.) and that they should thus be given access to specialized treatment. Likewise, an absurd situation emerges: society is blamed for producing the tormentors and, with similar consequences, produces experts to provide discreet treatment for torture survivors.

4. The gift of the word should be rescued through persistent efforts, and against all odds. Our everyday language did not have expressions for communicating the experience of terror; there were no connotations for the anguish that stems from the chronic fear instilled by external and unquestionable motives; people only knew to keep silent in the face of shame caused by offenses against intimacy, hitherto conceived of as inviolable; there were no structures for communicating the pain of torture, which is self-perpetuating in those thus victimized. There was but a limited realm for expressing the insecurity felt when expelled from one's own land and having to live as an

alien. Yet the culture of these societies turned out to be more resourceful than one might have anticipated in the face of the invasion by everyday terror. Frightened and silent, stunned in the full sense of the word: this was the state of the first generation affected by the organized violence of Nazism. The massive experiences of human degradation left a profound mark of suffering on the critical consciousness of many men and women in the 20th century and created a social and cultural basis for the struggle to ensure respect for human rights.

One example of this absolute terror and its effects on those left stunned, which may even take the form of a survival tactic, can be gleaned from the report of professor Jan Gross of the Hamburg University Psychiatric Clinic. He tells of a patient who entered the clinic with depression in the late 1970s. His speech was stilted, artificial; he was a German Jew who had avoided Nazi persecution in Poland by pretending to be a mentally-deficient deaf-mute. Thus he found food and shelter with the peasants of a district bordering on his place of origin and succeeded in going unnoticed during the six years of Nazi domination. His employers, very interested in his labor, answered the regular questioning of the SS guards that yes, there was an outsider on the farm, but that he was a hard-working, deaf-mute idiot. Imbued with the fear of giving himself away, for example, by talking in his sleep, this furtive character voluntarily forgot language; he was the only member of a large family to survive Nazi extermination. After the defeat of Nazism, he nonetheless had great difficulty recovering his speech and his place in society. In the 1970s, he participated in campaigns to defend human rights in South America and even took the risk of traveling to the respective countries to raise his voice to protest the crimes against humanity. Privately, he stated that he had never felt so fulfilled and so enthusiastic when participating in political and social activities as on those occasions. He stated that he thus found fellow travelers in the struggle against a form of injustice and threats which hitherto he could only conceive of as annihilating.

5. Psychosocial health has been seriously jeopardized by the action of state terrorism in the respective societies over a long period.

Dante's contemporaries kept their distance from him, as he was reputed to have seen the inferno: "Eccovi l'uomo ch'e stato all'inferno."

Those affected by state terrorism have been brutally expelled from "normalcy" and have experienced "infernal" psychological and physical damages; yet it is known that these damages were inflicted by real people, of flesh and blood, like the victims themselves. The victims run the risk of being stigmatized and marginalized in the post-dictatorial societies if an effort is made to relegate the immediate past to forgetfulness and to keep them out of the public eye. They are nonetheless a substantial part of social reality and are essential for any authentic overcoming of the past.

State terrorism has represented a harsh burden for the physical and psycho-

logical survival of a considerable part of the population. Not only has it upset the rules of social comity; it has also constituted a specific threat for many: torture, "disappearance," exile, massive assassinations, campaigns to intimidate entire populations are but the direct forms employed by state terrorism. The underlying interest, nonetheless, is to form passive, submissive persons with no opinion or attitude of their own regarding the world around them.

Promoting psychosocial health in South America requires unmasking these methods and artifices for subjugating minds. The experience of recent decades in South America has shown that the struggle for human rights is fundamentally a struggle for psychosocial health.

The authors hope that this book will help to further knowledge and understanding of the Era in Twilight, in both its psychotherapeutic and sociocultural aspects. If it arouses the reader's interest and spurs new questions about the experiences of this period and its after-effects in a post-dictatorial society, it will have achieved its purpose, insofar as it contributes to broadening the social and cultural base so that the cry of "Never again!" may be a living proposition, not just a motto of good intentions but with little impact in South America, or wherever state terrorism threatens peace and civility.

The general participation of society is needed in this task of recovery and restructuring of social ethics in the wake of the experience of state terrorism. Based on recent experiences in South America, there is a clear need to reflect upon the psychosocial aspects of this period in order to make it possible to grow and overcome this Era in Twilight.

<div style="text-align: right;">Horacio Riquelme U.</div>

Acknowledgments

I am pleased to acknowledge the effort and collaboration of those who have made it possible to publish this book in English.

The very fact of quickly getting these essays to press in their fourth language (the book has already appeared in German, Portuguese and Spanish) is inherently significant. The essays are succeeding in reaching their natural audience and interlocutor, the critical reader. Despite the emotional intensity of the subject, the authors have fostered this socially necessary discussion in order to further psychosocial knowledge of the effects of state terrorism in Latin America. They have also promoted cultural and psychotherapeutic activities over the years in Europe and the Americas to overcome this Era in Twilight and rescue the human values and humanity sacrificed in situations of organized violence in and from everyday experience and psychotherapeutic work.

In this book intellectuals once again assume responsibility for reversing de-humanization through their own action in society, whether in Argentina, Denmark, or Uruguay, critically addressing one of most burning issues of the last three decades, one which calls out for understanding.

As I cannot list all the many forms of support that have made it possible to undertake this effort, I should like to name just a few of people and institutions that had a direct hand in making this book possible.

Master Fernando Botero was so kind as to allow us to reproduce his well-known painting "The President's Family" on the front cover.

The Area of Medicine and Clinical Psychiatry of the University of Hamburg has provided the infrastructure and basic financing for the interdisciplinary symposium "Culture and Psychosocial Situation in Latin America." In so doing, it has fostered a productive interaction by bringing together scholars and practitioners from different continents.

The Hamburg Foundation for the Promotion of Science and Culture (Hamburger Stiftung zur Förderung von Wissenschaft und Kultur) made possible the translation from Spanish to English, displaying once again its firm commitment to activities to publicize and promote academic work on human rights, especially from a transcultural angle.

The Foundation for Children continues —with a grant for the publication of this book— a long time work for the promotion of understanding and sharing between the so called First and Third World, but also for the incentivation of a South-South-cooperation.

Charles Roberts of Washington took on the challenge of translating the

texts to English; to this end, he engaged in a useful dialogue with the authors, who are living in several cities large and small in Latin America and Europe. He remained steadfast in the face of the inevitable frustrations that can stem from dealing with different cultural rhythms and in some cases with mail systems that are not up to par.

Sharlene García of Bad Hersfeld (Germany) was named to represent the critical readers for the English version. They all facilitated the transfer of ideas and emotions from one cultural context to another.

The Paidós publishing house of Buenos Aires kindly gave permission to use the texts, updated by the authors for this book, of the Movimiento Solidario de Salud Mental (Mental Health Solidarity Movement) (Fariña, Marciano, Mar-tínez, Pechman, and Zito Lema) that first appeared in *Terrorismo de Estado: efectos psicológicos en los niños*, Buenos Aires, 1987.

For all those whose names I have omitted, I trust that this book will help us to cultivate that friendship of physical distances and existential immediacies, and that it will strengthen us in the belief that we can participate in this dialogue from different corners of the planet.

I request your understanding for any mistakes you may find; I have made an effort to ensure that they not outstrip the limits of what is normal in any human undertaking. Naturally I assume responsibility for them. As no set of essays can be better than what their readers make of them, I take this opportunity to wish that the English-language readers find their interaction with these essays most satisfying.

Horacio Riquelme U.

FIRST PART

Violation of Human Rights &
Psychotherapeutic Competence

1

The Effects of Institutionalized Violence: A Psychoanalytical Contribution to its Understanding

Silvia Amati

1 Introduction

These reflections are based on my experience as a psychoanalyst practicing psychotherapy with patients who have suffered torture, disappearance and concentration camps in Latin America. As this symposium is being held in Germany, it seems necessary to consider the similarity between the techniques of psychological repression used by military governments in the Third World and the Nazi phenomenon. Nazism represents the visible synthesis of 20th. century mass culture and technology in its most extreme and fanatical form. Nazism brought together the "cold eye" of science, the "cold eye" of technology, a charismatic delirious leader, and a people culturally conditioned to an authoritarian pedagogy (Miller, 1982), along with a considerable number of psychopathic followers (Cohen, 1988). This convergence of facts produced, at a particular moment in European history, what has been called a "gap in culture," i.e. a phenomenon so singular that it was to permeate human experience worldwide and far beyond the outcome of the war. It is important to consider the *penetrability* of the Nazi phenomenon and the *fascination* which it had on military powers worldwide (Friedlander, 1981), as well as how they used the Nazi experience.

As Adorno said: "After Auschwitz, all culture is filthy." We resist to perceive that this is so, because accepting such a statement may undermine our hopes and our moral challenge. Nonetheless, we must recognize the ethical point around which our struggle evolves: it is a struggle for what is human, against the human tendency towards reification, towards the metamorphosis of that what is human into a thing (Lichtenstein, 1963).

Among the many psychoanalytical models that have emerged from Freud's theory, each psychoanalyst seeks the ones which are more compatible and coherent with the questions with which he is concerned, and which offer the

most appropriate words to express the affective constellations in the patients experience and in his owns.

To study the phenomena associated with social violence psychoanalysis needs points of view dealing not only with what is intrasubjective but that also encompass the intersubjective and transubjective issues (Puget, 1989): such models which make possible to understand the dynamics between the subjects internal world and the social context, as well as the representation of what is social within the individual psyche. According to J. Puget (1989):

> Social insertion includes the individual in a history that comes before him and continues after him; social insertion has an unconscious quality and transforms the subject into the transmitter and actor of a social organization in which he is an active subject and a passive object, and in which he will be the bearer of a code that refers to his belonging to the social structure.

This author uses the concept of "social reality" to refer to all individuals existing in a certain context. The family is but one manifestation on the social reality, and differs from social insertion. "The family structure is marked by the Oedipal complex; its organizing principle is castration. By contrast, social insertion has its own laws, its organizing principle is to be found in the rules and the institution." ... "What is prohibited in the family is incest and parricide, while in social insertion what is prohibited is anomie and the murder of any other else." If institutions are unavoidable human phenomena associated with social insertion, then the institutions that govern through torture, fraud, and imposture pervert the basic institutional rules. When the social and the institutional are perverted, we may think that the family takes even a still greater role in supporting individual psychological development. But in the mass-media culture of our time, and the mass-scale manipulation by terror, the social context pervades the family and considerable resistance and a special consciousness are needed to diminish its impact.

As I have said before (Amati, 1986), in conditions of social violence every person increasingly accepts that which he disapproves. This is similar to what happens to the prisoner subjected to extreme conditions who, as Bettelheim (1943) says, behaves in a manner which he himself does not approve.

One possible psychoanalytical hypothesis for understanding these problems is to consider that in some part of our inner world we are directed by an omnipotent and imperious need for security and protection from archaic catastrophic anxieties. We seek security in our immediate external reality, where we necessarily deposit the most undifferentiated, less discriminated and less known parts of ourselves. But it is in this tacit and unconscious dependency on our environment, that despite ourselves, we are vulnerable and susceptible to be possessed and manipulated.

Thinking about the constant threat of nuclear war with which we live (Amati, 1985), I asked myself: "How is it possible that we accept the unacceptable, that we adapt to whatsoever? What psychological mechanism makes possible for us to take extremely grave matters as if they were taken for

granted?...." I will refer here below to the paper *"Megadeath, a Measurement or a Metaphor"* (Amati 1985). The only human being who is absolutely obliged to adapt to whatsoever is the newborn. At that moment, the human being has no choice at all. He is totally dependent on the outside world and in his sense of being he is in unity with his environment. Only a "good enough" environment can offer to the newborn the basic security and the "good symbiosis" in which to lay the basic trust that he needs to continue his development. Here after through a complex interplay of identifications with his privileged objects, he will develop a personality different from others, and will acquire the sense of his own identity. At the best of his evolution it will be possible for him to *choose* his scale of values and his *partners*; he will also be capable of intrasubjective conflict and ambivalence.

Thus we see that the human being follows a course that goes from having no choice to becoming able to choose. Nonetheless, there will always remain in his unconscious a residue of that moment of primary indifferentiation "in which there was no difference between the ego and the outside world, or between the ego and others" (Freud, 1919). At this psychological level, he will always be obliged to find his security in the outside world. In this archaic level of indifferentiation we can situate a "primal fantasy" of the human being, an omnipotent fantasy of survival and hope "at any price." which is in balance with the existential uncertainty and insecurity of the human mind (catastrophic anxiety). This unconscious fantasy implies the unavoidable existence on the external world of a basic complementary object that may provide containment and holding. At this so very archaic point of the individuals psychic life the context or frames provided by the mother, the family, and the entire society are in conjunction in the individual mind. Here it is where the family and cultural belongings and the tacit social insertion of the individual person begins, and it is at this psychological point that the social manipulations of terror and violence has its impact.

2   Defense mechanisms and ambiguity

I use the theoretical model proposed by Argentinian psychoanalyst José Bleger (1962) to understand the different psychodynamic manifestations of primary indifferentiation because it usefully clarifies some links between the internal world and the social context. Bleger calls "agglutinated nucleus" or "ambiguous nucleus" that which in the mature personality remains of primary indifferentiation. He postulates that the more differentiated ego is obliged to project and deposit outside itself this archaic nucleus, fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty. This "deposing projection" is done towards the outside world into any situation of the immediate environment that will provide security: be it privileged partners or the usual course of everyday life, or ones own belongings and institutions (family, profession, religion, ideology). We see

that these are situations of the external world that are taken for granted by the more developed ego and provide security, belonging, and identity. Bleger calls "symbiotic link" this móvement of projection and deposititation of the ambiguous nucleus toward an external depositary.

The symbiotic link has not the same conceptual dynamics as the projective identification because what is projected here is "an undifferentiated nucleus," (not an internal object) which is a set of affects not yet discriminated and splitted into contradictory of opposing pairs (love-hate; pleasure-unpleasure; etc.), i.e. affects that are neither organized nor classified. So in the "ambiguous nucleus" incompatible sentiments are not naturally excluded, therefore there is a tacit coexistence of opposites without conflict. So ambiguity must be differentiated from ambivalence. All creative discriminating possibilities are potentially within the ambiguous nucleus, but also the most tenacious inertia. (The ambiguous position of J. Bleger is to be placed before the classical schizo-paranoid and depressive positions of M. Klein).

The most important point in the dynamics of the symbiotic link is that it is two-way: it always has a double direction. If each of us unconsciously deposits outside oneself this nucleus of archaic fantasies and anxieties, and would like to immobilize it forever outside oneself, at the same time each of us is also the depositary or unconscious bearer of the ambiguity and archaic fantasies of others. These links make everyone unconsciously sensitive to the movements of existential anxiety in oneself and the others in our immediate environment and also in all social situations of change. In this subtle and tenacious exchange of anxiety we can imagine the region of primary indifferentiation as a continuum beyond the individual mind. It is a transsubjective unconscious psychological region common to us all where each one can find his own mimetic tendency, which allows us to be part of a mass, and massifiable, adaptable, manipulable, and alienable. All this we are without wanting to know about it, because our more integrated personality does not accept as its own the basic opportunism and conformism that underlie this psychological region. Thus we disguise it with all sort of conscious rationalizations, and we fear it as a dangerous double, a social double that bears our less controlled reactions.

Being manipulated means precisely that we are thrown back into our basic insecurity or that we are offered an uncanny security (like nuclear bombs), which pose to us a dilemma, a false choice that we cannot process, discriminate, or define by ourselves. Unsustainable paradoxes throw us back into ambiguity, which is a regressive condition in which we accept without conflict the world as it is.

However, to *be adapted* is a normal and constant situation. The mechanisms of adaptation (different from defense mechanisms) serve the purpose of confronting the influences of the social environment (Parin, 1971). These adaptation mechanisms are set in motion unconsciously and automatically and always in the same way, in a specific style in each culture. The mechanisms of adaptation can be considered as the form or style that the symbiotic links

may take in relation to any specific cultural milieu.

Dr. Parin refers to a mechanism of adaptation called "clan consciousness" (or consciousness of belonging), about which he says:

> ... clan consciousness does not truly result from projective identification.... Rather, clan consciousness receives its social significance from the opposite movement: if the values and demands of society change (a process that may be induced by social powers and the communications media), the ego must adapt to the new ideologies and subordinate itself to them so as to preserve its ability to function. This mechanism (*clan consciousness*) functions at the price of the individuals tendency to be manipulated.

To adapt ourselves to the technological mass culture of our days (so confusing and invasive through the mass media), a considerable part of us remains or tends to become ambiguous. The order to maintain ones own sense of belonging to a social group, each person unconsciously lends himself to social manipulation. Manipulation may be obtained by the destabilization of the ambiguous nucleus that is deposited in depositaries common to us all, such as the State, economy, work, everyday customs, etc. To avoid the insecurity and catastrophic anxiety that the abrupt movements of the ambiguous nucleus may produce we easily become familiar with institutional changes.

When very abrupt and unexpected changes occur in the outside world, ambiguity invades the ego (a sort of return of what was split off and deposited outside) and various symptoms may appear. The common denominator of these symptoms is the numbing of thought and a momentary or permanent loss of the individuals most elaborated faculties.

Studying the consequences of the atom bomb on survivors of Hiroshima, Lifton (1980) speaks of "*numbing,*" which was accompanied by loss of the sense of reality. In this particular case, the total destruction of the environment and of all human means of support for ones identity lead the victims to a state of affective anesthesia. The victims of Hiroshima could find neither explanation nor meaning to what had happened to them. For Lifton, numbing is the result of the "desymbolizing effect of the traumatic event."

So we can suppose that a permanent state of traumatic threat can bring a stop to the process of thinking, or a "mimetism of thought" that may remain concrete and splitted from affects, totally linked to external reality. This happened in the Nazi concentration camps another coldly planned extreme manmade situation. Here no "working through" of grief became impossible for the victims. The awareness that such an atrocity was the idea and action of human beings who had a deliberate plan of destruction caused the surviving victims their greatest trauma and led them to a profound, sometimes irreversible disillusion and destruction of basic trust and hope. In extreme breakdown, the "invasion of the ego by ambiguity" plays a major defensive function that makes possible the preservation of life at any price. The victims adapted to the concrete reality without denying it but retracted as much as they could the functioning of their ego. This was in fact, the aim of the totalitarian system,

which ordered each person not to have a psychic existence and to become dependent and totally adapted to the extreme situation that they offered to them.

> Theoretically, the dynamic of the ambiguous nucleus and its projection and depositing in the external world enable us to elaborate the relation between psychic vulnerability, dependency, traumatizability, and adaptability. It also enables us to situate in our inner world the place in which we are in the most direct, continuous, and obliged contact with the outside world, with no defense mediating. Regression to the ambiguous position may at the same time play the role of a defense against anxiety, and of a mechanism of adaptation that makes the outside world appear familiar and benevolent even when it is not (Amati, 1985).

3   Trauma and the therapeutic process

The aim of torture and other extreme forms of social violence is precisely the mobilization, in a massive and insidious way, of the most mimetic, opportunistic, and conformist aspects of human beings, those which make us "adaptable to whatsoever," that is, adaptable even to the most extreme situations.

The goal of torture is to induce the victim to regress to an ambiguous position (Bleger, 1972), to an archaic state of absolute dependency (Winnicott, 1974), to a state of passive and of permanent loss of the mature capacity to discriminate and choose. Torture constitutes a specific attack on all that is active and creative in the ego, on symbolic thought, on ethical conflict and identity.[1]

If mass society tends to transform human beings into ambiguous person-alities without ethical conflict, the torture system as a means of government, has the aim of making us adaptable, conformist, and profoundly opportunistic. In psychotherapy we accept the challenge of this social situation, and we fight for our patients identity and for our owns.

The therapeutical process with patients who have been victims of institu-tionalized violence brings the therapist to feel a particular personal experience that requires (of him or her) an intense affective elaboration. I believe that some counter-transference feelings as discouragement (by which I intend a loss of the sense of the meaning of our therapeutical convictions), as well as feelings of shame, may be considered as pathognomonic countertransference signs of the sort of internal experience that the patient has gone through (Amati, 1986, 1989).

For the patient, the therapeutic process will necessarily be painful, since it

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1   Cf. Amati (1986) *Malestar y psicoterapia.*

precisely involves exploring and understanding regions of himself which, under normal circumstances, he would have never acknowledged, and which existence was not even suspected by himself.

The therapist needs all his elaborative concern and alarm, and tries to operate at his most nature and adult levels, in full possession of his ability to make value judgments. The problem is to cope with the truth and to give the patient the example of coping with it (Buber, 1957). During these psychotherapies, a particular aspect of the therapeutic setting, i.e. the therapist himself, becomes fully apparent. While the settings parameters of space and time (or the theoretical frame), may eventually need to be changed, the maximum of continuity and coherence is demanded of the therapist as a moral person. Elaborative concern and ethical alarm imply giving oneself, as a therapist, the opportunity to conceive ethical points of view that enable us to provide coherent and structuring responses to face the profound dislocation of values that the patient has experienced.

In each session, and in an ongoing manner, the therapist must elaborate and recover clear ethical orientations as there are not obvious interpretations or trivial answer here. Nothing of what the patient has experienced in a situation of social violence can be considered a priori as obvious, justifiable, or acceptable.

The experience of trauma situation (with its corollary of defensive transformations) has occupied a precise moment in the time and space of the patients personal life. Discriminating places and persons, and maintaining them rigorously discriminated, will be a first step to emerge from confusion. To differentiate the spaces and times of the traumatic experience from the rest of ones life may take a long time. It is for the victim a process of separation from the corrupting experience and from his relation to the torture system, maintaining at the same time the ability to recognize himself as the same person before, during, and after the traumatic experience. Familiarity with the torturing system is sticky and uncanny, and at the beginning of therapy it surpasses the patients ability to be fully aware of it. It is a sort of "impregnation" or primary identification with the torturing context that manifests itself through gestures, and attitudes.

At the beginning of her psychotherapy, a patient went on experiencing her daily life as of she was in the concentration camp, although she was been already for some time in other conditions. She said: " I am still in the camp," and she had the feeling that the camp was "within" her. She expressed this by gestures as if she had something in her head and in her stomach that she wanted to vomit and remove from within.

We can say that the "torturing system" is like a "foreign body" that occupies the internal world of the victim. As stated by Fairbarn (1952), "the task of differentiating the object is resolved in the problem of expelling an incorporated object, i.e. into a problem of expelling contents." The psychotherapist will be the "bearer" or depositary of a very heavy and ambiguous

package, whose contents, made up of guilt and shame, of rage, uncertainties, and impotence, can not be resolved by merely telling episodes and anecdotes. As in all psychic processes, each image recalled or dreamed represent complex emotional situations; but the "package" also contains the desire to "survive as a person," to recover, to "save oneself" and to repair damaged objects.

I think that at the beginning of psychotherapy the therapist is more a depositary or an alternative object of identification than an object of transference; in this sense the therapists availability is essential. In some occasions prolonged or unexpected sessions are required for the patient to feel that he (or she) is respected and accepted, and capable of exercising a certain degree of control over the therapeutic situation. We can understand this in the sense of Winnicotts permissiveness, which gives the patient the opportunity to rediscover an active continuity within himself by "using" the therapist, by "creating" a new relationship. At this point in the therapeutic process it would be a mistake to interpret this phenomenon as a perverse and immobilizing control exercised over the therapist; there will be time to make such interpretations if it is necessary, when the patient has already recovered his more nature functioning and the sense of his internal continuity. This permissiveness in relation to the therapeutic setting makes it possible to establish a potential tacit "mutuality," a reciprocity that allows the therapist not to accept an excessive dependence on the part of the patient, so as to avoid as much as possible symptomatic regressions that may damage the patients situation in his life out of the therapeutic context. Technical rigor here is not necessarily a question of the setting parameters, but of the intense elaborative work to which patient and therapist constrain themselves in order to give verbal expression to unthinkable situations.

What is at stake at the outset of the therapeutic relationship has to do with the safety feeling (Sandler, 1960), i.e. a basic sense of security. This implies, for those who have endured extreme experiences, the need to not perceive any abusive intent in the mutual relationship with the therapist. It is a question of establishing a "good symbiosis" to counter the immobilizing, addictive, and alienating symbiosis produced by the torturing system through the action of its agents. That is why it is important to understand what the relationship with the torturing system involves, and to determine its similarities and differences with respect to the relationship established with the therapist. This determines an obliged realm of reflection for any professional group working on torture problems, since in order to avoid banalities and generalizations that give rise to confusion (such as, "we are all torturers") we must clarify why we are not torturers, and what does it mean not to be one.

The torturer is someone who acts deliberately upon another person, someone who in an asymmetric power relationship abuses and deprives the other of his will, his ability to make decisions, and his own definition of himself. Our therapeutic objective is certainly not to "steal" the other persons identity, but to help our patient find it and search for it, to define it, to recover his capacity

to have relationships, and his creativity and ability to develop himself.

As I indicated above, the torturer continues to occupy a place in the patients inner world. Like an usurper, he has taken the place of the basic objects, he has placed himself as a saving mother, a protective father, a giver of life or death, absolution or direction. These "roles" of functions are transference phenomena which the torturer has assumed. The objects and "belongings" of the victim have been displaced, sabotaged, and falsified in the inner world, and are beyond his reach. The same happens in the external reality, in which friends and relatives have often been brought through blackmail to the situation of being direct accomplices of the torturing system. At the beginning of psychotherapy the patient is intensely confused among these different levels of his own experience and functioning.

Therapist and patient not only seek to heal the patient; they also need to understand the phenomena of social violence, a need that arises from the common belief that no one can passively accept such sort of evils.

Nevertheless, there is an ethical danger of accepting unaware the premises of the torturing system if we do not carefully differentiate ourselves from their ways of thinking. Any tacit collusion may have iatrogenic effects, which may lead the patient to remain in the role of victim.

As I stated in the work cited above (Amati, 1986), the question arises as to how and where in our inner world we resist this extreme manipulation of the unconscious. To save or to heal oneself: what does this mean ? Sonia Salmeron speaks of a "compulsion to save." In fact the victim passes through critical moments of self-saving omnipotence, moments of lucidity in which he grasps an inner danger, a depersonalization or an identity catastrophe; moments of insight into ones own alienation which (whether during or after the traumatic situation), may gave rise to self-saving actions (escaping, testifying, seeking help).

Through the experience of several psychotherapeutic processes. I have observed how the patient vacillates between the impulse to save himself and a lack of impulse, to discouragement, to psychic death. A fundamental loss of meaning ensues, raising a fundamental question: "What for?" In his effort to maintain his therapeutic conviction and his trust in the structuring process, the therapist may also loose the meaning and sense of his work. As I said before this loss of meaning, together with discouragement, is an important sign, perhaps the sign of a designification, a pathognomonic desymbolization that traps the therapist; the sign of a tendency to accept with resignation (even inside the therapeutic setting and even far from actual political repression) the conformism and apathy that extreme social violence tends to impose on the social group.

The discouragement and loss of meaning subtly manifested in countertransference, may reveal the nature of the phenomenon conveyed by social violence, for both the individual and the group. The description of the psychological region of vulnerability to which the victim is brought may be found in many

psychoanalytical thinkers. But Blegers model throws light on "ambiguity," which this author precisely describes as confusion, disorientation, and absence of internal conflict.

If a premise of our therapeutic work, is to accept human vulnerability (which leads us to seek "security at any price") another fundamental premise is to allow and respect the patients tendency to flee from chaos, stagnation, and alienation. Trusting this tendency is also a fundamental premise: the tendency of the human being to interpret reality and to seek meanings (Decobert), to save oneself (Salmerón), to create and use objects (Winnicott), to seek the truth (Bion), to adopt different positions (Klein), to look for causality (Aulagnier), and to evolve to separation and individuation (Mahler).

4   Shame as a sign of recovery

The feeling of shame that is to be found in both patient and therapist is an invaluable indicator of the persons internal resistance to the corruption imposed on ones mind.

I observed my inhibition to expose, to tell, and to exemplify the histories of these patients, as if "these themes" had contaminating aspects that should remain, more than ever, in the privacy and secrecy of the therapeutic session. Speaking of such degrading human events breaks the elementary rules of culture; it is disturbing to others, it is telling others what they do not want to hear, imposing on them the knowledge that each one is a participant in this uncanny century whose guilt and shame are difficult to withstand.

Shame felt by the therapist can be interpreted as a counter-transference phenomenon which is an indication of the intense feeling of dissociation and conflict that the patient experiences between the traumatic experience that "occupies" his inner self and his actual reality, between what he has been able to perceive about himself at the moment of the traumatic experience, and the idea he had of himself before it.

Shame has been studied (and often confused) with guilt. For W. Kinston (1983), shame is an emotional response that appears when the child becomes aware of separation and individuation (i.e., when emerging from the symbiotic relationship). It is a basic emotion or displeasure that acquires all its meaning when the ego is capable of dealing with discrimination and internal conflict. I think that shame signals the emergence of an internal conflict when the risk of becoming ambiguous or equivocal in relation to ones own values and ones own ego ideal is perceived. Thus, shame defends the individuals coherence continuity and sense of identity.

In patients who have been subjected to institutionalized violence the feeling of shame appears when the person becomes aware of unknown aspects of ones own passivity, of having accepted something not desired, i.e. of having " adap ted to whatsoever." Feelings of shame appear when the survivor is emerging

from the symbiosis with the concentration camp that occupies him, when he recovers the sense of being able to choose his own behavior, and when he perceives his own alienation and the possibility of overcoming it.

In prolonged therapeutic process I perceived the existence of "levels of shame," suggesting that there are intolerable levels of shame that shield other intolerable levels of shame. By gradually elaborating and situation each experience in its particular context, other levels of the experience are discovered. These "levels of shame" are particular to each patient and depend on the structure of the patients personality and his own hierarchy of values.

The feelings of shame that appear first in the therapeutic situation are those associated with "losing face," i.e. the image of oneself that is most conventional in the natural social milieu. Then appear feelings of shame which the person feels vis-à-vis his own responses in situations that he could not possibly anticipate in extreme circumstances where ones own actions and forms of behavior astonish the person and break his sense of inner continuity.

But the most intolerable shame is the fact of having got adapted to inhuman situations: to have been conditioned to the forms of behavior and cynicism of the extreme situation imposed to oneself. Through therapy the person tries to recover his fundamental points of reference (objects of identification and rules of conviviality), and becomes able to avoid the position of victim that has been assigned to him by the torturing system.

Through suffering, shame, guilt, and discouragement, the patient will integrate the trauma in his life. Nevertheless the psychic trauma will probably "repeat itself" as memories to be elaborated upon or as a return of depressive and persecutory anxieties. But even when the trauma may never be fully worked through, the strengthening of the personality and of the persons ability to discriminate will make possible to recover ones own "identificatory project" (P. Aulagnier) and the sense of historicity, coherence and continuity of ones own identity.

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2

Human Rights and Psychosocial Health in South America

Horacio Riquelme U.

1 Introduction

Over the past ten years the concept of organized violence has entered into the lexicon of international organizations such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations (Van Geuns, 1987).

This concept designates the way some regimes, after having assumed power through military intervention, deal with their own populations, with the objective of maintaining unjust social structures. Such regimes, in addition to suspending political and social rights, systematically intimidate the population; this can include annihilating entire social groups.[1]

Most of the South American countries have suffered state terrorism in one way or another over the past 20 years. It has persisted in unabashed form in some countries, such as Chile (Olivares, 1985).

The ideological framework for these repressive governments is the doctrine of "internal state security" which gives the state a legal context for imposing state-of-siege conditions, enabling its agents and the armed forces to carry out actions in the name of combating chaos, rebellion, and popular protest, with the objective of maintaining order and the status quo. This has been the organizational basis on which the Latin American armies have carried out terrorist actions against their own people for many years.

P. Watson has correctly defined the role and significance of "psychological warfare" in one Latin American country as follows: "It appears that the Brazilian army ... is capable of directing psychological warfare against its own people in exactly the same way as against foreigners."[2]

This psychological war waged by the armed forces against their own

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[1] In Latin America, this is known as "terrorismo de Estado," or "state terror-ism." See Duhalde, 1983; several authors, 1984.

[2] Watson, 1978. He specifically analyzes a document from Brazil's Ministry of

populations has become an essential feature of military activity in Latin America. It is psychological warfare insofar as its express objectives include intimidation and subjection of a large part of the population through the use of psychological operations designed specifically to impose the passive acceptance of authoritarian structures of domination and to create in their alleged opponents the sense of a constant threat to their very existence and of personal impotence *vis-à-vis* the military apparatus.

This psychological war is carried out in three mutually complementary areas, which can be considered the three main forms of organized violence: a) the disappearance of regime opponents; b) systematic torture; and c) intervention in the mass communications media. This organized violence can be considered a premeditated and permanent attack on the psychosocial health of most of the population. This essay will describe its major manifestations and illustrate its consequences for the population, a population which, in principle, is defenseless.

It is important to consider the forms of self-defense and resistance that the population develops, i.e., the types of psychosocial protection and sociocultural self-affirmation that arise in the psychotherapeutic praxis of these countries when confronted with such a magnitude of "everyday" atrocities. These new forms of psychosocial praxis may well be the key for overcoming this painful and destructive experience.

Our attitude when faced with the praxis of psychological warfare is not moral indignation, which to date has failed to prevent criminal actions; rather, we seek to fully understand what has been called state terrorism. Knowledge of the methods and consequences of the psychological war —including forms of self-defense— may enhance our understanding of those affected in Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and other countries. Such knowledge can also be used to help prevent the first outbreaks of organized violence against the population in other countries.

2   The "disappearance" of regime opponents

This method involves the detention of alleged political opponents of the regime by the army or, more often, by paramilitary groups working under the direction of members of the army. Once detained, the victims are kept in places which are not known to be jails and/or transferred from place to place to keep them from being found.

This tactic is used to instill a high level of uncertainty as to the effectiveness

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Defense, which in 1956 had already laid down the fundamental strategic lines of the psychological war in Brazil.

of the judicial system and personal impotence on the part of the prisoners' family and friends. Since it is not known where the "disappeared" person is being held, the relatives cannot make use of regular legal remedies, such as habeas corpus, nor can they mount a defense of the person held through the appropriate legal channels. The wall of silence one runs up against in police stations and prisons when inquiring as to the whereabouts of the person sought reinforces friends' and relatives' sense of insecurity and abandon, while the detention and disappearance of their loved one marginalizes them from the "established order."

During the last 15 years formal testimony and evidence have been produced of 30,000 cases of "disappeared" persons in South America (Escudero, 1983). This method of removing regime opponents is not, however, the "brilliant invention" of some member of the repressive apparatus in Latin America. Rather, it constitutes the large-scale application of a method already commonplace in psychological warfare and which probably grew out of the experiences that U.S. military theorists had in the Indochina war (Watson, 1978, note 367). The historical antecedent of this practice is the transport of prisoners "under cover of darkness" from territories occupied by Nazi Germany in order to break the nationalist resistance of the respective countries, pursuant to the Keitel decree of 1942 (Shirer, 1960).

Social psychologists and cultural anthropologists from the United States who scientifically monitored the Indochina war made important observations and reached basic conclusions on the morale behind the Vietnamese defense: what most affected Vietnamese involved in the war was not the death of neighbors or relatives due to the U.S. aggression, but their inability to celebrate the traditional ceremonies of mourning and bidding farewell to the deceased through ritual. The absence of ceremonies for grieving broke the delicate cultural bond through which the living relate to the dead; the family and community felt very insecure, as if they had collectively violated a taboo. This tactic was known as "wandering souls;" it proved very useful in the psychological war against Vietnam.

The disappearance of alleged regime opponents was not used systematically until the mid-1970s, when it probably became clear that the population would not passively accept the reactionary schemes of social organization, but rather could be expected to cultivate a passive and active long-term resistance.

A "disappearance" provokes a highly contradictory emotional state in friends and relatives. Since they know that the repressive forces systematically torture prisoners, relatives develop impotent compassion ("I hope that he/she dies soon and doesn't have to suffer too much") mixed with "irrational" hope ("I hope that he/she is alive and will be back with us soon") (Ulloa, 1986; Guinsberg, 1987: 180-191). The relatives describe this situation as a "permanent shock, a situation of latent and continuing crisis, in which the grief and pain caused by the absence of the loved one are experienced as eternal."

There is no situation of mourning perceived as such; the experience is rather

one of absence with no resolution. Absence and loss of a loved one are not synonyms insofar as "the process of grieving or suffering is essential for assimilating the loss.... Through mourning one learns to accept the change that always follows the death of a loved one. When this process of grieving is not realized (when it remains incomplete), a healthy adaptation to the loss suffered is unlikely" (Kavanaugh, 1982: 177). The relatives' feeling of absence becomes chronic and profoundly impacts on their social behavior. As they reconstruct what happened (Amnesty International, 1982) the relatives of the disappeared experience this "atrocious absurdity" in three stages (Bonaparte, 1984):

1. Their immediate reaction is generally feeling disconcerted and being afflicted by existential anxiety: Will I ask the right questions without compromising others? Will I act without reflecting and thus place the disappeared person and his relatives in greater danger? This often leads to an attitude of inactive perplexity, as when lightning strikes.

2. After some time a stage marked by a desperate search ensues, in which the relatives do everything possible and imaginable to find the disappeared person. "Absolute uncertainty as to the prisoner's whereabouts produces profound anxiety, while the hope of seeing the loved one again gives relatives a sense of absolute urgency to their search" (AI, 1982: 118).

3. In the third stage, the relatives' collective actions are shaped. All of the relatives are convinced that individual approaches are fruitless, so joint action is proposed to find a way out of this tragic labyrinth.

The collective activity of relatives in response to the disappearance of regime opponents, such as that of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo of Argentina, has brought out the true scope of these crimes against humanity, both in number and personal significance. Furthermore, only through such action was it possible to design and enhance psychotherapeutic treatments for overcoming these traumatic experiences: "Chilean and Argentinian therapists consider that one important way [to do so] is for the relatives of the *disappeared* to join solidarity groups."[3]

To appreciate the impact of the "disappearances" on the population's

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3   From a psychoanalytical perspective, Ulloa defines the situation of the relatives of the disappeared as tragic: while they bear it privately, they are caught in a dead end, where feelings of grief and hatred for the disappeared person mix with feelings of impotence and negative identification toward the authorities (who are in a position to put an end to the suffering of the disappeared person). "The tragedy is paralyzing.... It is possible to escape this circle with the help of third persons.... The drama provoked by the intervention of third parties re-establishes once again the dynamic components of suffering.... That is the role that human rights organizations play, fostering solidarity, sharing reflections; furthermore, the feelings of the participants are clarified and their actions defined" (Ulloa, 1986: 121).

psychosocial health, it is important to consider that many relatives of the disappeared are children, all the more defenseless in the face of this "tactic of psychological warfare" [4] and for whom society must assume responsibility.

3   The psychosocial dimension of systematic torture

The torture of regime opponents has become a necessary part of the social praxis of military regimes in South America. The prospective study of experiences of torture related by the victims reveals the incorporation of technical improvements, so that we must speak of systematized torture, i.e. torture with a scientific basis (Watson, 1978), whose effects on the individual and the persons close to him are monitored on the basis of shared canons of psychological warfare. Refined knowledge of the practice of torture is exchanged across borders, thus strengthening the repressive apparatuses of "friendly countries."

Some research on the ever more refined methods of torture used against opponents is well-known (AI, 1985; Larsen, 1983). The thesis that torturers are persons with latent yet very significant psychological anomalies, who due to their pathological predispositions would enjoy tormenting their victims, has been shown to be erroneous. The praxis of torture is one more technical device in the arsenal of psychological warfare; generally speaking, as noted in the Nuremberg trial (Bettelheim, 1943: 417-452) and during the war in Algeria (Fanon, 1963, ch.V), it may be exercised by any member of society with a "normal and common" ethical framework in the form of unconditional submission to an authority who frees him from responsibility for his personal acts and presents his activity as a torturer as socially necessary.

In the framework of psychological warfare, the systematic torture of

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4   On this point, the book T*errorismo de Estado: efectos psicológicos en los niños* (State Terrorism: Psychological Effects on Children) states its central thesis as follows: "It is legitimate to think that if these children, in whose symptomatic behavior the disquieting memory of the horrifying past of which they were victims persists, find no social system as they grow up that has brought out the truth and brought to justice the perpetrators and systems that committed the crimes, it will be all the more difficult for them to break loose from their symptomatic memory and be capable of real elaboration. It is as though the threat of crystallization of the symptomatic violence condemned them to the effective exhumation of the tragedy suffered by their elders. This will occur not only in their generation, but also in the generations that follow, as the European experience has taught." This book resulted from a collaborative effort involving relatives of persons who, for political reasons, were detained and disappeared and the Movimiento Solidario de Salud Mental; it was published by Paidós, Buenos Aires, 1987. See also: Allodi, 1977; Maci et al., 1983; and Martínez et al., in this book.

political opponents has the following objectives:

1. To obtain information from persons accused of belonging to a resistance party or group. Here many and varied psychological and physical punitive techniques are used to soften and break the resistance of the person affected. The main aim is to get a confession that compromises the individual in question and his alleged companions.

2. To confront individuals or social groups with a specific embodiment of state authority, which presents itself as omnipotent. Here the repressive apparatus should induce the people in question to feel unprotected and to passively adapt to the system. Specifically, they are made to witness the torture and mistreatment of persons of prestige as a "lesson," for example, in the massive raids and sweeps carried out in Chile in recent years.

3. To sow mutual distrust in the opposition groups. As in the foregoing point, here the idea is to produce mutual distrust through arbitrary detention and mistreatment. The suspicion that each member of the group may be an informant must be propagated. This method has proven to be very costly and in general has produced limited results.

4. To provoke the psychosocial disability of supposed or known regime opponents. Here, as in point 1, it is a question of provoking a lasting lesion in the individual's psychosocial integrity.

The person affected must leave marked by the "invisible pain of torture" (Barudy and Vieytes, 1985), giving the impression that his personality has been destroyed, and thereby infusing fear in his community of origin.

Thanks to the public education work done by the psychotherapists of the persons affected, as well as the direct testimony of torture victims, the effects on psychosocial health have become known (Castillo et al., 1986). Based on a study of torture victims in Denmark in 1977, it is evident that for the victims "the worst consequences of torture are psychological and neurological. Often states of anxiety, irritability, and depression are noted" (Larsen, 1983: 101). The therapists underscore the indirect effects of torture on the victims' relatives, and on friends and acquaintances in general.

In Chile proposals have been made to further preventive work against systematic torture.[5] The extreme experiences of some people with the apparatus of repression have been discussed in grass-roots groups, thereby breaking the silence and the inability to express such experiences.[6] Thus, as Jean Amery

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5   Investigations, for example, such as *"Collective Intimidation," "Study on a Group of Political Prisoners Who Were Tortured,"* and *"An Experience of Psychotherapy with Political Prisoners in the Prisons,"* at CODEPU (1986; 1987).

6   Larsen (1983: 66) reports: "The ecclesiastic authorities published *Ten commandments for those suffering political persecution..* In this document they advise that in the case of a detention, the person being detained should shout

says, "he who suffered torture will never again feel indifferent towards this world;" i.e. the "socialization" of anxiety-inducing experiences is used to overcome the isolation that generally affects torture victims (Castillo et al., 1986), as well as to diminish the premonitory anxiety if one is detained by making the horror explicit.

4   Role of and intervention in the mass media

One of the first measures adopted in a military coup is the voluntary or required intervention of the mass communications media, for the purposes of influencing public information, exercising coercion, and imposing discipline.

This manipulation of public opinion may turn out to be somewhat unsophisticated, as in Chile immediately after the military coup, when the "male" pants of women were cut off above the knee, just as the long "feminine" hair of young men was cut at the nape. Journalists serving as vicars of the recently-established dictatorship commented on these matters in humorous terms. Nonetheless, such manipulation can also be done with greater perspicacity, as in Argentina from 1976 to 1983. There the communications media were intervened in to reinforce the impact of repression on relatives of the victims of forced disappearances through the continuous and systematic broadcasting of certain announcements and slogans (Kordon, et al., 1986). The texts that were most widely and continuously disseminated in the mass media insinuated: a) that one should be silent about the "disappeared" person, considering the dishonor the event causes relatives and friends; b) that the parents should continuously reflect on their responsibility for their older children's behavior, to induce the belief that their disappearance resulted from their poor upbringing; this was implied through questions such as: How did you raise your children? Do you know what your child is doing right now?; c) that a collective decision be made as soon as possible to forget the disappeared person, or consider him dead, suggesting that he had voluntarily abandoned family and friends, going abroad for example, and that due to this "irresponsible" attitude he should be punished with indifference and be forgotten; d) that the "disappearance" be considered as proof of the person's guilt, blaming the victim. Indirect turns of phrase were used to convey these messages, such as: "He must have done something," "Who knows what he might have been involved in," etc.; e) that political dissidence should be considered a manifes-

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out his or her name and place of work. They also give pointers to help determine the location and distance of the place to which the person detained was taken, even if his eyes were blindfolded. And detained persons are urged to overcome the fear of denouncing the torture suffered to the courts and to demand a medical examination..."

tation of a psychological disturbance, assuming that normalcy, thus mental health, involves accepting social reality as it is, i.e. accepting the mechanisms of authoritarian domination and social injustice and passively adapting to that situation. It is insinuated that the failure on the part of the persons affected to accept the status quo is clear evidence of their immaturity.

These points were developed through a sophisticated propaganda campaign, using all the modern methods of publicity, such as radio and television spots, indirect turns of phrase, billboards, etc. This systematic intervention in the communications media took on exemplary forms in Argentina. Through this campaign a climate of profound insecurity was fostered. The aim was for the relatives and friends of the disappeared, and the population in general, to become aware of a certain latent guilt and of their impotence, and to behave in a manner adapted and subordinated to military rule; in sum, to bring about the "type of *man* and *woman* needed" by state terrorism (Kordon et al., 1986).

The enduring psychosocial effects of this coercive propaganda have begun to be studied in the post-dictatorial period in Argentina. In some people one notes a sort of dual perception (between what is possible and what is prohibited), and sound formal behavior to guarantee against any misunderstandings, indicating that the messages conveyed were highly internalized, while others appear to feel a high degree of insecurity associated with the rules and standards of behavior, as if they had to restructure their perception of the social milieu around them (Candia, 1986: 29-32).

5   Comment: Forms of psychosocial resistance

During the last 20 years, human rights organizations have continuously reported on the neglect and abuse of human rights in South America.

By now it is clear that the violation of human rights is an integral part of the psychological war that local armies are waging against their own populations to impede social reform and to try to impose a military mentality on the dissident majorities. This praxis vis-à-vis the population itself can be summarized in the concept of "organized violence."

The psychosocial effects of this organized violence on individuals and small groups has been documented in the experiences of those who have participated directly or indirectly as its victims. The multiple implications of military intervention in social life cannot yet be assessed.

Nonetheless, the persistent use of the military apparatus for repression in the countries of South America has provoked more than the subjection and passive adaptation of the population. Nowhere have such military regimes been accepted unconditionally; it cannot be said that they have succeeded in ideologically consolidating their supposed followers. To the contrary, the praxis of organized violence in South America has created the basis for a form of psychosocial resistance that has not succumbed to fear, but rather engages

in a wide array of forms of public expression, in order to denounce human suffering caused by systematic repression in full detail (Lira et al., 1984).

Thus, a specific psychosocial praxis is developing that has responsibly assumed the task of providing assistance in the legal, social-therapeutic, and psychotherapeutic fields to the victims of organized violence (Pesutic, 1986).

The following position has been asserted in response to the fear and anxiety induced by organized violence:

> Fear, a subjective phenomenon that is initially private, has become a massive and perceptible psychosocial experience simultaneously affecting thousands of people in our society; indeed, it has become pervasive in daily life and social interaction in Chile today.... We want to make it perfectly clear that the therapeutic objective of treating families with fear is not to overcome the fear. Overcoming it would be equivalent to denying it, and therefore perpetuating its destructive impact on the family and society. Rather, the main objective of psychotherapy is to confront the fear so as to integrate it in a healthy and dialectical manner with all its implications and contradictions (Becker et al., 1986: 57-64).

> It is the role of psychology to examine this in greater depth both individually and collectively, assuming that fear may come to constitute a powerful motivation of social behavior in relation to social and political participation and responsibility, since it is necessary to unveil its impact and counter its effects in order to bring about a democratic and participatory society (Lira et al., 1986: 51-57).

The professional attitude adopted by psychotherapists in treating victims of organized violence is described as follows:

> If we have had to treat patients (victims of organized violence) and confront ourselves with and share in their suffering, it has not been to try to create here and now a new form of psychopathological category or a new scientific analysis that greatly enhances the sophistication of our techniques as yet another branch of medicine, psychology, or psychiatry. On the contrary, dealing with the patients' ailments should help us to better understand the methods and artifices through which this state violence establishes itself in this society; this is of strategic importance in the re-democratization processes unfolding in Latin America... Insofar as we can speak as scientists about the mechanisms of domination, we can contribute to the creation in our peoples of more solid cultures in opposition to different forms of authoritarianism and militarism... To the extent that we are able to unveil how these mechanisms of domination are exercised, we will be better positioned to carry out preventive campaigns and campaigns to raise political and social consciousness so that our people never again live under a dictatorship (Lira, 1986: 71-76).

This form of psychosocial praxis is important not only for the psychotherapists directly involved (Weinstein et al., 1987); confronting organized violence and participating in social experiences that have evolved over the last twenty years has been and continues to be a social and political task that should involve all the social forces, emphasizing prevention in our long-suffering America, so that the cry of "Never again!" may be assumed by broad sectors of society

and become a historic reality (National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons, 1984).

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3

Sexuality as a Tool of Political Repression

Inger Agger and Sören Jensen

1   Introduction

Many political prisoners suffer sexual trauma as part of torture. Although deliberate and systematic attempts at breaking down political opponents on the physical and psychological levels are known to be practiced in one-third of the world's countries (Amnesty International, 1984), little is known about the sexual traumatization inherent in torture. According to Bustos (1988), Chilean ex-prisoners have begun to break "the conspiracy of silence" surrounding sexual trauma in prisons, and this has also been the case in some Iranian exile groups, but we still know little about sequel and appropriate interventions connected with the trauma. The article is mainly based on written material from Latin America and clinical experience in a Danish exile setting with refugees from the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America. But first, we shall focus on a few general aspects of torture.

Methods of torture are normally classified as either physical or psychological. The primary aim of physical torture is to inflict upon the victim varying degrees of physical pain by use of blows, kicks, suspensions, electric torture, water torture, and/or many other forms of physical violence.

The aim of psychological torture is to break down and shatter the victim's psychological defense mechanisms by causing psychic pain. Here, the methods used are often long-term isolation, extensive and exhausting interrogation, sense —and sleep— deprivation, threats, mock executions, witnessing the torture of others, and other forms of humiliating treatments, such as nakedness and sexual torture.

The victims often describe the psychological methods as being the most difficult to defend oneself against and survive. The torturers break down and humiliate the victim through the manipulation of a complex lattice of common human feelings. In exile, the victim easily comes in a situation where the reality of his or her suffering may be met with mistrust. It is so difficult, for those of us who have not experienced it, to contain the knowledge of the torturers'

bestialities, that we —in order to protect ourselves— must deny or mistrust what we are told: Is it really true? Can it be proved? Who will supply proof, and what would it consist of? It is an integral part of the torturers' choice of methods that, if the story be told, no one is going to believe it. There is no need counting on the authorities to give confirmation. On the contrary, the prisoners are forced to sign a declaration, before they are released, in which they testify that they have been not subjected to torture (Sveaass, 1987).

It is therefore not surprising that the use of sexual torture methods is so widespread. Sexual torture is deeply traumatic, but at the same time often leaves no evident traces. As the physical and psychological methods are often interchangeable, it may seem artificial to segregate them. It is important for psychotherapy, however, that the psychological and sexological aspects of torture, because they have severe and traumatic effects, are more closely and exactly defined and understood (Agger, 1987, 1988; Agger and Jensen, 1987). We shall therefore attempt in the following to describe and define more precisely how sexuality is exploited in the aggressive context of the torture session.

2 Background on sexual torture

2.1 Theoretical framework

2.1.1 Preliminaries

On account of the taboo which surrounds this topic, we have very few studies which focus on sexual torture: "One talks a lot about the special torture of women,... a theme that no doubt would be advantageous to at one time or another study in depth. This would form a new and revealing perspective, making it possible to analyze some structural aspects of our own society."

Sexual torture has been touched upon indirectly in numerous papers. For example, in an otherwise thorough report made by an Argentinean psychologist, who himself spent nine years in prison and was submitted to "physical, psychological, and moral torture" (Samojedny, 1985: 2). He quotes the torturers as often saying: "nobody will ever escape from here alive. We will destroy you all. You will either end up mad, as whores, or committing suicide" (Samojedny, 1985: 17).

The Chilean psychologists Lira and Weinstein (1986: 1) have, however, on the basis of wide experience with treatment of torture victims, described the aim of sexual torture. They define sexual torture as "the use of any form of sexual activity with the purpose of manifesting aggression and of causing physical and psychological damage." It is stressed that the goal of sexual torture is to destroy the prisoner's identity, with the aim of neutralizing the opponent without killing the prisoner. In addition there are the more general

aims of terrorizing the population and preventing punishment of "subversive" elements.

With the help of different torture methods, the authorities seek to remove any human, reliable, or mutual relationship and thereby bring the prisoner into a state of extreme physical and psychological regression, where it is no longer possible to relate to the body, to the world outside, or to other people.

Hence, torture seeks deliberately to change the psychoformative processes and bring about those changes which are generally described in post-traumatic theory as the sequel of extreme stress: changes in the self-structure of the individual which include an experience of disintegration and a changed view of the world (Wilson, 1989). The extreme stress of sexual trauma, therefore, may fulfill the aim of torture as it brings about "a loss of self-continuity and self-sameness; a loss of a coherent and cohesive sense of self; feelings of narcissistic injury and a fragmentation of the ego and identity processes" (Wilson, 1989). The changed view of the world, which is the result of this process, may of course also affect the political identity of the prisoner.

2.1.2 Methods

According to Lira and Weinstein (1986: 2-3), the breaking-down process is primarily carried out in two ways: (1) by forcing the prisoner to take part in humiliating ("perverse") sexual relations, and (2) by inflicting physical pain to the genitals, which brings the prisoner to associate pain/panic with sexuality. The sexual methods of torture can consist of:

> Either heterosexual or homosexual rape; the rape of women by the use of specially trained dogs; the use of electric currents upon the sexual organs; mechanical stimulation of the erogenous zones; manual stimulation of the erogenous zones; the insertion of penis-shaped objects into the body openings (these can be made of metal or other materials to which an electrical current is later connected, are often grotesquely large and cause subsequent physical damage, and are used on both male and female victims); the forced witnessing of "unnatural" sexual relations; forced masturbation or to be masturbated by others; fellatio and oral coitus; and finally, the general atmosphere of sexual aggression which arises from being molested, from the nakedness, and from the lewd and lecherous remarks and threats of the loss of ability of reproduction and enjoyment in the future.

Thus, some sexual torture methods are directed at women, others are directed at men, and some are directed at both genders. Heterosexual rape is predominant in the torture of women, while homosexual rape is the dominating element in the sexual torture of men. Future sexual functioning is threatened in both genders.

2.1.3 A psychodynamic definition

On the basis of these and other sources (Amati, 1983; de Beauvoir and Halimi, 1962; Bundgaard, 1979; Espinola et al., 1985; IX Latin American

Congress of Psychiatry, 1977; van Willigen, 1984; Barudy et al. 1980) and my own clinical experience, we propose the following psychodynamic definition: In sexual torture, the interchange between victim and torturer is characterized by an ambiguity consisting of both aggressive and libidinal elements. The victim's as well as the torturer's sexual structure is involved in the psychodynamics of this interaction, and the victim experiences the torture as directed against his or her sexual body-image and identity with the aim of destroying it. Thus, the essential parts of sexual torture's traumatic and identity-damaging effect is the feeling of being an accomplice in an ambiguous situation which contains both aggressive and libidinal elements in a confusing mixture. "The individual experiences himself (or herself) as a partaker in a homosexual (or heterosexual) relation and is overwhelmed by a feeling of being a party to the act, with an intensity which is much greater than the feelings experienced in connection with other forms of torture" (Lira and Weinstein, 1986: 6).

A great degree of moral conflict and complexity is involved, therefore, in the trauma of sexual torture. Pathological outcome of trauma is, as noted by Wilson (1989), in general, directly proportional to the magnitude of moral conflict and complexity.

Examining more specifically the psychodynamics of the sexual torture of male victims, it is our conclusion that their sexual structure is involved mainly (1) by provoking the active sexuality, thereby activating castration anxiety; and (2) by provoking the passive, receptive sexuality, thereby activating homosexual anxiety and identity feeling. We shall return to this later.

In the sexual torture of women, the social and cultural aspects of the violence is more evident. The following two case histories from Latin America illustrate the interplay between aggression and sexuality. Cultural values (to be a beautiful woman) are used as a vehicle.

2.2   Empirical Approaches

2.2.1   On the Empirical Definition

In the following, we briefly introduce some empirical approaches on sexual torture and a case study from El Salvador that illustrates the use of sexuality against male political prisoners.

The recorded frequency of sexual torture is influenced by the context in which the data were collected. The sparse literature on the subject is primarily based on data collected by professionals in exile countries, and the recording of sexual torture has not been based on a proper definition, but rather on classifications according to certain forms of torture. Therefore, reservations must be made with respect to the recorded frequencies.

Daugaard et al. (1983) seem to conceive of sexual torture as a torture form directed at the genitals (blows at/wringing of the testicles, and electric torture of the testicles). In their study, 43% (12/28) of the Greek male prisoners they

investigated had been subjected to genital trauma. In an investigation by Ortmann and Lunde (1988) of 148 torture victims, 69% reported having suffered sexual torture (there are no separate data on women and men). This result is based on a descriptive concept of sexual torture based on classification into five torture forms, but without any attempt at explanatory or psychodynamic definition. In a study of torture sequel among Latin American refugees by Thorvaldsen (1986), sexual torture is placed in the category "psychological encroachments." This includes "sexual assault with or without physical contact" (p.21). In this material, of 36 men and eight women, 0% of the men and 88% of the women state that they have been subjected to sexual torture, to which Thorvaldsen observes (p.32) that "when no sexual abuse has been registered among men, it is not to be taken as evidence that no such abuse has happened. This might be an area in which a more comprehensive interview would reveal other results."

2.2.2 Two Reports

Case One

We were all three of us blindfolded and handcuffed, and during the journey we were constantly molested... The same person later returned with somebody who professed that he was a doctor, and that he would examine us, and again I was molested all over my body without in any way being medically examined... I fell asleep, I don't know how long after, when suddenly the cell door opens, and I am raped by one of the guards.

The following Sunday the same person is on guard, and he apologizes for the fact that he can't be together with me again, as he prefers blondes —I have black hair— and that he did not know that I was not a member of a guerrilla organization. The day he raped me, he told me that if I did not keep my mouth shut, he would send me to "the Machine" [the torture chamber], whereupon he kicked me in the head while he threatened me.

The following morning, when tea was served, the same person enters and offers me sugar as "thanks for services rendered." The same morning another man enters my cell and orders me in a loud voice to take off my clothes, whereupon he pushes me up against a wall and rapes me.

Sunday evening the man who just raped me is on duty, and he forces me to play cards with him.

Later on the same night he enters again and rapes me for the second time (Argentinean woman: *Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas*, 1985: 155).

Case Two

When they told me that I was to take off my clothes, I tried to do it as if it didn't really matter. This infuriated them and they shouted that I should hurry up as they did not feel any inclination for one such as I, who was so ugly. I then understood that they would not rape me as they kept on insulting me and telling me how ugly I appeared to them. This confirmed my impression that they would not rape me or harm me in any sexual manner, and this proved to be true. The only thing they did do was to put electric

current through my genitals.
(Chilean woman. CODEPU, 1985: 18-19).

As such complex experiences, seen from a cultural and moral point of view, are connected with great conflict and therefore can only be experienced as ultimately humiliating, it is understandable that they are seldom referred to in literature, but as a rule only implied. Recounting and living with these experiences are connected with strong feelings of guilt and shame for the victims.

In the following, sexual torture is presented from another angle: An investigation done by political prisoners themselves in a prison in El Salvador.

2.2.3 The El Salvador Report: A Case Study of Sexual Torture of Men

The prisoners in El Salvador have, in a unique way, collected data inside the prison by interviewing fellow prisoners about the torture to which they were subjected before being transferred to the prison. The information is compiled in a *White Book* issued by the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador. The *White Book*'s purpose is to serve as testimony, and to accuse the authorities who deny that torture is performed in the country. The intro-duction states: "It will be of help to us if this document becomes known, in spite of the limitations which surrounded its coming into existence, namely, inside the walls of the prison" (CDHS, 1986: 2).

The *White Book* starts with a description of the political and economic situation in the country as an explanation of the regime's terror against its opponents, followed by description and illustration of the 40 torture methods recorded by the prisoners. In table form, the methods of torture applied to each and every prisoner are presented, as well as the total number of torture methods applied. This registration has been carried out for all prisoners transferred to the prison from the torture chambers during the period February to August 1986, a total of 434. The *White Book* concludes with detailed testimonies of eight prisoners about the torture to which they had been submitted.

The prisoners have divided the torture methods into three categories: physical, physical-psychological, and psychological. They do not consider sexual torture a separate category, but based on the sources cited earlier, we have chosen to define six of the 40 registered methods specifically as sexual methods. These are (1) blows to the testicles, (2) electric torture, (3) nakedness, (4) rape, (5) threats of rape, and (6) the category "other methods."

Table 1, shows the recorded frequencies of sexual torture applied to the prisoners. Seventy percent of them had been subjected to sexual torture.

Table 1   Recorded frequencies of sexual torture among 4,343 male
            political prisoners in the La esperanza Prison (El Salvador)

- Number of prisoners submitted to at least 1 of 6 selected torture forms defined here as sexual torture:	329/434 = 76%
- Number submitted to torture provoking castration anxiety (1), (2), (6):	186/434 = 43%
- Number submitted to torture provoking homosexual anxiety (3), (4), (5):	269/434 = 62%
Of 329 prisoners sexually tortured:	
- Submitted to several sexual torture forms	159/329 = 48%
- Submitted to 1 of the selected forms indicated	170/329 = 52%

The general taboo on talking about sexuality, and especially about sexual torture, can explain the fact that sexual torture forms are not registered in the El Salvador report in greater numbers. On the other hand, it is surprising, sexual abuse is described so directly by the prisoners themselves —even through exact drawings—. Experience from psychotherapy with torture victims shows that information about sexual torture is generally volunteered first at a late stage in therapy. It can therefore be assumed that some of the sexual torture performed in El Salvador has not been registered by the prisoners, and that the collected data express a minimum.

2.3   The context of sexual torture

Sexual torture involves psychological, social, biological, and chronological factors, each of which influences and is influenced by the rest. In the following we focus on some of these factors.

2.3.1   The political factor: the power of patriarchy

The strategies of power for destroying the potency of the counter-power should be seen in relation to the structure of the system of power, as reflected both in the system's representative, the torturer, and in the system's opponent, the victim.

The countries in which torture is systematically practiced have very hierarchical systems of power. In most of these cases the country is governed by a single "strongman," a dictator. He represents the economic interests of a minority and is generally supported by a superpower whose political and economic interests depend on the dictatorship being maintained.

Patriarchy is an important part of this socioeconomic strategy. Patriarchy is not limited to the dictatorial states that practice torture. The Western democracies are also patriarchies, though the dominant position of men is veiled by ideologies of freedom and equality. In response to this reality, women's movements, movements to reform sexuality, grass-roots movements, etc. have implemented strategies of counter-power, but to date they

have yet to reform the fundamental patriarchal structure.

In the countries in which torture is practiced, patriarchy stands out in a reinforced form. These are countries of Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa in which only a small percentage of women have social and economic power. This is due, in turn, to the fact that in these countries the economic structure has not required the massive incorporation of women into production, as has occurred in the industrial countries. These economies thus do not require massive education for women. Limited participation in the productive process and in education promote a patriarchal structure.

The education of children also reflects these circumstances. In accordance with the male ideology, the education of male children is geared to turning them into "real" men. They are raised within a hierarchy of children in which the biggest and strongest is compensated with respect and power. Girls are taught from a very young age that they are "the second sex" (De Beauvoir, 1964), i.e. that their position is secondary and that their status is that of object in relation to the "first sex," who the subjects who act in all life relations, above all in sexual life.

While girls are taught to be sexually passive and receptive, boys learn to be sexually active, to take the initiative, and more than anything else to be potent. These myths associated with patriarchy are systematically violated under sexual torture. But in addition, the infantile impulses that derive from the psychosexual development of early infancy are also manipulated.

2.3.2 The psychological factor: nudity, fear of castration, and homophobia

In situations of torture, in which one party has unlimited physical power over the other, the powerful have a political pretext for experiencing sexual desires that are normally unacceptable. Based on testimony of nightmares of torture, all situations are characterized by a dreamlike atmosphere that can give rise to associations with the most repressed aspects of the unconscious. Analsadistic, voyeurist, exhibitionist, and homosexual impulses, normally prohibited, can be freely experienced with the prisoner, who in his submission is in a regressive state (Agger, 1988, pp. 231-241). Nudity is experienced as a threat, since the lack of bodily protection also symbolizes the prisoners' surrender. The pre-oedipal fear of castration is awaken by the direct and indirect threats against the genitalia. These threats are often made in connection with threats to rape the prisoner's wife, mother, or sister, further accentuating the castration complex. If to this is added being forced to masturbate in the presence of others, the prisoner ends up finding himself in a situation in which he is forced to do things which are punished unconsciously by the fear of castration. The prisoner is not only openly threatened with castration by the torturers; he is also threatened by his own sadistic alter ego, for since his earliest childhood the prohibition of masturbation has been inculcated in him, with an

even greater taboo on doing so in the presence of others.

Bisexuality, which Freud describes as a psychosexual disposition present in all men, is normally repressed in patriarchal cultures. It is considered shameful for a man to be homosexual, and in many countries where torture is practiced, acts that are clearly homosexual are prohibited. Therefore, homosexual attacks on male prisoners may affect repressed homosexual impulses, and at the same time may be experienced as social humiliation; the prisoner is then classified as an outcast of society. If the prisoner, as a victim of this aggression, has an erection and ejaculates, he may see himself as an active participant in his own humiliation, i.e. as his own torturer.

Although torture makes reference to the instinctual desire of early infancy, political prisoners are normally characterized by not suffering a psychological disease, and by having passed through these phases "normally" in their sexual development. Nonetheless, almost all people, including those considered normal, have vulnerable areas related to early sexual conflicts.

But sexuality linked to the later phase of latency may also be used. In this phase in child rearing there is a stage in the male's upbringing in which boys learn their place in the hierarchy of boys. They learn who is bigger and stronger, who has power, and who has priority access to the "second sex." Also, this phase has latent characteristics of homosexuality with the shared experiences of masturbation common in boys' lives.

In addition to this, the prisoners come from a predominantly male political group with its own hierarchy and its own standards of what constitutes a leader, and what the rank-and-file militants should be like, despite their common struggle. A whole set of "norms for male behavior" is developed to delineate what constitutes "true" male behavior and what places a man on a lower rung of the hierarchy. If someone has not been capable of remaining silent during torture, he will clearly descend in the hierarchy. The closed world of men in the prisons is also conducive for them to establish their own hierarchy, in which almost all contact is with other men.

2.3.3 The biological factor

Several of the methods used in torture may affect physical integrity. This can be caused by direct damage to the genitals or indirectly through damage to other parts of the body or a central damage of the functioning of the hypophysis

Nowhere, however, has a relationship between biological damage and sexual dysfunction been proven. Nonetheless, the limited nature of the materials and the reservations one must make regarding the methodology are such that one cannot discard the possibility of biological factors having some impact.

There are no special examinations of sexual dysfunctions with regard to respect for one's own body affected by visible damages as the result of torture.

2.3.4 The chronological factor

To better understand the consequences of sexual torture for the prisoner, one must also take into account the dimension of time and development. How old was he when tortured? At what sexual stage was he at? Was he living with someone else as part of a couple? And if so, for how long? Since when has he had possible symptoms? If in a state of crisis: at what stage of the crisis is he? And finally, if seeking exile, are his symptoms related to the development of the process of going into exile? At what phase of the process of going into exile is he at?

3 Some Aspects of Transcultural Treatment

3.1 The transcultural psychotherapy

We still know too little about the various ways cultural differences affect the perception, interpretation, and assimilation of traumatic events (Wilson, 1989). Nor do we know to what extent we can apply Western concepts and classification schemes to the symptoms presented by the refugees. But studies of Indochinese refugees suggest that many refugee patients suffer from both depressive and trauma-related symptoms (Mollica and Lavelle, 1988).

The Danish Red Cross estimates that of the 9,000 refugees who applied for asylum in 1986, at least 20% had been exposed to torture and had severe psychological and physical problems (Kjersem, 1987). An investigation carried out at the Hillerod Central Hospital in Denmark reported that 88% of the refugees referred for treatment to the psychiatric unit met the criteria for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) diagnosis (Jensen et al., 1989). Using structured interviews with a group of victims who had been submitted to physical, psychological, and/or sexual torture, Ortmann and Lunde (1988) reported affirmative answers to a question of a "felling of changed identity" from 74%, a "loss of self-esteem" from 72%, a "suffering from anxiety" from 78%, and a "feeling of depression" from 76%. However, these data do not permit any etiologic conclusions.

Among the different symptoms which the refugee may present are also sexual symptoms. Common dysfunctions are impotence and/or reduced desire and aversion to sex (Barudy et al., 1980; Lira and Weinstein, 1986; Bustos, 1988). As sexual dysfunction is one of the general responses to traumatic stress, it cannot be concluded that sexual dysfunction is a direct sequel to sexual torture. Accordingly, it cannot be concluded that sexual torture causes sexual dysfunction. But to understand and to initiate treatment of a refugee who presents a sexual symptom, it is important to clarify whether the client has been subjected to this trauma.

Burge (1988) reports that women who have been raped often have

flashbacks during sexual activity, in which the present partner is perceived as the rapist. Victims of sexual torture are also known to have intrusive thoughts about the torture during intercourse (Agger, 1987). Psychic numbing, which is a response to extreme stress (Lifton, 1967), can manifest itself in impacted sensuality. Burge (1988) notes that sexual dysfunction in rape victims may result from either decreased affect or from the dread of intrusive thoughts; likewise, for rape victims sexual activity can be associated with shame and guilt about behavior which was required in order to survive.

These reactions are also found in victims of sexual torture (both men and women), but we must be aware of the differences between rape and sexual torture. In rape, the act is experienced as being without meaning, while sexual torture can be conceived of as being meaningful if viewed as a part of a systematic process of destruction. Therefore, sexual torture has cultural and political dimensions which are different from rape in a Western society.

The sexual torture of men employs humiliating techniques and takes advantage of forms of anxiety which are well-known in the areas of sexuality: the voyeurist and exhibitionist humiliation brought about by the forced nakedness, the activation of castration anxiety and homosexual anxiety. Ultimately, the torture makes use of the in-grown fear of not being a "real" man. Cultural norms regarding the right kind of masculinity are implanted in both torturer and victim, and can therefore be exploited in torture.

Likewise, sexual torture of women uses cultural norms about the "right" kind of femininity. It takes advantage of shame and guilt in connection with an active, feminine sexuality.

The ideology behind sexual torture of men can be said to be an abolition of political power/potency by the induction of sexual passivity, whereas the ideology behind sexual torture of women is rather the abolition of political power/potency by the activation of sexuality. The aim is to induce shame and guilt in the woman for being a "whore" because in this way, the authorities seek to identify political activity with sexual activity. Hence, sexual torture seeks to reverse culturally-defined gender roles.

3.2   Reframing

Until we had well-founded documentation of the extensive use of sexual torture, it was difficult to employ this information in therapy. Sometimes the therapists themselves had difficulty believing that what the clients told them had really happened. It had to be "confessed" before it became real for the therapist, regardless of the pain it caused the client, who has a natural resistance to dealing with the traumatic experiences, since it can be perceived as a repetition of the torture.

From experience with Indochinese refugees, Mollica and Lavelle (1988) found that a review of the trauma story was not in itself therapeutic. Often, it could stimulate further intrusive thoughts which intensified existing symp-

toms. For these reasons, it is especially important that the painful events come to be seen in a new context, that is, that they be reframed. Through reframing, the reliving of the trauma is not only a repetition of the pain; it is also experienced and understood in a new and more meaningful manner (Lindy, 1986). "It helps the patients give meaning to their questions *Why did this happen to me? How can human beings be so cruel?*" (Mollica and Lavelle, 1988: 290). Therefore, the therapist should not try to break through the resistance to get to "the feelings." A provocation of this kind may lead to an increase of the "private" pain at the expense of the "political" pain, and the therapist might be identified with the torturer in the transference situation.

Rather, it should be communicated to the client, that many tortured prisoners have also been subjected to sexual torture, and that those in power use this strategy in an attempt to create "political impotence," which can also manifest itself as sexual impotence. In this way, the refugee may potentially regard his or her private symptom as part of an attempt to bring about ideological destruction. It should be emphasized that the torturers consciously have employed methods which do not leave visible traces, but instead remain invisibly in the victim's consciousness, primarily as strong feelings of guilt and shame. Even in the prison community, it has been difficult to mention sexual torture.

3.3   The testimony method

One important reframing method is the Testimony Method, which has been developed by Chilean psychologists in their work with former political prisoners (Cienfuegos and Monelli, 1983; Domínguez and Weinstein, 1987). The method has been further developed for use in exile countries, and has been shown to have transcultural value (Jensen and Agger, 1988; Agger and Jensen, 1990).

In cooperation with the therapist and interpreter, the refugee attests to the abuse he or she has been subjected to. The account is written down for the purpose of drawing up a document which the refugee can later use as evidence —"to let the world know." Besides being a tool for reframing, the method also has an offense quality: by testifying against the torture, one also becomes part of the struggle against torture.

The Testimony Method is immediately intelligible ,including for refugees to whom Western psychotherapeutic thinking is very foreign. Once reliable contact and alliance have been established, the therapist can propose collaboration on a testimony, especially if the client is distrustful of psychotherapeutic treatment. The cognitive lead in the therapeutic process will then be the detailed account of the traumatic events which the therapist will be able to deindividualize and reframe. The therapist writes the account out in detail (or has the interpreter record the account on a dictaphone for later transcription).

The therapist encourages the expression of emotional aspects if they are

not expressed spontaneously, but with respect for the client's emotional defenses. In this way, the testimony moves between the cognitive and the emotional levels. After finishing the testimony, it is read through and edited in cooperation with the refugee. By repeatedly working through the trauma story in this way, it can gradually be objectified: the evil is, so to say, moved out onto the white paper.

The client determines how the testimony is used. It is especially provoking, of course, to bear testimony about sexual trauma, but there are quite valid reasons for doing so: Knowledge about the topic is limited, and international organizations need documentation. If the refugee is willing, therefore, perhaps anonymously, such testimony can give real and valid meaning to the trauma.

Some Latin American and Iranian ex-prisoners have already testified to sexual torture. As noted by Mollica and Lavelle (1988: 291), "rape is a secret issue surrounded by an extreme reticence to reveal details." In this connection it may seem absurd to propose the method. But it is exactly the secrecy which keeps the shame and guilt alive. If no one gets to know about it, how can it ever be prevented? As clinicians we need to know more about how we can stop the conspiracy of silence.

3.4 Sexological interventions

Many clinicians have the opinion that people from non-Western cultures will not discuss sexual matters. This has not been my experience, but we still need more research in the area of transcultural sexology. We need, for example, to know if and/or how general sexological techniques such as sensate focus (Masters and Johnson, 1970) can be employed in a transcultural setting. Nonverbal body treatment of sexually tortured women has been carried out with positive effect (Larsen and Pagaduan-López, 1987).

But we need to know more about how the ecology of exile influences the family system. Knowledge about sexual abuse can be expected to influence the relationship significantly. In many cultural contexts, rape (both heterosexual and homosexual) can lead to rejection by the partner. This implies that victims of sexual torture will rightfully be opposed to telling about the abuse in the partner's presence. Although it is, for example, customary in general sexological treatment to involve the partner as early as possible, this principle will not necessarily apply to transcultural sexology.

4 Conclusion

Sexual torture is widely used in the process of breaking down the identity of political prisoners. It is important to understand the psychodynamics of this trauma, since many refugees who seek psychological and psychiatric assistance have suffered sexual trauma.

Although we still know little about the transcultural aspects of trauma, professionals in the Western exile countries can probably draw upon many of the general principles of post-traumatic therapy. For example, the ritual and the reframing connected with giving testimony, of bearing witness, might be one of the ways to help traumatized refugees re-establish a core identity. They might then to able to see the traumatic fusion of aggression and sexuality which they have suffered as but one of the societal ways of exerting power.

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Extreme Traumas, Processes of Social Reparation, Political Crisis

David Becker & Hugo Calderón

It was long thought that once the dictatorship had come to an end, there would also be an end to the terror, destruction, and trauma. Nonetheless, our experience in therapy in recent years with the victims of repression in Chile suggests otherwise. A short time ago, for example, we received a 35-year-old female patient who had been detained and tortured in 1974, later exiled, and then returned. Her first husband was assassinated in 1978, her second husband suffered the same fate in 1982, after which she again went into exile; she returned to Chile to stay approximately one year ago. All this time she suffered blow after blow, yet she had not broken down. Now, after having successfully reinserting in the country, at a moment when she could start her life anew, she is feeling very bad, cries all day, and in general presents severe depressive symptomatology. Her case is not exceptional. She is only one of many that are asking for help now, although the apparent cause of their suffering, dictatorship, formally ended some time ago.

Just as the destruction caused by a fire does not disappear when the flames are extinguished, the damage to the victims of repression may endure, and is sometimes manifested years or generations after the traumatic events have occurred.

In other words, when the dictatorship ends the traumatic events end, but not the consequences for individuals and society. When we speak of torture victims, relatives of the detained-disappeared, relatives of persons executed, we are speaking of people who are victims of extreme trauma. This term, originally introduced by Bettelheim (1943) defines one or more catastrophic experiences that occur in a sociopolitical context and that affect the subject in such a way that their basic structure is damaged.

Traumatic experiences, given their quality and magnitude, cannot be processed or assimilated by the individual's psychic structure. The de-structuring that results implies that all later efforts at reorganization are marked by the damage inflicted. The trauma persists over time, sometimes visible, sometimes invisible. Thus, victims of extreme trauma develop existential,

psychosocial, and clinical manifestations, even many years after the original destructive experience.

Repression is experienced individually, but as such it is part of a sociopolitical process that involves all of society. This process is characterized by the existence of the dictatorship itself, whose central characteristic is the use of terror and repression as means of political control.

The legitimacy of the "new order" imposed by the military was based on the doctrine of national security, which presupposes the existence of an internal enemy that must be annihilated, or at least demoralized and neutralized. The use of terror has been functional to this ideological outlook.

What has properly been called state terrorism in this context has meant untold physical, psychological, and social damages. It has also meant that violence, destruction, and death became a part of daily life in Chilean society. Reality surpassed the worst fantasies and most terrible nightmares. Initial reactions of shock and silenced rage were followed by feelings of impotence, hopelessness, and indifference, which can be understood as adaptive defensive mechanisms to guarantee survival in such a reality. A passive attitude came to prevail vis-à-vis the events, reducing the responses to the desire to distance oneself from terror, or the desire for the terror to come to an end, no matter what the price.

Thus, that which is uncanny (Freud, 1919) is established as a constant in social life, which means that not only were the direct victims affected; indeed all people, as well as their social relations, were affected.

It therefore appears valid to speak not only of traumatized individuals, but also of a traumatized society, whose central characteristics have been the omnipotence of fear, insecurity, distrust, lack of a critical posture, and the internalization of authoritarian and repressive structures, in the public as well as private spheres.

The persistence of the distinction between friends and enemies (privileged method of social control used by the regime), between victims and victimizers, between those who knew, those who did not know, and those who did not want to know about human rights violations, has interfered with, distorted, and perverted the basic ethic of social interaction.

The subject of this paper is social reparation, understood both as the reparation that is possible and necessary for the direct victims, and the reparation of all of society.

In English we speak of *reparation* [Sp. *reparación*] (Becker, D.; Castillo, M.I., 1988), thus consciously using not only a legal term, but also a term introduced to clinical psychology by Melanie Klein (1932). The unfortunate official translation of this term into German is *Wiedergutmachung*, which means "to make well again." In our view, nothing of what was destroyed will be recovered in the same condition as when it was lost. No one can bring the dead back to life, make the detained-disappeared return, eliminate the experience of torture from the minds of those who suffered it. We have to try to repair,

but without illusions, as maybe not quite so accidentally expressed in the respective words of the German language, which suggest one might be able to recover what was lost.

Reparation is a collective task, and a key aspect of the political process in Chile since the end of the dictatorship. How can or how should that process be carried out? Before trying to answer this question, we should analyze two problems:

1. The specific characteristics of the process whereby the policy of repression, the external threat, became an element of individual's psychic structures, and thus central to collective behavior: In other words, how and when was the dictatorship established in people's minds.

2. The characteristics of the so-called "process of transition to democracy": How should the current sociopolitical process be interpreted? This process is the context in which we must confront the problem of damages brought on by repression and the possible reparation.

While in the first point the possibilities, risks, and limits of intrapsychic processes are addressed, in the second the possibilities, risks, and limits of the macrosocial process are defined.

Let us analyze first then, how the dictatorship became established in people's psyches how the external threat turned to chronic fear.

The threat in Chile has taken on different forms: a) undertaking sufficient repressive activities to convince the entire population that the threat was real; b) defining the reasons for the repression in sufficiently vague and arbitrary terms so that anyone might see himself as a potential victim of such repression; c) at certain moments, denial of the existence of repression and at other times spectacularly highlighting its existence; d) always making it clear that the threat was an existential threat, i.e., a threat of physical death and psychological annihilation.

The threat thus implied: a) the unreliability of the macrosocial structures and the unpredictable nature of events; b) the dependence of individuals on such structures; c) the danger of death; d) the impotence of individuals to confront or prevent this danger.

Thus a typical situation arises that psychology calls a "double bind." One must act, but all of the possible actions are harmful; and it is impossible to abandon the field.

The threat is applied directly against some people, but is effective for all. Here it is worth recalling what Freud developed so convincingly in *Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety* (1926). He shows the primarily defensive character of anxiety, describing it as a mechanism that at different stages of development takes on different levels of differentiation.

Automatic anxiety refers to the time when for the individual there are still no trustworthy internal or external structures, when there is no ability to differentiate between a real threat and an imaginary one, and where this threat always signifies the total experience of destruction, or as Winnicott says, the

eternal experience of "falling into emptiness" (1965), which is, thus, the result of a traumatic experience.

The signal of anxiety, which appears afterwards as a function of the ego, protects the individual from imminent dangers and is a normal, necessary element for adequate functioning of the psychic apparatus. This signal can only be based on prior, quasi-psychotic experiences of automatic anxiety. In other words, from what Freud says it follows that all individuals possess intrapsychic registers of existential and de-structuring anxieties, which may be mobilized depending on the structure of the external threat.

We can thus understand how the external threat in Chile mobilizes very primary anxieties in individuals, in turn producing a considerable decline in the ability to adequately differentiate between reality and fantasy.

Slowly a situation builds up that turns the perception of reality into a sort of psychotic nightmare, in which a conscious effort is made to act within the framework of the signal of anxiety, while unconsciously one acts in reference to the possibility of total destruction, with the experience of fear of death very much present.

If some years ago you asked someone in Chile how many deaths he or she supposed had occurred since 1973 as a result of the repression, the response was usually a figure from 30,000 to 100,000. The real figure (based on documentation by the Vicariate of Solidarity, CODEPU, FASIC, and other human rights organizations in Chile, as well as the report of the official presidential committee that had to investigate the human rights violations that occurred during the dictatorship, and assuming some number of cases we still don't know about) is no more than 4,000.

Of course in value terms it makes no difference whether there were 1,000 10,000 or 100,000 dead; also, there is no doubt about the fact that hundreds of thousands were detained, tortured, and exiled. The difference between the real figures for the number of dead and the figures people imaged demonstrate the power and effectiveness of the regime's strategy of terror.

In Chile there have been deaths, persons detained-disappeared, and many torture victims. There has been a massive exile, as well as repression of the masses inside Chile. But in concrete terms, the repression has been the most technically refined of the Latin American dictatorships. This means it has been carried out with the "necessary" cost calculated to obtain the maximum paralytic effect on the population.

The resulting impotence, the individual and collective paralysis, has been powerful. And even though it has been possible to oppose it over all these years through acts of resistance and active opposition, and beginning in 1983 with massive protests, in 1988 through victory in the plebiscite, and in 1989 the democratic election of President Aylwin, that spirit continues in the minds of many people to this day.

Despite so many people wishing to see the end of the dictatorship, the fear of "democratic chaos" is almost as great as fear of the "dictatorial order."

Fear was not only an instrument that the dictatorship tried to use against supposed and real opponents; it is also an instrument of control and discipline for its own partisans. Presenting one's opponents as representatives of chaos, the government sought to arouse fear in the population over the possibility of a change. The continuity and maintenance of the dictatorial order was presented as the only option that could guarantee collective security.

The outcome of the 1988 plebiscite does not clash with this description. One of the main reasons why the television campaign prior to the plebiscite had such a devastating impact on the dictatorship was the fact that 30 minutes daily, the government and opposition aired their political conceptions through images. The television viewer, for the first time in 15 years, could draw out the contrast between the image (in literal terms) presented by both sides. It was the government that showed chaos, destruction, and war, while the opposition showed images reflecting the desire to build, to bring about peaceful change. In sum, in relation to fear, the government fell into its own trap.

The government, through its own images, ended up being the representative of chaos, and the opposition the representatives of order. Notwithstanding the fact that this perspective corresponds to reality, as we also believe, it is important to understand that in this process too, structures of fear and insecurity, which the government had established in the minds of the population, continued to function. These same structures were also at work a year later, when President Aylwin was voted into office. On the one hand this was the big victory over the dictatorship; on the other hand even though it was impressive to observe how voters voted basically anti-conflict, i.e. in opposition to all persons or parties that seemed conflictive, from both left and right, whether partisans or foes of the dictatorship. Nevertheless, in all of this the final strategy of the dictatorship failed. They had to turn power over to the opposition. How was this possible within the institutional schemes set up by the regime itself?

Here we begin to analyze the second point mentioned above: The main characteristics of the so-called process of democratic transition.

The determination of the opposition forces to participate in the institutional framework developed by the regime, with the objective of altering it, was expressed in participation in the October 1988 plebiscite. No doubt, this step meant recognizing the legality of the dictatorship. This decision had and will have profound implications for the nature of the process of democratic transition, and will define its limits. But the triumph of the opposition marked a historic turn of events and opened the period of transition. These were marked by the negotiation between the regime's supporters and their challengers, about the necessary changes in the 1980 Constitution. In this context the military managed to protect its fundamental interests, as for example the monopoly of arms, and the control of the armed forces independent of civil society, i.e. the legislative and executive branches of government.

The transition to democracy is proceeding on the basis of adjustments in

the institutional process proposed by the regime. The opposition attempted to modify the procedures and make the election processes more transparent. The regime tried to retain the central features of its institutional scheme. This resulted in an agreement on constitutional reform prior to the December elections, which has determined the pace of the transition for the next few years, expanding the number of parliamentarians eligible to participate in the future parliament, but leaving untouched the problem of designated members of parliament and the continuation and permanence of General Pinochet as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

It is likely that sectors of the armed forces would have preferred continuation of the dictatorship. Nonetheless, the country's political situation, as a result of the plebiscite, made this political and institutional perspective inviable. All this means, in the final analysis, that the transition to democracy, despite the opinion of major sectors of the armed forces, is taking place through negotiations between civil society and the armed forces. But it is also a transition that occurs with their consent, and which in no case will develop into a such a way as to oppose their fundamental interests.

The essence of the transition process involves gradually transforming the institutional structure erected by the Constitution of 1980 into one that is less and less antidemocratic, taking care to prevent the threat of open military intervention from becoming a reality.

Sectors of the political right and the armed forces try to block a process of profound reforms, using legal obstruction and de facto threats. The possibility of democratization depends on the ability of the democratic sectors to keep the conflict in the political realm, where they have power and more citizen support, avoiding the logic of war, which favors the partisans of the dictatorship.

The question of human rights is not only the problem of pressing legal charges against those individuals who have been accomplices in such violations, but also how to take on an experience that has been traumatic for all of society, that has affected all interpersonal relations.

If society does not recognize the reality of the damages and the need for reparation, reparation will be reduced to the private space of the victim or family affected, further compounding the traumatization.

The social and political marginalization of the victims results from that denial, which defines society as a whole as a damaged society, part of the traumatic process. The failure to elaborate the damage at a social level implies that the political structures are overtly or covertly affected by the consequences of the traumatization.

Democracy is a political system characterized, among other things, by tolerance of differences, the appearance of contradictions, a variety of opinions, and open dialogue; these are factors whose realization is contradictory to the defensive processes of a psychic structure threatened as an effect of traumatization. Fear, the rigid perception of a life threat, and distrust are all characteristics of social interactions, even long after the period in which they

were adaptive behaviors appropriate to the traumatizing reality. In consequence normal elements of life in democracy such as disagreement and differences tend to be interpreted as a threat to one's own identity.

The failure to elaborate the trauma at the social level entails the enormous risk of social practice being contradictory to democracy, as a political system, therefore always undermining the possibilities of stabilizing the democratic process.

For some, it might seem that the subject of human rights is negotiable, and that to the extent that human rights as a problem has a low profile, the population, the military, and the democratic process itself will be all the more productive and tranquil. Nonetheless, if one also bears in mind the damages resulting from repression in individuals and in society, it is obvious that an apparently "pragmatic" approach to the problem not only jeopardizes all possibility of reparation for the direct victims, but also for society and for reconstruction of the political system.

Perhaps the clearest example of this problem is manifested in what happened in Argentina. There, a limited number of public trials were held for human rights violations. On the other hand, several coup attempts have threatened democratic stability in recent years. At the same time, in the view of those directly affected, the actions of the democratic government have fallen short, and the perpetrators have continued to enjoy impunity. The difficulties that have arisen have to do with the limited nature of the process, which does not include reparation in its broad sense, and therefore maintains victims as victims and victimizers as victimizers, failing to resolve the underlying conflict.

Society's desire "not to know" contributes to the polarization of social positions, and to maintaining the victims' marginality and the victimizers' impunity.

Based on our psychotherapeutic work with victims of repression in Chile, we know that no one feels like a hero, happy to need help. We know that they have experienced such extreme humiliation and destruction, that many have developed severe psychological symptomatology, experiencing their problems as individual illnesses. We have learned that psychotherapy is an initial point at which the process of "re-socialization," or better put, the de-privatization of the damage, begins. We know that within what we have called the "bond of commitment," i.e. within a therapeutic bond that is not neutral, but rather one that clearly recognizes the damage inflicted in a given social and political context, it is possible to recover first of all the right to recognize and denounce the damage, and second the right to build a new life potential, a new life project. We also know that this building or construction is never reconstruction, because what was lost cannot be recovered, though one can grieve what was lost and struggle for new things (Weinstein, E.; Lira, E., et al., 1987; Becker, D.; Castillo, M.I., 1988).

But we also know that the final reparation cannot be achieved in psycho-

therapy. If the damage is at the same time individual and social, reparation for the direct victims can only occur in a social process. Our experience with those who have suffered most from the repression makes us feel certain that the process of overall social reparation also involves daring to face things, to call them by their names, to state the truth, even if this truth is painful and contradictory.

But establishing the truth is not just a question of justice. Perhaps Germany is the most convincing example that while judicial trials are important, by themselves they do not guarantee collective elaboration. In German in this context the psychoanalytical term Verdrängung (repression) is often used.

In Chile and Latin America in general we prefer to use the term negación (denial). In our view, the German terminology demonstrates a desire that covers up the failure to proceed with real elaboration. Denial is the true risk; it is imperative that this denial be broken down in the immediate future, since it is still possible to attain this objective. Perhaps a couple of years hence it will be much more difficult.

If we truly wish to facilitate reparation, expand the narrow context that defines the transition for us, break with the dynamic of fear and internalization of the dictatorship, we have to bring an end to what we have called the "strategy of silence," and defend the ethics of conflict.

Naturally, it is not a question of discussing the issue with a spirit of vengeance; but there is a need to collectively define an approach to the issue, as we know that covering up the truth and persistence of impunity perverts the essential notions of life in society, fostering repetition of the horror and terror.

Social reparation thus must be included in the processes of rebuilding democracy, because it implies re-establishing the basic values of life within a community in their true dimensions. Recognizing the violation of human rights is a task that all must participate in, since everybody's values have been perverted.

Reparation is thus a political, social, and cultural process that begins together with the transition, and which is fundamental for developing the democratic process. This task implies speaking, informing, discussing in a nationwide forum, because the violation of human rights is not a private event, but a social one.

The violation of human rights should be addressed as a public matter. This public event or issue is not constructed through denunciation alone, but through transformation of the events into a social experience, involving the sharing of knowledge. The objective is to attain a level of awareness in each and every individual of what happened, who it happened to, how it happened, why it happened, and for what purpose.

Reparation begins when everyone has become undeniably and indelibly aware of the damage. It is only from that moment onwards that a distinction can be made between guilty and not guilty, between individuals who are

responsible for what has happened, and institutions.

In the dictatorship, the issues of conflict are resolved by excluding and annihilating dissidents. Overcoming the dictatorship and its war-bound values is part of the new collective experience that we must make happen. Only if we succeed in confronting the past will we be able to effectively leave it behind us and build a different future.[1]

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1   This text was written at the beginning of the transition period in Chile (1989). When revising it for the English translation (1991), we unfortunately had to note that there was not much to change in the basic assumptions. Although Chile has lived under a democratic government for nearly two years now, there has been little progress. In fact, without denying that some progress has been made, in some respects we might feel more despair now than at the time the original version was written.

5

The Similarities and Differences of Psychopathological Problems Associated with Political Repression

Mario Vidal

Psychopathology associated with political repression has raised a series of questions still open for discussion since the problem took on a massive scale in the field of mental health. Can this be seen as just one more pathology, alongside the others already systematized by clinical and psychotherapeutic experience? If not, wherein lies its specificity? And based on this question, what are its implications for the therapeutic approach?

It seems clear that political repression cannot be understood as an isolated event, or as the sick expression of some sadistic authority capriciously abusing his power. Political repression is part of an overall policy of repression. It has a rationale of its own and is functional to the interests and needs of the dominant groups. If one wishes to psychologically understand the victims of repression, one must get into an area that is not strictly psychological: the realm of political praxis. Seen in this way, and given the nature of the subject, I have considered it necessary to begin with some very general considerations from the standpoint of political sociology, to make for greater consistency in the points that I will raise below.

All concrete human societies are defined mainly by the degree of development attained by their productive forces, the particular way in which the agents of production relate to one another, greater or lesser diversification of the social spectrum, and a certain way of distributing power among the various groups that make up that spectrum. Thus a society is a necessarily complex and contradictory whole, most of the time with social classes whose interests are mutually antagonistic and clash with one another.

The origin of psychopathological problems associated with political repression must be sought outside of the individuals who fall victim to that repression. It is to be found in the social conflicts, which are an expression of the entire set of contradictions that characterizes a given society. In the societies of concern to us here —those of Latin America— these contradictions occur

primarily at the economic base. In contrast to other psychopathological problems that stem from intrapsychic conflicts, or from interpersonal conflicts (between specific individuals), in the case of psychopathology and political repression, the conflict is primarily social, among social classes or social strata. It is, of course, a conflict in which all specific individuals participate; but they are not the ones who determine it.

This excentric origin, i.e. outside of the individuals who suffer the problem, could lead one to consider the psychopathology of political repression as being on the same plane as problems observed in some natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes). We know that in such cases, which are clearly beyond human control, the catastrophe cannot be seen as something purely external, not involving those who suffer losses, who will experience the traumatic event based on the different meanings it may hold for them. But this is where the similarity ends. What is particular and unique about social conflicts —the objective, suprapersonal origin of the psychopathological problems that we observe in political repression— is that in this case the people involved may more or less directly, more or less actively influence the course of the social conflict. What is characteristic of psychopathology associated with political repression is determined by the dialectical tension that links historic necessity to human freedom, the objective laws, and the conscious activity of people, which is explained by the dual nature of the social relations that constitute humanity. Strictly speaking, that dialectical tension is always present in man, in both healthy and sick individuals, but the specificity of the problem we are discussing stems from the suprapersonal origins, or macrosocial origins, if you will, of the conflict, which clearly gives the objective side of this dialectic —historic necessity— greater relative weight.

It is generally recommended that all psychological theories and psycho-therapeutic practices should make explicit the respective conceptions of man and society on which they are based. In the issue before us, given the various possible ways of understanding social conflicts, this recommendation becomes an inevitable demand. Here we have adopted the socio-historical point of view in psychology, according to which man is basically shaped in the process of assimilating the accumulated social experience of a specific society. In children this is the process of acquiring beliefs, values, norms of behavior, attitudes, customs, etc., shared by the society in which the child is brought up, or by a subgroup of said society, i.e. acquiring a set of pre-existing meanings and guidelines for action, already elaborated socially, that identify him or her with a cultural world.

Furthermore, this includes the process of appropriating the material and spiritual goods produced by the human activity of transformation that will enable people to acquire those more specifically human capabilities, those that increasingly distance humans from the animal world, and which are deposited, "made into objects," precisely in those products of practical and theoretical activity of the generations that have come before us.

These two lines of assimilation of social experience, inseparable yet distinguishable, one adaptive, the other shaping capabilities that can continue to grow and differentiate, are unimaginable outside of human society. Already-elaborated social experience is conveyed to young child through communication with others: first, the family group, then other significant figures, whether through imitation, or gestures, or verbally (the oral and written word). This interpersonal communication can be seen in the various sets, or subsystems, of social relations (family, playmates, study groups, work teams, etc.) that the person establishes throughout his lifetime, social relations that psychology calls intersubjective, face-to-face relations, which can be initiated, sustained, and terminated more or less at will.

The socio-historic perspective emphasizes the fact that the possibilities of such inter-subjective social relations are framed by the social relations of production, which exist prior to individuals, independent of their will, and which will a priori determine their social class position. That social class position, or in other words, the specific living conditions in which people are born and raised, will foretell the patterns of cultural identification to be assimilated; opportunities for gaining access to ownership of the goods produced by that society; and thus the extent to which certain very special human capabilities will be developed in a given individual.

This dual nature of social relations can be clearly seen in a specific example very pertinent to this subject. In capitalist societies such as our own —and this is for the "normal" periods when democratic institutions are in place— workers and businessmen can enter into agreement more or less freely on the terms of the labor contract they sign. On occasion, more in small-scale than large industry, they might even establish personal relations marked by a certain camaraderie. Likewise, when they consider it appropriate, either of the two parties can end the work relationship that brought them together. In other areas of social life, for example in what we call everyday life, people also enter into such intersubjective, face-to-face relationships. But these workers and entrepreneurs, who can establish relationships with one another and with others more or less freely, equal before the law and even equal at the ballot box (one man, one vote), are they equal vis-à-vis the "machine," i.e. all means of production? At what moment, Poulantzas asks, did the worker agree that he was going to enter the work world separated from the means of production, which were already the property of the entrepreneur? Now we find ourselves before another type of relationship, social relations of production, which link people through the regime of property in the means of production. These relations are already-existing; changing them is beyond one's individual will.

In other words, the set of contradictions that are specific to each historic social formation impacts on the social relations that occur at the productive base in a certain way; in capitalist society (not exactly as in feudal society, for example) they will be expressed in the distribution of persons involved in production into two major classes that are necessarily counterpoised to one

another: owners of the means of production, and those who do not own means of production. Other social groups and strata, which have other types of relations with the productive apparatus (professionals, for example), will identify with the objective interests of one of these two fundamental classes, independent of whether they are aware of this.

Seen in this light, the social conflict, which is the point of departure for the psychopathological problems associated with political repression, does not arise at the level of intersubjective, face-to-face relations, in which the members of a given society may engage. The social conflict arises due to exacerbation of the contradictions and imbalances in the social base, accentuating the confrontation over distribution of the opportunities required for meeting many needs and aspirations of the social classes, which are the natural and direct expression of these contradictions.

That conflict between social classes, which begins with a historic need —in which the collective activity of people has participated, but which arises independent of the will of any individual— can only be manifested through the individuals who belong to the social classes (and the groups that identify with them), giving rise to different forms of political praxis, the express objective of which will be taking or holding on to state power.

This notable ambiguity can only be understood if man is seen simultaneously as the general representative of a class and as an individual member of that class, a dialectical synthesis that necessarily links the universal and the particular.

"The" worker, for example, seen as the general representative of a class, is not the specific, empirical worker, but the bearer of the economic specifications that define the class to which he belongs: a direct producer separated from the means of production, who sells his labor power not in exchange for what it produces, but in exchange for a wage equivalent to the time necessary to reproduce that labor power, generating a surplus value through the unremunerated time worked that is appropriated by the owner of capital, etc. This is very different from a "psychological profile" that describes the average empirical worker of a given society. Likewise, other specifications could be used to describe the capitalist, the feudal lord, the serf, the master or slave, to cite only the fundamental classes of different societies in history. This generic worker is only expressed through the individual workers; and they exist, as individual workers, only by virtue of their relationship with the class of which they are a part. (A particular object is such by opposition to other particular objects; not just any others, but only those that are part of the same universe).

What constitutes "a" specific worker, an individual member of the class, is the difference between him or her and other specific workers, with whom he or she shares a common basis of essential properties (those which define the generic worker); but the specific worker also exhibits other properties, which make him or her unique.

As a generic worker, one is determined by the social relations of production,

which pre-date the individual and exist independent of his or her will. In the individual worker these relationships will be mediated, nuanced, and modulated by the intersubjective relations that he or she may establish more or less freely.

The dialectic of the universal and the particular is repeated, and expresses the full depth of its meaning, in political praxis: what for the generic worker, as the working class taken as a whole, is historic necessity, associated with the objective laws that explain the contradictions inherent to the social structure, in an individual worker may be experienced as personal freedom, more or less room for maneuver —delimited in the main by those same objective laws— in one's political activity. Such activity is aimed at contributing, together with other individual subjects, to an effort to consciously transform the living conditions that were determining him or her.

Personal freedom, which is never absolute, is understood through development of the human consciousness. Consciousness, seen not in the light of traditional psychology as a cognitive function alongside all others, but as the relationship that the whole person establishes —the real historical person— with a sector of reality and that enables him or her to grasp the meanings found in that reality. From the socio-historical point of view, and supposing that the long-standing dichotomies between "the rational" and "the irrational" are overcome, it is postulated that the totality of the psychic being participates in that grasping of meanings, with his or her needs and desires (some conscious, others not), complex affective life, socially conditioned attitudes and values, memories and knowledge acquired in previous experiences with that sector of reality, etc. The psychological being is also a corporal being, an individual who will always be interacting with other individuals in different systems and subsystems of social relations.

The growth of human consciousness is not purely quantitative; it is also qualitative. As consciousness develops (in a process mediated by the appropriation of cultural heritage) it takes on the ability to change points of view —recall Piaget's research on "de-centering"— facing, or if you will, surrounding the "object" of consciousness from different perspectives, which is something only humans can do. The different meanings that one gradually discovers in that realm of reality will be such that one's behavior in relation to it will take on the form of options, among which one may be chosen and decided upon. This is what we call personal freedom. In its higher form, as critical reflection, consciousness may review and question the meanings already acquired, including those unconsciously and acritically assimilated in the process of early socialization, the other line of appropriation of the accumulated social experience.

What the child of a subordinated class, for example, learned was his reality, as defined by others, (assuming a subject who is not necessarily or excessively neurotic) he or she may subject to critical assessment, and may eventually exchange this perception of reality for another one that better reflects his living

conditions. This is a difficult process that is not purely intellectual, a question of more or less knowledge; rather, it is fundamentally a question of collective praxis, of activities with other persons who share the same frustrations and the same interests.

The possibility of associating one's personal interests with those of one's class is at the basis of identification with a political project that explicitly proposes a model of what society should be, a project that would have no meaning because it would be ineffectual, if posed as a private life project; but nor would it make any sense if the members of a class did not take it on as a personal project. Once again one sees here the dialectic of the general and the individual.

This long yet necessary parenthesis will help us to more clearly pose what is the same and what is different about psychopathological problems associated with political repression. These are problems that arise from the depths of a given social structure, the inability of its productive forces (we are speaking of our underdeveloped societies) to meet the constantly growing needs of the majority, the necessary clash of interests between opposing classes, which will be expressed, among other things, in the various forms of political praxis in the struggle to take state power or remain in power. What is different as compared to other problems of psychopathology is determined by the level of human experience whence the conflict has arisen. These are neither intrapsychic or interpersonal conflicts, they are social (macrosocial) conflicts unleashed independent of the will of any particular individual. The similarity stems from the fact that the individual members are involved in this conflict among social classes; the individuals involved will participate in the conflict and experience its effects (in the case of victims of political repression) in function of their own personal characteristics. The specificity of these problems derives precisely from this ambiguity, which cannot be addressed with a purely psychological approach, or with a purely sociological approach. What is particular to people, to the real historic person (which is a necessary synthesis of that which determines this person as a class and that which indetermines him or her as a unique individual), takes on a certain physiognomy in these cases that is not the same as that of other conflicts studied by psychology, because of the greater relative weight of macrosocial factors in the origin of the conflict.

On examining the problem closer up, and taking into account primarily the political repression practiced by the Latin American dictatorships and inspired by national security doctrine, a series of specific questions arises.

First, we must define what political repression involves psychologically. It is a traumatic experience that must be elaborated in its multiple emotional contents (some hidden): its true meanings for the given individual must be clarified; and the various forms of psychological damage that may be involved must be repaired. But in many cases political repression is not something that was, but something that is. Such is the case of political prisoners, former

political prisoners, exiles and returnees from exile who continue to publicly confront the dictatorship, relatives of persons executed or of the detained-disappeared who have made the struggle for truth and justice the central issue in their lives, in sum, people engaged in various expressions of dissidence that expose them to new dangers, new threats, new fears that are not fantasized, but grounded in reality.

We read in the minutes of the first international meeting on caring for the victims of organized violence the work of a South African psychologist, who for obvious reasons did not give his name, in which he developed the concept of "continuing traumatic stress syndrome" to describe what happens not to just any victim of apartheid, but to those who fight apartheid actively. Most of the patients cared for in the mental health centers in Chile that are linked to human rights organizations are members of those "active minorities." We are aware that alongside those active minorities is another sector of victims of political repression, significantly broader, that has responded to the traumatic experience by abandoning prior life projects or taking refuge in apathy; these are some of the forms that the psychological damage may assume. The understanding of an experience of repression must examine whether it is unfolding in an individual who is sharing with others the commitment to oppose the dictatorship. The significance, for example, of the kidnapping and repeated rape of a woman in the hands of a group of security agents varies depending on whether she was or was not actively participating in some opposition organization; and the forms of behavior that stem from that meaning will also differ.

Second, the use of certain nosological categories ("neurosis," "existential crisis," etc.) that have generally been thought of in connection with other types of conflicts is subject to debate. The relativization of the clinical diagnosis does not exclude the need for expert handling of semiology, which will always contribute valuable prognostic indicators, and possibly those needed to determine an appropriate pharmacological therapy.

With most (but not all) of our patients, before placing them in one or another nosological category we have opted to see them as "individuals in a situation of political repression," someone who is confronting his or her political reality not as a present that can be pinpointed, but as an "extensive present," impregnated with the past and pregnant with the future, and in which the exact place of the political project must be determined. The emphasis will be on determining how the particular individual experiences that specific situation. This involves exploring with the patient his or her feelings, doubts, processes of questioning, etc., fostering communication with the parts that are blocked, and becoming aware of some dissociated or denied contents; in other words, accompanying the patient in the process of taking on the totality of his or her experience.

The phenomenological exploration of feelings, as they are directly experienced (for which it will be necessary to put any interpretation or causal

explanation thereof in parenthesis), refers directly to the meaning of the situation the patient is experiencing. Feelings, Buytendijk says, become organs that receive meanings, while also constituting specific responses to these meanings.

One objective of psychotherapy with these patients will thus involve unveiling feelings not clearly perceived, which will enable them to make contact with a new meaning of objective reality. If one characteristic of mature adults (from the socio-historical point of view) is the ability to look at reality from different angles, these new meanings recognized in the situation one is experiencing may be translated into a new attitude so as to be able to confront the situation. (To cite just one example: Part of the behavior of relatives of the detained-disappeared can be explained by the strong sense of indignation that moves them, a feeling of indignation which, as is known, is a specific response whenever certain essential rights having to do with the objective value of human dignity are violated. Based on this meaning, the relatives have been able to transform the impotence of their private drama into a struggle full of meaning for a more just social order, in which a mockery will no longer be made of rights that are not only theirs, but which are universal. What has developed spontaneously in some relatives of the detained-disappeared, independent of their political ideology —and often with no political ideology— in Santiago, Buenos Aires, or Montevideo, may orient psychotherapy with other relatives still caught up in the desperation of a radically ambiguous situation, i.e. a situation without meaning.)

Understanding phenomenologically what is involved in a specific situation for a specific individual, the different meanings it may have for him or her, and how he or she responds to it necessarily leads one to ask why he experiences in that way, and not otherwise. In this regard, it is helpful to determine the patient's early history, the context in which his most significant interpersonal relations took shape, his defensive style, personality structure, life project, the different groups he belongs to, and how he or she ranks them (the common conflict, for example, between family and political party), etc. The dynamic understanding of the person, thus schematized, is not all that different from what one looks for in other types of problems one sees in psychotherapy, but here too one must recognize wherein lies the difference. It is not just a question of the key role of the political project in one's personal life, and how that project may condition the quality of the therapeutic bond (the question of political trust, so often discussed in connection with caring for the victims of repression). All that, of course, should be considered. But it seems more important to us —and this could be the third subject for discussion— to ask about the role of the unconscious factors in a type of conflict whose origin lies outside the individual psychic realm. The response, we believe, can only be found empirically, recognizing different modes of participation of those unconscious dynamics in the pathogeny of the patient's clinical

picture.

There are cases in which the event of repression, rather discrete, appears to play no more than a catalytic role, mobilizing unconscious neurotic conflicts that will be the ones truly responsible for producing the psychological damage. There are other cases in which the experience of repression has been so brutal that the adult psyche is brought back to levels of functioning typical of the stage of extreme biological dependence: the process of "demolition" studied by Viñar (1983) in some victims of torture, which leads to de-identification with his or her life project and to a new identification, this time with the aggressor; or the need for security based on an omnipotent figure, described by Silvia Amati, to defend oneself from archaic anxieties of annihilation. And there will probably be other cases as well, in which the subject continues to behave as a fully-differentiated adult, preserving his acquired political identity and self-reflexive consciousness, which give him a margin of personal freedom face his situation. In these cases the unconscious dynamics will eventually play a rather pathoplastic role; the psychological response to abuses of authority of a despotic regime are not always, of course, a simple repetition of the experiences the child had with the punishing parent, though these may be amplifying and coloring his or her response.

Other considerations include the very special nature of the "psychothera-peutic environment" (in the sense attributed by Balint to the setting) with these patients who the therapist generally finds in fora, public meetings, street protests, sometimes fleeing police repression together. Another issue is how political repression impacts on a member of the family group. The suffering of the direct victim is shared; in addition, the group dynamics are reconfigured and weakened due to the sometimes misguided defensive behaviors described above aimed at attenuating that suffering ("the pathogenic secret," for exam-ple). But in addition is the not uncommon event of the family being harassed by the prevailing policy of repression. In these cases, the "scapegoat" de-scribed by the systemic approaches can no longer be seen as that relative in whom the tensions and contradictions of a sick family are deposited; here it is the entire family that becomes the scapegoat of a sick society. Yet another area for further consideration is the wide variety of therapeutic resources that must be drawn on to address these problems, approaching them with different psychotherapeutic techniques. An interdisciplinary team is needed to repair the psychological damage, its somatic concomitants, and its repercussions on the family group, as well as for attending to these patients' need for social and labor reinsertion

The focus of this essay has been on the clearly dual characteristic of psychopathological problems associated with political repression. Here, more than in any other psychopathological problem, one can appreciate the dual nature of social relations. In the problems of concern to us, that dual character will often be expressed in the individual's subjectivity in the discovery that what he or she was experiencing as a private drama, or as the failure of a

personal life project is ultimately rooted in structural, macrosocial contradictions, which are beyond his or her control. A political understanding of the problem is needed that may be expressed later by developing or strengthening the desire to share with others in relations entered into more or less freely, the willingness to overcome these contradictions.

This is what one patient I treated in 1976 told me in a somewhat convoluted way. He was a militant in a Marxist party. His girlfriend, also a militant, had been disappeared for several months. One day he said: "I would like to be so lucid as to be able to accept that it is because of the various laws of history that there has been so much suffering; but I would also like to one day be able to say that since there was so much suffering, certain things happened in history."

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6

The Language of Fear: Collective Dynamics of Communication Under Fear in Chile

Héctor Faúndez

1   Introduction

This essay seeks to illustrate certain mechanisms of communication observed in a human population subjected to terror.

The phenomena discussed herein have been drawn from a collective and multidisciplinary experience of more than five years providing assistance to direct victims of repression, their families, and the groups to which they belong, including approximately 1,000 cases of medical-psychological care for individuals and family groups.

This assistance has been given by an ad hoc group from the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the People (CODEPU: Comité de Defensa de los Derechos del Pueblo) where medical, psychological, social, and legal assistance are integrated with education, prevention, research, and denunciation.

The very nature of the phenomena observed, the ethical and ideological position of the observers, and the urgency of the demands and pressures to which all the assisted, the assisting, and observers are subjected, make these observations participatory and action-oriented. The commitment to action is often pressing and risky. We consciously assume that we cannot claim neutrality or scientific "purity." Moreover, we believe that in this context such claims of "scientific" objectivity have been yet another way in which certain institutions (scientific ones, in this case) have fallen into the communication dynamics characterized by active and passive denial, thereby running the risk of being ill-formed of the phenomena they set out to analyze.

The main goal of the repression exercised by recent dictatorships in Latin America is to bring about as great a change as possible in the consciousness of the population under their domination.

In the case of Chile, this aim is set forth explicitly in the document "Declaration of Principles of the Government of Chile," signed and made

public by the Military Junta in March 1974:

> The Armed Forces and Forces of Order set no time limit to their period of government, because the task of moral, institutional, and material rebuilding of the country requires deep and prolonged action. Definitely, it is imperative that the mentality of the Chilean people be changed.

Greater conceptual precision on the concepts of "consciousness," "mentality," or "identity" is irrelevant here. The essential issue is that the goal of the violent imposition of a social, political, and economic model and the establishment of a repressive state is a forced historic change in the values and attitudes of each member of Chilean society, and in the society as a whole.

The instruments used to achieve that goal find their ideological, political, and military cohesion and "program" in the National Security Doctrine, which justifies and is the basis for an "internal war." This "internal war" takes the form of "psychological warfare" within the country as its ongoing and expanded form.

In Chile, as in the other Latin American countries subjected to military dictatorships, the most important aspects of this psychological warfare are:

1. Torture, which is functional to and an integral part of the state security apparatus.

2. Systematic propaganda, including the use of rumors and intelligence operations through the mass media.

3. The movement of the population, i.e. exile, forced exile, expulsion, and internal exile (relegation) to extremely isolated areas.

4. The forced disappearance of persons.

5. Political executions and assassinations.

6. A set of planned actions directed to sectors of the population: pressure, blackmail, dismissal from employment, sweeps covering entire shantytowns and other extensive areas, etc., all of which we classify as collective intimidation.

The factor shared by these elements of psychological warfare is fear. Fear, in all its forms, is both a means and an end, a necessary condition and a result sought.

As a planned situation created and exacerbated by the power of the dictatorial state, fear has ceased being a natural reaction that protects the individual, it is no longer a purely individual experience. It has become the backdrop for and nexus of social relations, i.e. of interpersonal communication.

The dictatorship has thus brought about a situation in which relationships are deeply distorted, and changes have taken place in the rules governing and habits of inter-personal communication.

2   Analysis of some paradigms

Every instance of human communication, to be positively healthy, needs participants in dialogue whose interaction is based on a minimum of mutual trust. This trust is the basis for all communication practices.

To avoid any misunderstanding, we summarize some principles of communication that we believe are valid: a) all behavior is communication; b) there is no such thing as non-behavior; c) all communication comes from someone; d) all communication is perceived by someone and has some effect; e) this effect generates, in turn, a new message, renewing the dialectical continuum of the permanent and infinite sequence of communication.

Without getting into detail, we say that the modes and quality of communication depend on the participants in dialogue themselves and on their particular intimate surroundings, but also on the group and social atmosphere in which the fundamental guidelines and rules of communication are generated, modified, and created. These constitute the sociocultural context and its rules.

What was the predominant social context in Chile under the dictatorship, and what were the main rules of interaction for communication?

The social context was determined by an hegemonic power that tried to bring about a substantial change in the mentality of all Chileans. The fundamental rule that governs the behavior of this power is political and ideological imposition through violent compulsion and terror. The discourse of the dictatorial power, nonetheless, needs to be ambiguous and indeed is contradictory. It continuously uses dual messages, thereby creating rules that both impose and deny, in the context of it being a power that penetrates all aspects of life and is met with impunity. This power proclaims itself to be apolitical, yet it exercises political power. It says it is against —and above— ideologies, and at the same time it carries out a program of indoctrination which tries to recruit the entire nation. In practice it carries out a war against the people while proclaiming peace, tranquillity, and order; it arrests, kidnaps, tortures, executes, makes people disappear, and actively denies the existence of political persecution and political prisoners.

The dictatorial power is thus caught up in its own contradictory trap of image and reality; of peace and war; of proclamations of national unity and the physical and civic exclusion of a large part of the population; offers of security (the "security" of its doctrine) and the manipulation of insecurity; the omnipotent desire to be a legitimately authoritarian and trustworthy pater, and the greatest distrust in relations that the nation has ever known.

Chilean society has touched bottom: the trust that is basic for healthy communication has turned into multifaceted distrust. Even the members of the armed forces and security agencies are indoctrinated in fear and hatred of the "internal enemy" and are instilled with a sense of insecurity about its possible attacks. What is happening in this human environment in which trust has been

replaced by distrust? What happens when the substratum of the participants in dialogue is insecurity (and risk) and the principal nexus of communication is fear?

3   Some typical situations, presented as paradigms

Let us imagine the following apparently banal scene: An agent of authority, either in uniform or in civilian attire, questions any passer-by, on any street, in connection with any routine security check.

In his exchange with the person inspected, the agent takes as a guide the following syllogism: a) if someone is nervous, he is afraid; b) if someone is afraid, it is because he has done "something," c) therefore he is suspicious and should be arrested.

The specific contextual message of this paradigmatic situation, which the dictatorial power disseminates among the civilian population to put it at ease, is: "if you have not done anything (of what is prohibited), you have nothing to fear (from the agents of authority)." As can be seen, this is based on the old adage, "He who does nothing fears nothing."

For his part, the person stopped and inspected in our paradigm, independent of whether he has real motives to be fearful, may become intimidated because of the very situation the agent creates. For him, therefore, the syllogism that guides him is: a) I am afraid; b) my fear mustn't be perceived, since if it is I will be a suspect, and a suspect is treated as a criminal, i.e. with torture, etc.; c) thus, I must deny my fear.

Let us now examine some relevant particulars of the participants and the real surroundings in the paradigm we have designed.

First, not each and every subject of the civilian population is permanently intimidated, nor have all done something prohibited by the tyranny, and of those who have done something declared to be punishable, not all are fearful, even when speaking directly with the authorities. In sum, the action and reactions of the interactional sequence of the paradigm is particular to each individual.

On the other hand, notwithstanding the foregoing major sectors of the population are already suspect, by virtue of their "being in the world." They are the marginals, the unemployed, the young people from the urban slums, the progressive intellectuals. For these millions of human beings, their role and their stigma in this world is to be relegated to defenselessness, humiliation, and abandon. Like anyone and everyone, each of them thinks, feels, and becomes indignant (let us remember that ideas are also punishable, even by law!). Each of them, by all means, experiences pains, fears, and rages. Yet they still fight for their survival and their dignity.

For this reason and this reason alone, these people are fearful. This means that even without "doing anything" they live in fear.

This aphorism, the basis for the interactional message of the authorities, actually means something else: Is it really the case that he who does nothing has nothing to fear? No. Many who do nothing are in fear of fear itself.

And to fear being afraid is to be trapped in the dark illusion of not being afraid. In any event it is tantamount to being fearful, and therefore needing to hide and deny it.

The predominant language of fear, of those suffering anxiety, whether or not they recognize it, is active denial and covering it up. Just as fear has ceased to be just an individual and temporary response, denial as a psychological phenomenon ceases to be just an unconscious phenomenon in this context.

More than an unconscious defense mechanism, it has come to constitute a survival tactic, a lucid hyperconsciousness for functioning with all the signs and on all levels of communication. One lives with the absurdity of having to trust in the most vigilant form of distrust.

Let us go back to the paradigmatic situation raised: a) the agent shows his authority explicitly and analogically; b) the subject inspected, independent of whether he has a real cause for fear, becomes intimidated. He obviously tries to hide this. If the agent perceives it, he unveils this denial ("you are nervous... What are you afraid of...?"). The subject will immediately have to deny twice: "neither am I afraid nor am I hiding it."

Imbued as both are in the distrust of interaction, the situation is "resolved" only by the conclusion that is analogically drawn by the one who has power; practically any type of conduct the subject displays may be reason for him to be classified as suspicious and arrested.

4   The bond of communication in torture and some of its consequences

At the outset of interrogation/torture, the victim of torture experiences the belief that he is before his peers. As his torment proceeds it increasingly appears to him that he has experienced an "illusion" upon thinking that in torture he would be among human beings. The uncertainty as to the essential quality of the persons acting on the bond of torture may lead to an experience of horror, of the most profound indetermination: the victimizers "cannot be people, they cannot be human beings!"

Accepting that those individuals, who based on their appearance are just like him, could be his peers, implies accepting the dehumanization that the agents seek to impose on him.

This phenomenon can be described as follows: a) at the beginning the victim of torture sees himself and the torturer as "human beings;" b) the torturer leads the victim to question his humanity by treating him de facto and explicitly as an animal or a thing (as a subhuman creature); c) the torture victim defends his integrity, his determination of his own ego as a human, considering

the torturer to be non-human ("beast" or "machine"), or may exculpate the
torturer, considering him psychopathic or insane; d) nonetheless, the torturer's
human gestures, in the technique of the "good guy" or in pauses during the
torment, return the victim to the conflict of equality: both are, after all, human;
e) either both are not human, or the torturer is not human, or humanity is subject
to a value judgment and is essentially indeterminate and unpredictable. In any
case, and at the end, humanity in the victim's specific circumstances cannot
be trusted.

Some torture victims overcome this essential uncertainty induced by torture
by identifying the torturer as the agent of repression, as the enemy, as a
psychopath, or as insane. With this, he restores and reconstructs in himself the
identity of a person who has been victimized.

Other torture victims, unfortunately, do not overcome the contradiction and
agonize for years in a torture that corrodes their spirit: "Who is a human
being?" In these people, one finds in addition to distrust, caution and feigning
to survive, and a sense of absolute indetermination; their spontaneous certainty
as to their own humanity is mutilated or lost.

This phenomenon, with the obvious nuances that are part of all individual
processes, is extremely important for psychoanalysis. When the interview
takes on any inkling of interrogation, the defenses of that mutilated ego will
be actualized by projection and transfer, which will immediately provoke a
halt to or regression in the healing process, if not failure and desertion by the
patient.

We have learned from our experience that therapeutic communication in
these cases will only be possible if the parameters of trust are —for the
patient— defined and sanctioned collectively. Prior to the first interview the
torture victim has had a long experience of successive efforts to gradually
define the elements with which he will reconstruct a minimal level of trust with
the person or persons who will be his therapist(s). Without selecting and
gradually winning the acceptance of the groups to which he belongs, no
psychotherapy is possible; there will only be partial symptomatic relief, or an
imitation of psychotherapy

As he no longer has a minimum of spontaneous human trust, the torture
victim will require conditions for and determinants of relationships that go
beyond the conventional context of a psychotherapeutic encounter between
patient and therapist. He will need to be assured not only that he will be received
professionally, but also that his political and ideological values will be well-
received; in some cases he will even have to inquire about the therapist's
personal experiences of suffering and his willingness to share the horror. Only
then can the slow reconstruction of the bases of communication, i.e. of a
minimum of human trust, begin.

Even so, it may take years to articulate his will to elaborate the traumas. A
sensitive and intelligent person who had been tortured for months in 1974 told
me with great lucidity when I treated him ten years later: "I realize that even

though I force my mind —because I know that it is all in my memory— now there is a fog that prevents what I experienced from being transformed into ideas and then words. I feel that it is a nightmare that is there, in my mind, not wanting to be forgotten, but at the same time not wanting to come out...''

5　Some situations of intrafamily communication

The circulation of fear within a family group is also marked by denial, feigning, and concealing. Phenomena of fear are associated here with guilt, hostility, and mutual desires for protection more clearly than in other contexts of communication.

The intensity and nature of intrafamily communication make it impossible for feigning and concealing to go unnoticed. Living in a world of "as if" (as if there were no fears or pain) results in the basic rule of communication being the "shared secret," in which one or some of the family members will play the role of delegate of the group's anxiety, the scapegoat, the "weak victim," the "invincible problem solver," and other functions that tend to maintain the family's dysfunctional cohesion and survival. In any of these cases and their variations and combinations, rigidity and the inevitable tendency to homeostasis will appear.

We have treated families in which one of the members, usually a parent, breaks the "shared secret" when no longer able to bear the bad conscience of his or her own feigning. Caught by this guilt, he or she undertakes an act of courage and declares his or her fears. In an attempt to seek relief from his or her self-reproaches and weaknesses, he or she also atones before loved ones, declaring that he or she is a "coward." With this the family member attempts to bring the matter to a close, assuming one's own guilt and that of others in an effort to protect the family.

But it turns out that these acts do not always achieve relief from guilt; much less do they allay the fears. The subject is trapped and may engage in self-reproach for being a "coward" on two counts: first, for not having done something consistent with his principles, and second, for not admitting the true history and determinants of his fears and guilt, which is being submerged in the indignity and impotence into which the state power has thrust him. He then goes into a rage. Hostility is added to fear and guilt. He will go into a rage against the state, its symbols and representatives, but it is also common for such a humiliated, fearful, and guilt-ridden individual to direct his anger and frustration against members of his own family.

The motivations of intrafamily mutual protection experienced together with the risky disposition to be true to one's beliefs have led some members of these families to highly pathological patterns of interaction. Of these, two pathological conditions that we have observed in fathers who have suffered torture and prolonged imprisonment merit special mention: a) "I am worth-

less... I have done only stupid things...!''; b) "Don't love me!''

Statement a) may sometimes be clearly explained and argued by the individual himself. The individual tries to simultaneously explain and/or justify his life process, his current fears, and eventually atone for the guilt he feels for "breaking" in torture. In the family context, particularly in front of his children, it may be an attempt to protect them, to prevent them from taking the same path. Most such cases are enigmatic, as it is rare for the subjects to get to the point of sharing traumatic events and feelings of their life story.

These parents dismantle their own image and are self-deprecating; at the same time they compel their families to give them a devout display of love as they assume the place of victim.

The natural confrontation and differentiation with adolescent children inevitably leads them to "solutions" that may be extreme: either they close themselves up in bitter and solitary resignation, or they respond in a hostile, authoritarian manner. Either response means, however, that they again deny with their practice the ideals that give meaning to their existence.

Throughout this process the fear of "touching" the nucleus of the traumatic experiences of horror is ever-present. Family members perceive and share the "untouchable" quality of that pain. In turn, they protect the person in question by inhibiting dialogue. The trap of the anxieties, pains, and fears closes in again and again.

In the situation of imperative statement b), "Don't love me!," the subject is paralyzed by the guilt of having inflicted "avoidable" pain on his family, generally after having led a clandestine life, and being kidnaped, tortured, and imprisoned. Even when after their release they are able to lead a life full of precautions and "not to get involved in anything," they live with the fear of renewed persecution by the state. Without being paranoid, they act as though they were.

While trying to prevent greater pain for their loved ones, they protect their relatives by trying to force them not to love them. They turn inward and become cold, stubborn, unsociable, distant, and introverted. They do not speak or allow anyone to speak of political issues or of their past. They take refuge in the effort to provide as well as possible for their families in the material sense.

In everyday language, this paradoxical paradigm is cast in the following terms:

Subject: *Because I love you, I demand that you do not love me. Because you love me, you should learn to not love me.*

Family: *Because of our affection for you and to protect you, we pretend that we don't love you. Out of our love for you, we each experience our pain alone, in silence.*

Family relations freeze up; family members accompany one another by sharing their pain in silence and solitude.

6   Conclusions

1. For a large part of the Chilean population, under the dictatorship fear ceased being a passing individual response, and became the permanent backdrop for and nexus of communication.

2. The general context is determined by a discourse of power that is a continuum of double-binding messages. In this situation distrust has replaced trust as the basis of interaction.

3. The distortions of rules and habits of communication are governed predominantly by denial, simulation, and concealing.

4. The psychological concept of denial does not offer a complete explanation, nor does it encompass the main forms of the communication of fear.

5. Simulation and active concealment are truly lucid survival techniques. They may gradually cease to be used as mutual trust is restored in group and societal interaction.

6. The mechanisms of intra-group simulation, concealing, and denial (e.g. in the family) are accompanied by a significant degree of guilt, hostility, and solitude.

7. The phenomena described, especially those involving basic distrust provoked by torture, are of prime importance in psychotherapy.

8. As a general conclusion, we can say that the distorted mechanisms of fear, denial, concealing, and distrust lead to individual and family isolation in such a way as to make group and community life impossible or extremely difficult.

In contrast to the material damage caused by the dictatorship, which grouped the persons damaged in ghettos, this psychological misery isolates each person victimized unless the victims find human groups accept them and restore their trust in human beings and in their own human dignity.

"Is it Nice to Be a Grown-up...?" Different Moments in the Treatment of Children of "Desaparecidos"

Victoria Martínez, Mónica Marciano, Marta Pechman &
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1 Introduction

Children are not among the military targets in conventional warfare. All international treaties and provisions protect non-combatant civilians, especially children. Nonetheless, the state terrorism that installed itself in power in Argentina from 1976 to 1983 created hitherto unknown forms of aggression, one of whose most dramatic chapters has to do with childhood.

The phenomenon of people being disappeared produces a situation of "suspended grief" in the victims' relatives; the impact is one of paralysis and erosion, which have been used by terror regimes for their objectives of social control. In children, for whom the idea of death is a fact yet to be constructed, this situation has set off defense mechanisms and forms of representation that cannot be assimilated by the conventional categories of psychopathology.

The intention of this work is to provide insight, from a variety of approaches, into this difficult reality experienced by children and adolescents whose parents were among the persons detained and disappeared by state terrorism in Argentina. To do so, we summarize three episodes in the clinical assistance and research work of the Movimiento Solidario de Salud Mental since 1983.

We recount an experience of group psychotherapy that took place from 1983 to 1986, which clearly reflects both the type of symbolizations that occur through verbalization and dramatic play, and the intensity of the transference and counter-transference phenomena. We then include fragments of the life histories of children of the disappeared, taken down 10 years from the traumatic events, together with some samples of their verbalizations, which show their own understanding of their situation. Finally, we offer some reflections on the current situation, as most of these children are now in puberty

or adolescence

Summarizing their words, we find ourselves facing the scope and persistence of the pain, years after their parents' disappearance. Some have appealed to forgetfulness to build a peaceful present that will not marginalize them again. Others insist on remembering some qualities, tastes, and occupations that enable them to somehow recover the lost figures.

The permanent interest in the political reality, the search for information, reveals their need to understand what happened, and why it happened to them. To try to understand why, despite their insistence on hiding the fact, they feel different, and why others feel them to be different.

Their skepticism and distrust of adult values make it necessary for us once again to return to them trustworthy and dignified models so that they may build a future and not remain trapped in a past to which they are bound with neither justice or answers.

- Daniel, 11 years old, father disappeared:

   Interviewer: How do you think your father's disappearance affected you? *Daniel*: The thing is, I almost didn't know him, I was two years old when they took him from his workplace. I once drew a picture of him, but I barely had any memory; I had a lot of photos that I saw, but nothing more... Just before he was taken away, my mother had separated from him because she was afraid; she did it so that nothing would happen to us. I think she had had me already, yes, we were living in my grandparents' house...
   Interviewer: And how are you now...?
   Daniel: Fine, for a long time I haven't thought about...

- Carlitos, 11 years old, father and grandmother disappeared, exiled:

   When they took my dad I was in my mom's womb. I imagine she would have wondered whether I was male or female, and it was me, male like my dad... (He has his father's name).

- Lucero, 11 years old, father disappeared:

   ... Me, I don't remember anything about my father, I was two-and-a-half months old when they took him, I only knew him in photos. At my grandmother's house there is a beret that she puts in the big chair where he used to sit... At first my mom didn't tell me the truth, but I suspected something, because I used to go with her to the Plaza de Mayo. Once I asked her and she told me that he was disappeared and that the milicos [slang pejorative reference to members of the military] were to blame; I asked her little by little, because I didn't understand and well, now I still don't understand...

- Esteban, 13 years old, both parents disappeared when he was 2 years old:

   ...I'm sorry that I don't have memories, I don't have images... I would like to remember their faces. When I think of mom and dad I think of the words 'mom' and 'dad,' and the word 'disappeared.' I don't remember their faces...

- María, 12 years old, both parents disappeared:

  When I was 14 months old they came into my house and took them. My mom put a phone number here on my chest; it was my grandparents' phone number. The milicos left me at the door of the convent school, and when the nuns saw me in the morning, they called my grandfather and he came for me, and I've been with them until now.
  Interviewer: And how did you find out about what happened...?
  María: So, when I was six years old one day my grandmother was doing the wash and I asked her if she was my mom and right then and there she told me everything, and it surprised me a bit, but even though it may sound strange I felt calm after she told me everything...

- Federico, 11 years old, born in captivity, parents political detainees, then exiled:

  What happened to me, I sure don't remember; it's as if they had erased it from my mind. My father returned last year and then didn't appear again, he went to Sweden again [rubs his eyes with anxious discomfort]. Whenever I'm sleepy my eyes hurt... Well, I was saying that I don't remember anything and that's why I don't feel, because you feel when you remember, and since I don't remember, I don't have problems...

- Ramiro, 13 years old, father disappeared:

  Interviewer: What do you think the future holds in store for the country?
  Ramiro: And I think that in five years things will change, things will get better...
  Interviewer: Why in five years?
  Ramiro: Because I'm going to go out and fight...

2   Is it nice to be a grown-up?

Puberty and pre-adolescence in children of the disappeared illustrate the articulation between a moment of vital crisis and the re-signification for which space is created in this evolutionary and social moment by the traumatic event, which occurred 10 years ago.

Is it nice to be a grown-up? A 12-year-old boy whose father is disappeared begins his session with this question, and continues: "because I see that my mother is always sick, or sad, or angry, I never see her happy, it's as though being alive isn't nice, but I think my father liked it..."

If we situate ourselves in the world of the adolescent, this question is emblematic of the whole stage of adolescence: What will it be like to stop being a child, dependent and protected, and to become a grown-up, independent but responsible, self-determined?

In adolescence one learns to be an adult. How will these children, victims of state terrorism, learn?

Adolescence is characterized by an identity crisis, a product of the conflict among opposing impulses that tend to express themselves. Insecurity, aliena-

tion, fear of change, and fear of growth appear.

The conflictual configurations of childhood are newly reorganized, permitting their appearance as transitory alterations or as organized symptoms.

We understand organized symptoms to be those alterations which, not having been resolved in childhood at the moment of the conflictive act, reappear with a pathogenic character in adolescence.

Each symptom or character trait reveals the history of the successive emotional situations, conflictive or otherwise, that are reactivated with the revelation of identifications that characterize this stage of development.

In children of detained and disappeared persons, the situations of conflict that will be resolved as a function of growth and development are fixed to the re-signification of the traumatic act experienced at an early age, producing symptoms or failures in the defenses which hitherto may have been adequate.

Many of them were witnesses to the kidnapping of their parents, forced to undergo searches of their homes, before they had acquired language, which compounded the helplessness inherent in their age. The impossibility of responding to the aggression against one's immediate environment, the cover-up of what was happening, abrupt separation from their parents, uncertainty about their return, all made difficult the elaboration of situations which, given their intensity and massive scale, we consider traumatic.

The elaboration of anxieties, a product of the vital situations any pubescent youngster goes through, is hindered by the state of permanent crisis, and is blocked by the loss of a figure for whom you keep waiting, even though you may deny that this is so.

This stage, in which the youngster should separate from his infantile parents, constitutes a dual process within the family group, because it is they, the parents, who should make possible this separation, and the elaboration of the pain over the loss of the infant child. But then there appears a much more basic, intense, and real pain that was not resolved in these children; and now it emerges superimposed, stifling the possibility of this vital pain common to any adolescent.

If the basic conflict of this stage is the re-signification of the infantile relationship with the parents, we see why the identifications, i.e. those images that constitute the basic identity of the subject, become all-important.

In adolescence, the basic conflict is the re-signification of the infantile oedipus complex. In the triangular structure it is the father who exercises the law as regards the repression of incestuous impulses, which opens the way to the libidinization of other objects, subrogated to the parental identifications. The consolidation of the sexual identification is the possibility of access to genitality. This accumulation of impulse pressures makes the adolescent need to be valued and contained, so as not to experience his or her sexuality as dangerous. He or she needs trustworthy, secure, and stable models of identification, a mirror in whom to see oneself, but also from whom to differentiate oneself, making possible the natural rebellion of the adolescent on his or her

way to maturity, a social protagonism.

In our cases, we see that these children find as models parents who have been disappeared, punished, and tortured because they fought for their values, because they rebelled against the established order. Would it thus appear that the safe path is submission?

As a consequence, we observe a rigidification in their identifications due to the forced identification of their parents, which they are compelled to make in the face of a society that neither gives or demands answers, nor values them or recognizes their parents as an integral part of it, which has been damaged. Thus they preserve their parental figures within them, fixing them in time, idealizing them, stripping them of their everyday quality.

This gives rise to another difficulty, which appears in them when they begin to project their future: the fear of being older than their parents, of catching up to them at the age when they disappeared, as if growing up meant abandoning them, staining with guilt a place of separation and discrimination that should occur spontaneously.

One 16-year-old adolescent girl, both of whose parents are disappeared, confronting the fantasy of having children, says: "How can I be a mother, I can't imagine no longer being my mother's daughter, it's like betraying her, being her daughter is all that I have left of her..."

Another adolescent girl tells us: "I will never pardon them for condemning my children not to have grandparents..."

The traumatic act must succumb to the omnipotent fantasy of all adolescents. These children cannot tolerate the confrontation that separates them because of the meaning structure they get from social world: if it remains "attached" to their parents their life is at risk; if it separates, they are abandoned in forgotten memory as well as in society. This is a forced option, as Ulloa says, an "ambivalent trap" that has harmful effects. The habitual fantasy of the adult world as dangerous takes on a real dimension in them. Not only it is dangerous to be an adult, but also to be children; the hundreds of disappeared children and adolescents bear witness to this.

In clinical work we can see that they channel their suffering through multiple symptoms: learning difficulties, a tendency to lie, psychopathic situations in the cases of false information, in those in whom fragments of their reality take flight, social posturing, exposure to risks, addictive potential, psychosomatic conditions (allergies, asthma, etc.).

If we refer back to their early childhood we will be able to understand...

We will see that in general, due to the magnitude of the acts and the social silencing, they have been ostracized in school by their peers and overprotected by adults who, for a variety of reasons, have hidden the painful event to protect the child, distorting what information they have conveyed. In their fantasy then, reality became all the more threatening. On perceiving and suffering the anguish of the adults who stayed with them, their uncertainty heightened in the face of the danger of repeating the situation of repression that could bring

on new losses. The world of the adult family that should have been a containing and protective space was at the mercy of state terror, in the same defenseless and insecure condition as the child. This leads to a reversal of roles and identificatory possibilities, as well as difficulties in social insertion, since insertion came to entail persecution.

Those who work with children and adolescents directly affected by state terrorism put ourselves in the difficult place of representing the social, but with a different sign, which makes us trustworthy. We are clearly on the side of justice and the search for truth. External reality is objectively threatening and dangerous: no one can guarantee them security in a society that allows impunity for those who displaced them from their families, kidnapping and torturing their parents, for those who broke the law, arrogating to themselves the omnipresent law of terror.

How can we make them regain trust so that they can grow?

Those who work from different angles with children and adolescents know that they position us as mirrors for them. It is up to us to determine what image we wish to give back to them.

3 Vicissitudes of a psychotherapeutic group of pubescent youngsters

3.1 The experience

The experience with this group began in October 1983 with co-therapists (J and V) and five members:

S: 10-year-old girl, mother detained for eight years, recently freed when the group began; father first disappeared and then his body returned when S was one-and-a-half years old.

F: 10-year-old boy, father disappeared when he was three-and-a-half years old. He was detained with his mother, and freed after 24 hours. She remained in prison for six years.

M: 9-year-old girl, both parents detained when she was two years old, recently freed.

N: 9-year-old boy, father detained when he was 2 years old, freed one month before he joined the group. The mother abandoned him when the father was detained, visiting him occasionally.

C: 9-year-old boy, nephew of a detainee, who had experienced serious situations of insecurity, persecution, or harassment when visiting his maternal uncle in prison.

We will describe the development of the therapeutic process, using fragments of sessions reflecting the almost three years of our work. In this period there were certain vicissitudes in the co-therapy that would be interesting to analyze. Further on we will offer some hypotheses. There were also changes

in the composition of the group.

To better understand certain episodes we must situate ourselves in the social and political moments in Argentina.

When we began, during the height of the electoral campaign, we started out with a box full of games and unstructured materials. Each person made his or her own introduction, although some knew one another from having been involved in political activities with their parents.

In the second session, the game chosen was "War," it was repeated on several occasions. This time the males represented the USSR and China, and the females the United States and Great Britain. J and V were war correspondents. After playing for some time they called a truce and tied us to both of them by the hands, fearing that we might be enemy spies. At one point, F asked: "And why are we fighting?" S responded: "Because one must destroy oneself, one cannot live peacefully. Either you will live or we will live. Just like the milicos and the disappeared, don't you understand?" And they continued their game very aggressively.

After months of sessions in which they brought in the collapse of their expectations that all the disappeared would appear and the guilty would be judged, the work continued in a climate of depression and disillusion. In this situation, co-therapist J began to skip sessions without prior notice, or at times was present but practically without being there, without participating, thereby provoking direct attacks on the part of the patients, and reproaches, to get him to respond.

In addition, influenced by the dismal findings of unidentified corpses carried in excess by the communications media, there were dramatizations of torture and kidnapping of the therapists, sometimes accompanied by sadistic accounts.

Vacation came. In March, when school began again, no one came, leading us to ask ourselves, "Will they come? Might they have abandoned us?" When they reappeared after two sessions, three of them told of having spent their first vacations with their father or mother in six or eight years, after the parent's recent release.

Throughout the months J continued his "disappearances," arousing uncertainty, anger, and a sense of abandonment in both the patients and the co-therapist.

While this situation was worked on in the supervisory sessions and described as "identification with the figure of the disappeared person," it continued to recur. Curiously, we who made up the team of child therapists supervising the work of other groups were abandoned by our supervisor, due to his own excess workload, and were thus "orphans of his knowledge."

At this time an 11-year-old girl (VR), whose father continued to be disappeared, joined the group. VR, who is asthmatic, immediately established a good relationship with her companions, especially S, who was making herself

the group leader.

Shortly thereafter the co-therapist missed a session for the first time, due to illness, provoking the following situation in the next session: As soon as the children arrived they came to an agreement. C, speaking on behalf of the group, said: "Since you are abandoning us, we now have the right to decide whether or not to work." And they spent the entire session in a closed circle, their backs to the therapists, speaking or playing among themselves, saying that they were on a "patients' strike."

In the next session, therapist J acted out. The group requested that he not smoke in the session because it's bad for them, especially, they say, for VR because of her asthma.

Since he didn't pay attention to them, S headed up a protest, telling her: "I order you to stop smoking, in the name of the group." J answered: "I give the orders here and if you don't like it you can leave." S immediately left the room, very mad, and sat in the waiting room until the session was over. Then the rest of the group, after a long and tense silence, began to criticize S for her "bossiness." C: "She wants to order us all around. Who does she think she is, a milico?"

No one can discuss his or her discomfort with J; this is raised by the female therapist. The differences in the co-therapy were clearly brought out through a monologue of V as VR, in which she expressed dissent and was able to express her gratitude to S for wanting to care for her, and her anger at J for not paying attention to her.

In this situation, new supervision was immediately sought for the team, due to the conclusion of both co-therapists that it was impossible to work together. S left the group from that moment, which required much work and elaboration in the group due to the persecutory nature of her "disappearance."

Shortly thereafter there were vacations again; it was decided that the group would continue in March and resolve the co-therapy situation at that time.

In March M did not return either, due to a scheduling problem and distances; so the three males and VR, the only female, were left in the group.

It was decided that J would no longer be a co-therapist, and that this would be announced with at least one month anticipation to be able to work on it. It should be noted that at that time J was also a co-therapist with another group of adolescents, which included the brothers F and N; that group continued its work with no major problems.

To the surprise of everyone, including V, J announced that he was leaving the group the following session; he mentioned problems of overlapping schedules and an excessive workload. When finding out, the children said the following:

> C: "I condemn you to the penalty of exile!"
> N: "If we'd wanted to throw you out, you'd have been out of here a long time ago."
> F: "The chair will be empty."

And C, without awaiting a reply, said: "You must be thinking that we're going to make your life impossible..."

N: "Are you going to leave your brother in your place? Since you are going with our brothers..."

VR: "I am condemned to not have a father, but step-parents, they took away my Daddy, and my Daddy in the group is going away and another is coming."

Unexpectedly, the following session, J's last, was attended by S who, having been told by F that J would be there, came to bid farewell to him and to decide, she said, whether to return to the group. In the face of expressions of anger on the part of the children over the therapist's departure, S exclaimed angrily: "So you're angry again? But now everything is different, you may get in a bad way or sad, but it's other things that make me angry, the teachers for example."

VR asks her: "Why? Doesn't it make you angry that your father is disappeared? What changed?"

S answers: "And now we don't have to wait any more; we know that they're not going to come back..."

N: "It makes me mad that J is leaving. Everyone leaves us all of a sudden."

S: "It's useless, here we can't talk about anything else. I want to forget."

S did not return to the group; nor was there a new male co-therapist for a long time.

Before describing the addition of the new therapist, we will pause to analyze transferential and counter-transferential issues that arose in the therapeutic process thus far.

From the decision to go with co-therapy, something marked us. We were beginning to be a "couple" after a previous and parallel experience in a therapeutic "triangle" with another group of smaller children in which another therapist could not take charge of the group since he was the individual therapist for the brother of one of the patients.

Another problem soon arose. The supervisor "abandoned" us for another activity to which he assigned greater priority. We were condemned to experience the "father's" abandonment for something more important that us.

Throughout the sessions the therapeutic relationship continued to deteriorate. The male therapist complained that once the group sessions were over the female therapist would immediately occupy herself with another matter, thus closing off the possibility of "talking about what happened," and indicating that the style was too "maternal." The female therapist complained about abandonment of the role, about the male therapist not being the appropriate therapist model for pubescent males, about absences with no advance notice, and that even when in attendance, his style was present-absent.

He never found time to talk about the children; other tasks had higher priority.

Beginning with the episode with S, it became impossible to sustain co-therapy. The team was asked to help and a new supervisor was sought; with her

the group worked on J's distancing himself from the group.

While another male co-therapist was being sought, the female co-therapist decided to suspend the next two sessions given the impossibility of working alone in the wake of another symbolic abandonment by a co-therapist. Before leaving, J announced that he would be replaced by therapist D. After several weeks D announced that because of scheduling problems he would not be able to take on the job. Then an effort was made to change the day, which would have meant "excluding" one of the children. Finally it was decided to continue working the same day and time without a co-therapist.

When this was discussed in supervision, the burden of the situation had to be borne by the female therapist. It was suggested that because she was so demanding it was not possible to make room for a colleague, and that she identified with the mothers of these children. The female therapist did not accept this reasoning, since in the team the female supervisor and the male supposed cotherapist were also involved in this same counter-transferential acting out, since they had not taken notice of the dynamic earlier.

The female therapist found that working alone was wearing her down. She was angry at having to sustain the children's idealization of the therapist who "abandoned" them; and she felt guilty for not having chosen a good "Daddy" and for having fostered their illusion at the thought of a new therapist joining and not being able to "keep him." The fantasy was: "I cannot appear with a female co-therapist. Their Daddy left them, they need a male substitute."

This led to distrust in the new co-therapy. Meanwhile, when the sessions resumed after the break, and when the children found out that the psychotherapist who had been promised was not coming, all hell broke loose: they broke chairs, threw pillows, attacked one another, and were unable to listen to the therapist, until one of them verbalized: "Who will want to work with us with the mess we make?" With this, the group worked on the fantasy that they were the ones who threw out their parents or that they, the children, were not important enough for the parents to keep them; political activism was the parents' priority. This was resisted given their idealization of their parents, but they were able to accept that they felt abandoned, even though they knew that was not the case.

When the session ended, one of the children told the therapist: "Please don't get sick!"

In the following sessions new children were brought into the group. First AL, an 11-year-old girl not directly affected; then G, an 11-year-old boy whose father was disappeared, and M, a 12-year-old boy whose father was disappeared.

The new make-up of the group brought a certain "calm," an impasse in the chaotic process, in which they dramatized school situations. They even played the role of individual therapists, reinforcing expressions such as "I've come because I have problems, because I don't have a father."

Then M and N were absent on several occasions, and B, a 10-year-old boy

whose parents were disappeared, joined the group. He had very particular regressive characteristics. More situations of chaos and confusion ensued; he was made the scapegoat, the target of all the attacks and teasing.

In the session after one suspended when the therapist was sick, they played a game in which they gave her a token and made her leave the room to decide which one gave it to her. When she returned, everyone was hiding; they left a note asking one million dollars "ransom for the children." This caused the therapist much anxiety; she began "searching" for the children, while engaged in a "monologue about her uncertainty as to whether she will find them and in what conditions, whether they'll be OK, whether they might not return," etc. They later justified their game as a way of getting others "to be concerned about them."

N and M abandoned the group with no justification or farewell. Both "disappeared" from the group, generating a great deal of anxiety in the children, who persistently asked about them, until they stop asking, in a symptomatic silencing.

In another session, when the therapist entered the room she found the walls covered with clay, the materials destroyed and strewn about the floor. They had thrown projectiles of clay out the window at neighbors and passers-by.

When asked for an explanation, and interpreting their anger, G told of an episode with a schoolmate that caused him anxiety and anger, and said: "Since I come here to tell of everything happening with me and you'll just have to take it." He was asked to elaborate on the incident. A companion had told G: "Your father was an asshole, that's why they took him away." G hit him and the teacher admonished him, and so he called her a milica and accused his schoolmates of being accomplices since they did not defend him.

Based on this comment all the others explained situations of fighting with and being marginalized by their schoolmates; they felt "different" or superior because they have "left behind" children's games, or they were singled out because of their parents' activities; some people even "pitied" them.

One said he felt very bad and fearful because of the "state of siege" decree, since he remembered the persecution that forced him to go into exile with his mother.

Eight months elapsed from the time therapist J left until a new male therapist joined the group. At this point the female therapist felt the task to be overwhelming, at times almost impossible to bear alone given the weight of the massive transference of this group and its permanent tendencies to act out.

On announcing the arrival of the new therapist, D, there was distrust as to whether he would stay with them. One of the children talked about causing great scandals to "test him." "If he passes the test, he can stay," he noted.

The arrival of D imposed order from the preceding chaos. An attempt was made by the two of them to define their respective roles; the mere idea that he might also "abandon" them produced much anxiety.

In the first session, after everyone had introduced themselves, they chose

to play "blind-man's bluff;" one of them was the target of the aggressions and was teased throughout the session, unable to "grab anyone." Interestingly, one by one they all went to hide behind the new therapist, giving them the opportunity to approach him and touch him with the excuse of hiding. At the end of the session they refused to leave; they even broke the window of one of the doors while insisting that they stay to continue the session.

After a few sessions E, a 12-year-old boy, joined the group. He had returned from exile, and was brought in for consultation for his asthma. They openly made fun of him, but they told him they were doing so because he was new. "It happens to all of the new ones; and besides, you have a suspicious face," C said.

In this session when they referred to therapist D, they called him Tarzan, alluding to his physique, and reproached him for not talking very much.

It should be noted that at the same time as the new therapist arrived, therapist V had to inform the group that she was pregnant; the group responded to this news with considerable resistance. Each time this resistance was about to be made explicit as a result of the material that they themselves were bringing in, terrible chaos ensued (shouting, succession of guttural sounds); thus several sessions ended with talk of a "secret," but without being able to hear it explicitly.

Soon after a session in which the group worked with materials and each symbolized his or her "anxiety facing new things," and in which questions were asked about each one's religion and "origins," the female therapist was able to share her "secret."

In the following sessions the "older" members of the group needed to speak almost compulsively about the ones who were not present, asking why they left, knowing that there was no answer. They described the group's "pre-history" until this "surrogate father" joined.

After summer vacation JL, an 11-year-old boy, joined; both of his parents had been disappeared (kidnapped in his presence). When asked why he came to the group, he responded: "Because my parents are disappeared." This brought the subject back to the group; immediately, in response to an interpretation offered by D, they questioned themselves about "anguish," saying they did not know what it is; they asked the therapists to explain so that they could understand. So a "role shift" ensued, with the patients choosing different roles in succession. At the end of the session they communicated their unease, since they did not know what to do in the other's place; they did not know one another. In contrast, they fought to occupy the place of therapist D and imitate his attitudes and gestures.

During V's leave, the subject of the sessions was the sense of persecution that stemmed from the absences, and the fear produced by the possible "appearance" of a monster or madman. This was worked on based on a dream that C brought in that his father had returned, transformed into an ogre.

In the first session in which V rejoined the group, the subject that arose was

the time gone by, how they had grown, their imminent adolescence, and the fears they were feeling because of this. All except F agreed that they still felt pubescent, and they protested over adults' lack of understanding of their pranks or silliness.

VR complained: "Either they don't let us grow, or they think we're adults," all the others agreed.

Also, there may have been explicit anger with the therapists for "interpreting everything pertaining to them," an allusion to the mechanisms of denial and avoidance that arise when speaking of their issues. It was difficult for them to listen and to listen to themselves, although they were able to do so at this new moment in the group process. The thematic axis was the onset of adolescence and the consequent anxieties.

3.2 Comments

We decided to undertake this task bearing in mind that at the origin of these children's conflictive situations was a traumatic, unelaborated experience, and that a basic element shared by them was prolonged social isolation. Because of this, the dynamic affective interplay that occurs in all therapy groups could make it possible for them to open up their fantasies, even considering the contradiction of the group for those in the process of grieving.

This group process was begun following the criteria set forth by Tato Pavlovsky, our first supervisor, which had to do with the make-up of the groups and his approach. It went through several stages, in both its composition and dynamics. We also considered Anzieu's ideas for understanding the "unconscious group fantasy" as the primary organizing principle of this group. Actually, at first we agreed that "the fantasy may be a disorganizing force due to the massive anxiety that it arouses, an anxiety of fragmentation and devouring, of emptiness, or anxiety over loss of the object..."

These children's primitive experiences of abandonment, and loss resulting from the massive aggression to which they were subjected by society, were reactivated in the group situation, heightening their persecution anxieties. Thus manic defense, chaos, and aggression were all displayed. The "acting out" of sadism reflects these children's identification with those who carried out the acts that they feel victimized by. An absent parent who persecutes by virtue of his or her sinister character of being dead-alive, and the torturer as the one responsible for promoting such "fantasy resonance," permanently reappear in the group with each situation that mobilizes it, personified in whoever happens to be the scapegoat at any given moment, who becomes both torturer and tortured due to the dynamic generated by his or her peers.

It is also important to highlight the repercussions of social events on the therapeutic process. Given the changing forms assumed by the issue of their disappeared parents, the children were marginalized, in the dictatorship, but then became famous, even receiving coverage in the mass media with the

democratic opening. Then, during the first moments of constitutional govern-
ment, the expectations generated diminished little by little given the lack of a
response as to their parents' fate. This led to the deduction, due to the passing
of time, of certain death, which they themselves had to execute internally,
invading them with anxiety and guilt; the persecuting nature of this death with
no real representation was thus acted out in the group.

Support for the therapeutic work was centered on reconstructing their
parents' history so as to vindicate their lives, to recover an idealization that
would enable them to identify not with a fantasy, but with a parent who had
opted for political activism, and whose disappearance must not be met with
impunity. Expectations were focused on the possibility of obtaining justice by
"putting the military juntas on trial."

Once again the group worked on the members' disillusion with and distrust
of the values of this society, of which they are soon to become active members.
There is no law protecting their lives ("children are still disappeared"); there
is no law that will bring justice to the real agents of terror ("my father's torturer
is still free").

If we continue Anzieu's line, the second organizing principle of the group
would be the "imago," we might think of this ambivalence of the parental
image, the corporal basis for the group as a projection of the social uncon-
scious. These children are bearers and spokespersons of social denial.

I believe that at this moment the group made a transition to a third period:
regression to their original fantasies ("third organizing principle"), as dis-
played in their now-conflictual adolescence. For the first time they opened up
to a discussion of their sexuality.

Much remains to be said and researched on the group dynamic of these
children; indeed, the effects of a mobilizing and different separation, after the
announced and actual return of the therapist who had become pregnant, remain
to be seen.

The intent of this essay is to address the reality of these children who have
experienced periods of confusion and chaos, of lethargy and melancholy, of
mania and destruction. It is only recently, after these years of hard work, that
they can begin to talk, to discriminate themselves from each another, to seek
out their differences as individual traits, and not as a symbiotic whole on the
basis of their shared traumatic impact: "the loss, the fantasied sinister..."

Only now, perhaps, is it possible to analyze from a different vantage point
this dialectical interplay of an identity that constitutes them but that does not
mark them. Here, at the moment of their insertion in the social world, their
greatest questions are posed.

4 What games do these children play? Including body techniques in group psychotherapy

4.1 The experience

In the course of the treatment a recurrent symptomatology was observed having to do with bodily problems, which led the therapeutic group to devise a set of specific techniques.

The group began with 10 children, six boys and four girls, most of whom had suffered the disappearance of one or both parents. The patients not affected by disappearances were included in order to socialize the experience rather than segregating children of the disappeared in "ghettos;" indeed, we consider that the entire society was affected by the trauma.

The group was coordinated by a body movement therapist and a psychotherapist. In developing this work we wanted to bring out the most significant aspects having to do with the new approach and to the effects that working with the body produced in the children. We can understand the weight such an event had on their psychical constitution given the early age when the patients suffered the traumatic situation.

The impact of the loss was not only engraved on their "body ego;" it also signaled the possibility of "maternal support." We believe that the group dynamics reactivated that original configuration, and hence the confusion and tremendous amount of anxiety that invaded discrimination and individuation developed in the unfolding of the therapy.

As Lapierre states:

> ..we take into account that there is a necessary bodily availability to establish satisfactory symbiotic communication; that the nervous tension, anxiety, and depression experienced by the mothers provoked involuntary tensions in muscle tone that hindered the establishment in the children of a dialogue with their bodies that might make them feel secure; and that this generated in the children a permanent search for affection, or a turning inward, a refusal to engage in any communication, or development of the child's aggressiveness...

Hence the need to include body techniques in the group therapy work.

We will thus begin by relating some fragments of sessions, to give an idea of the dynamic of the group work.

When the group began, its situation was marked by chaos, much confusion, hyperactivity, and a great deal of aggressiveness; it was impossible to include not only the body, but also the word. There was no room for interpretation. From the outset, the children did not differentiate our place from their own. The relationship was established in the form of abuse, insults, hitting, fighting, running out of the room where the therapy session was being held, an inability to respect even the most minimal order.

Then the spokesperson for the aggression and violence arose, with a

polarized attitude evident in the group. These were "the inhibited ones and those who would act out," as noted by D. Anzieu (1978) when explaining fantasy resonance:

> ...it is the regrouping of some participants around one of them, who makes it seen, and suggests, through his actions, his way of being, or his words, one of his unconscious individual fantasies... The group's discourse can be understood as a re-enactment and in words of the fantasy of the bearer thereof, to which the rest of the group members, or some of them, responded... The exchanges unfolded in those participants available to the thematic content, who are included in it, and its problematic. In this way they can adopt one of the fantasy's forms of behavior... Those who remain silent are nonetheless present, but as hearing spectators. In this way one can identify those who update the fantasy, through this pole, or through the other, through identification with the other's desire or by defending against that same desire... Thus an unconscious individual fantasy becomes an organizer of the group's functioning...

As the sessions continued, we began to impose bodily limits; specifically, when the patients did not talk we proposed that we be included in the games, in order to be able to take action. Bodily contention and re-routing the aggression back to them made us reflect on the need to hear their bodies in motion, removing guilt from aggression.

They proposed games that were very related to what they needed. If we felt that communication was not being established, the "red phone" would appear; if we thought that they couldn't contain themselves, that they did not recognize their own limits, they played "cigarette 43" (known as the statue game); if the only thing they could connect with was violence, fighting, and accidents, they would dramatize wars or situations with wounded, gunmen, dead people, ambulances, and so forth. The "disappearances," with the need to turn out the lights, hide, lock themselves in, or lock us in, manifested the symbolism of impulses and conflicts reflected in their movement.

Based on our work of putting up limits and containing the game "body to body" with them, allowing them to express their aggression without the destructive content, we were able to move on to another moment, which was the attempt to arrive at symbolic representation through play.

In a session in which we worked with daily newspapers, the ritual would come up: one by one they represented dead people. The dead person was covered with the papers; everyone circled around, singing and dancing, like Indians. When that came to an end, they decided to revive the dead person. This scene caused great anxiety in the children, since it referred back to the fantasy presence of the disappeared person, the uncertainty generated by this absence of a dead-living person. We thus agree with Lapierre she notes that the game with the papers makes possible the release of aggressive impulses, de-structuring the relationship, to the point of seeking the removal of guilt for the transgression in a certain complicity with the adult who facilitated the aggression.

In other sessions we included the ball game: they made the rules, penalizing violations with tokens; they had to respect their own limits. With the game of the "distracted person," there was difficulty maintaining attention and looking at others. Initially they needed to connect with one another freely with the ball to invest the space; later the game became more organized, with a dialogue established among them through the object.

In developing the sessions we worked with psychodrama techniques; we also used a box with unstructured materials and large pillows.

In some situations we had to use the body technique of the "mirror," imitating the movements that made it difficult for them to listen. The children had fun. They said, "If we don't do it we'll go crazy," in an apparent allusion to the calming effect of connecting in a "mirror," as a containing influence, making it possible to then dramatize more conflictive situations. We based the application of these techniques on a deduction of a lack of maternal functions that they have suffered. As Winnicott says, these functions are essential for the separation-individual, for the emergence of the "transitional space." Perhaps as these mothers note, in their description of the first months of life, the traumatic experience invaded their relationship with the child, making it difficult for them to perform their "maternal functions."

They acted out this need in the first stage of the therapeutic process. We decided to accompany them in this regression, so as to then move on to its elaboration through symbolism.

We can clearly differentiate three moments in the group's development. First is that analyzed here, which reflects the beginning, with the emergence of confusional anxieties, chaos, indifferentiation, and release of aggression as the only possibility of expression.

We then come to a second, clearly differentiated moment in the coming together of several situations, as after the vacation several members of the group did not reappear, and one of the therapists was about to go on maternity leave. It should be noted that this therapist had occupied the place of the stable figure, since she had been in charge of the children's individual treatments for some time before the group was formed. It was thus to be expected that anxieties would be mobilized, making possible a repeated situation of loss.

We then referred to the family environment at the moment of the traumatic situation, to gain insight. We once again thought through the role of these mothers as stable figures, but with obvious difficulties in being containing, and the place of the "disappeared" as one who is idealized and absent. A shift in roles occurred in the group process with this renewed absence: the therapist who occupied the role of "third party" became identified with the mothers, and the "stable" therapist became a figure of persecution due to her desired (and at the same time feared) "reappearance."

We believed it was necessary to redefine the setting, including announcing absences before each session, due to the anxiety generated by "disappearances" of members for no apparent reason.

In the first session of this second moment the members spontaneously grouped in a circle and chatted, giving way to the word, expressing the need for caution towards the therapists and among themselves as a group, given the intense fantasies of self-destruction that stemmed from the anger generated by abandonment and the fear of being left alone, with no adult figure to provide containing.

During this session their history in the institution was reconstructed; they remembered themselves as children, and the anger associated with the fact that their parents disappeared without giving any notice. They then recalled their own history, how old they were when their parents were disappeared, what they went through. They spontaneously assembled a space craft, a long tunnel, which they proceeded to climb into; they then asked the therapist to close "the hatch." The leader drove the craft. They then said things such as: "I am sleeping," "It's going so fast it seems we're standing still," "I am choking," "It's so hot, I can't take it." The driver pressed the "air button" and everyone immediately expressed relief. They then reported that they had reached the moon and that they had to land on the moon in slow motion because of the "gravity;" they were very absorbed in their roles. When the leader so ordered, they all returned to the space ship and once again asked the therapist to close the hatches; they made her the base on earth, asking her for instructions, oxygen, and food. They finally landed and got ready to tell their experience to the news media. They organized the event, placing emphasis on the importance of "being heard."

They retold how they had brought back one large martian and one small martian; they displayed a ball, from which a "little Martian baby" is born. Then the concern is voiced that the mother is on the moon, and one of them exclaims: "The baby must be returned to its mother!"

They then returned to the ship and traveled, to drop off the baby. They immediately returned to earth, telling of how happy and grateful the mother was, and their satisfaction at being able to return the baby. Without planning, they decided to take another "little trip;" a few seconds later the ship exploded, with the cry "I pressed the self-destruct button!," causing destruction of the craft with them inside; they burned without trying to save themselves. The therapist decided to seek them out to talk about what had happened. The fantasy emerged of a "birth linked to destruction" and the concern that this not be the case of this birth (that of the therapist). They call for caution, saying that limits be imposed through the "instructions, oxygen, and food;" in so doing they were reliving their own birth with anguish.

The role of the permanent leader was then questioned, roles were changed, and each took his or her place, with the leader relieved. They spoke again of self-destruction; each responded to the space craft in different, discriminated ways. There were two simultaneous scenarios: while some wanted to rebuild the ship, others desperately tried to care for the injured. The leadership role was disputed, and each decided to build his or her own ship, so as to land

without self-destructing. When doing so, some remained silent, as injured persons in their craft.

To conclude, they tried to ask themselves about their own things, as if to relieve themselves of the weight of being identified as the "children of disappeared persons," recounting what each has, and what each has lost.

They dramatized their omnipotent fantasies of being responsible for giving life back and at the same time the association of departure —birth or death. They re-live the place, sadly well-known, of their status that led them to this group: a loss that marks them, due to the violence that surrounded them at that moment. On another occasion they dramatized "the weight they can bear" and on that basis they questioned what their role will be with respect to the therapist, who now had her own baby. They felt displaced, and also fantasized the danger of the group self-destructing upon her return, since that which is idealized is "that which is not there."

By this time they had become capable of displaying their fears through bodily expression, by listening, and by listening to themselves.

At the same time, a reflection group of parents and guardians was initiated; this was considered necessary given the children's ages and the influence of the parents and guardians. It was also to intended as a space for containing and orienting the concerns and anxieties that our work with the children had stirred up in them.

The same day the parents' group was begun, the session with the children began with their concern to "give notice of the absences" to keep the group together, noting the advisability of having a space in which to distinguish themselves from the adults' deposition of their own conflictive issues. They were animated in this session by the film King Kong, which they had seen on television. Their excessive exaltation led them to represent the main character; they lost control. The leader tried to break away from King Kong's arms, verbalizing his rage. At the same time the therapists spoke with his fellow group members, trying to involve them in the situation to get them to understand this discharge as an expression of his conflict, as asking for help and once again not attributing guilt to the aggression, but this time being accepted by the group, not just by the therapist. Once the boy was able to cry, to become depressed, the atmosphere changed. They asked to work with their bodies on the mat. A moment of free expression ensued, involving play but without the usual aggressive release. We found it significant that they asked to take off their shoes since, as Lapierre indicates, baring one's feet while the rest of the body is covered shows acceptance of a certain vulnerability, since the feet are the most solidly reinforced part of the body, for providing support, or for attacking and defending.

The moment when they put their shoes on was the most propitious for sharing what the session had evoked for each of them. They felt they could take charge of their conflicts; this enabled the leader to move away from the aggressive role, which in turn made possible an explosive yet affectionate

attitude toward the therapist, shifting her from the role of repressor, and integrating affection and care, fusing libidinal and aggressive impulses, which were generally projected in a dissociated manner.

Beginning with this session they began to come in pairs, expressing their fear over the group's destiny and calling for a more "absorbing, warm, soft" room to meet in (with characteristics of a large womb). They fantasized travel to link up with faraway relatives and prettier houses, with many telephones to be able to improve communication. They definitely wanted to take care of the therapeutic space; at the same time they regressed in a way that reproduced their personal mode of response to the traumatic situation. One girl, through the ever-unmet demand, which she attempts to meet through food; one boy displayed his helplessness by acting as a baby with unmet needs. They then assembled a craft in which each strived to reaffirm his or her identity and differentiated himself or herself. We reproduce the dialogue because of its significance.

The boy enters and exits the craft crawling; the girl then says:

> G: I'll give you the bottle; I'm going on my horse to the moon, so give me water or I'll destroy your craft, I need 10,000 liters of water, I am a Martian.
> B: (shy) And if I protest?
> G: (arrogant) You will have no craft!
> B: The receptacle has holes!
> G: Watch out! There will be no craft, I will change your receptacle and we will make a deal. Give me the plug and I will let you go; both plugs : Don't be impatient.
> G: (Imposing herself) I am very impatient and there is no craft.
> B: I will install them, one of Coca-Cola and another of water.
> G: Now I want light.
> B: Can I go now?
> G: My plug is gone, I want you to bring me more water.
> B: (Getting impatient) Want do you want now?
> G: Your craft.
> B: How will I get back?
> G: Don't go back.
> B: I'll take you in my craft!
> G: I'm keeping your craft!
> B: (Resigned) Well, I'll make another one.
> G: For my friends?
> B: (Changing his attitude, requesting a change in roles) Your friends can go to hell!
> G: Thank you! If they don't rescue me I'll always be a Martian!

In another session, when there was no light because of a power outage, they asked that we continue working just the same, since they were happy that everyone had come. They were able to express their fears of darkness, playing at frightening one another. The leader expressed his fear, which placed him in a position different from his usual one in the group, since he also showed his vulnerability.

In the session prior to the return of the other therapist her return was

mentioned, and they immediately began fighting amongst themselves. When asked to do so, they repeated the fight in slow motion, and then quickly. In this way they were able to "play out" the aggression, proposing a dramatization of a dead person turned into a phantasm.

In the session held when the therapist who had been absent rejoined the group, they enthusiastically told her of the changes that had taken place and the latest news. To ask her about her baby they decided to give her a report, and then reconstructed the prior dramatization for her. The subject was the same: after an exchange of gun fire, a dead person is in the grave and they have to go visit the grave. When they do so, he comes back to life and they flee. Frightened, some fainted; two became detectives to investigate the case. The leader proposed: "So I was the one who always took risks?" Then a fight ensued between the living and the dead, and they asked themselves: "Was he dead, or wasn't he?" They gave him a name, Mac Corwik, and spoke in a feigned English; one of them proposed that it had actually been a nightmare, that he was alive. Another exclaimed: "He was alive, all the time you were alive!"

They ended that dramatization and tried to present another final one, changing the place of the dead person. They came close to see the name on the gravestone and told him: "You must be alive; we shitted you out like pineapples to see if you're for real." Another says: "All the dead rise up!" They became frightened and decided to do a final dramatization: kidnapping the little girl in the group. She was unable to get into her role, which was unusual for her.

One manifestation of the change in roles was reflected in the statements of the leader to the therapist who had stayed with them, calling her a "busybody," and suggesting she was not qualified for the role. This was understood as a re-accommodation of the place of trust; with the distrust shifted to the last member to have come to the group, the danger externalized with the arrival of the old acquaintance. It is difficult to integrate the "third person," who is made out to be an agent of persecution.

We attempted to speak of their fears and fantasies about death. There was considerable ambivalence around the decision as to whether to consider dead or keep alive that phantasm who they decided to give a foreign name, and speak to in an unknown language, as though somehow alluding not only to the figure of their parents, but also those that would be "foreign" for them, since because they were so young most had almost no contact with that long-awaited parent. Thus the parent became an unknown and hence sinister familiar figure.

We note that they allowed themselves to get into this dramatization associated with the reappearance of the therapist who, because of the transference dynamic, moves from the role of "mother" to the one who disappears; anxieties were quelled with her return in the face of the fear of loss and the dangerous longing for desire that was feared and which became a reality.

In terms of counter-transference, these roles were assumed by the thera-

pists, with a dynamic of mutual distrust in the supervisory sessions and the fear of reproach that these mothers do not want to think about, but that at the same time they feared that this might be done to them. These sessions made elaboration possible.

To conclude, we note that what occurred was like a new stage, the third moment of the group process, which was spurred on when the therapist rejoined the group.

In one session, a boy commented on the confirmation of his father's death; while doing so, spinning about himself out of control, he said: "I am so pissed that I can't stay still." In view of his need, it is suggested that they continue discharging through movement. They soon became Russian and American gymnasts "for having been born one hour in each nation," dubbing the game with the father's name. They spoke among themselves, leaving out the therapists, exclaiming: "We alone know what we're saying."

Then they dramatized a comedy with three persons ("there is one person who is present but who cannot be seen"). They continued the game of free-style wrestling. We, as "trainers," asked them to work on something else, a non-aggressive proposal for the youngest ones. So they decided to play "Pinocchio and Giuseppe." The doll had several accidents, and had to be rebuilt "hammering his legs, tying them to the body with ropes."

They also fixed his legs, but he was not yet quite together. Pinocchio ended up dragging himself along. When asked how they felt, they replied: "Mac Corwik!," explaining that this means "the dead person."

Another significant session in this stage began with recollections of what they were like when small babies; they tried to discover what it feels like to be "inside." They rolled on a mat and spoke from there, asking one another, "Who are you?" each answered from within. Then they asked to use the toy box, which they had not opened for a long time; one of them proposed checking it "to find out how everything is." They recalled the children who were no longer coming to the sessions; each took out the work he or she had done long before. Then they wanted to do new things, but with the techniques they had used before. One boy said: "I want to remember, now I really want to remember." Another noted: "We keep the things that are useful for us, and cast aside the rest."

In another session, happy that all the others had come, they proposed playing "monkey in the middle" and for the first time were able to respect the rules of the game. What was different was that they began addressing one another, including the therapists, by their last names; this gave way to foot wrestling, then back-to-back; they ended with an exercise identifying and relaxing parts of the body.

It was hard for them to concentrate and give themselves over to their sensations; it scared them a lot to "close their eyes." This is how they showed it, and this is also included.

We pointed out that they could do body work in this third stage because of

what we had initially suggested about giving them a space other than their bodies, which were then no longer used as instruments for "releasing tension," or as a "target of aggression." The display of hyperactivity in the first stage was necessary, building its signification, opening the way to the word, discerning their places, and thus generating a space for containment that would enable them to once again learn about their real bodies, recognize their bodily image, and work mainly on "their supports." The support on the floor from the referent of the relationship with life and death, as a maternal support, a containing potential where "giving oneself over" to hearing one's own sensations is to let go of fear. Here two approaches came together: the body and the word, as a synthesis of closing and opening, of protection and care to "talk through" the conflicts. This is how the transitional therapeutic space was opened.

4.2 Comments

Based on our experience, we uphold the validity this way of working, i.e. including body techniques in group therapy. This was what made it possible to elaborate the traumatic situation, whose bodily support hindered access to the word.

One particularly significant quote was: "It is not surprising that the body, sacrificed in our culture, returns with the violence of the repressed, to the scenario of its exclusion..."

We thus believe that an important line of research was opened regarding the transferential dynamic displayed in these groups. As we already indicated throughout the essay, counter-transference takes on new values in this problematic, raising important questions, and suggesting hypotheses for further reflection, which is a task to which we have dedicated ourselves in an effort to conceptualize our practice.

5 Psychosomatic Diseases: Reflections and Questions

5.1 Preamble

> *You see, psychoanalysis is an ethical proposal. For he who calls himself a psychoanalyst, whether you are by definition has to do with whether you produce truth.*   Fernando Ulloa

Working with children affected by state terrorism raises a number of questions.

Several fields overlap in this practice. In effect, it is psychoanalysis, the psychoanalytical practice with children who are brought to consultations for different motives: "he is sad," "she is not doing well in school," "his behavior

is a disaster," "he is vomiting and has headaches," and others. But these children have experienced a trauma: they have been directly affected by state terrorism, in a society most of which was decimated, silenced, and also intimidated by the actions of the dictatorial state.

Shortly into these first interviews, individual and social trauma were articulated, always bearing in mind that each case is exactly that, the particular aspect of the structuring of its subject and its desire. There are some questions which continue to recur and which must be examined, and that they asked us about. We will try to address those questions.

5.2   Psychosomatic illness

We have discussed the variety of motives that have led these children to consultation through some parental figure.

Often this is elevated to the category of symptom, in an analytical sense, and then a demand for analysis is articulated. Nonetheless, we have been struck by the number of children who, with different degrees of gravity, suffer psychosomatic reactions. In general these include asthma, allergies with manifestations on the skin and in the respiratory tract, eczema, alopecia, and infectious acne.

We will try to specify these affections.

These bodily lesions are not closely related to conversion symptoms, and appear resistant to analytic interpretation. In conversion disorder symptomatic remission is frequent, even after a short time of analysis.

There is a certain "silence" in which the psychosomatic disease unfolds, a certain suspension of the signifiers, which appear not to form a chain, not to connect to another signifier, but to lead directly to the real of the body, becoming a lesion.

We recall that J. Lacan, in *Seminario II*, considers psychosomatic responses as falling outside the neurotic structures: It is not an object relation, but reality. "Intra-organic investitures properly speaking, which we call auto-erotic in analysis, play a very important role in psychosomatic phenomena... We do not know, but it appears that it is a question of an investiture of the organ itself."

The organism would be excluded from the narcissistic relationship, without speculating on the moment when the ego is constituted and the imagination organized.

Sigmund Freud, in his article "Psychoanalytical Concept of Psychogenic Disturbances of Sight," indicates the role of repression in the formation of neurotic symptoms when sexualization of the function of an organ poses a danger to the ego. Much different is what occurs in the psychosomatic phenomenon in which the organ and object become unified to such an extent that we cannot distinguish between the source and object of the impulse, a distinction that is possible in neurosis.

Reflecting on the foregoing, let us consider the body, the real organism:

how can individuals make sense of reality, how can they become familiar with the reality with which they come into contact? It is but a universe of symbols, words, which can introduce something human into a reality which, in itself, does not "say" anything. The introduction of symbolic mediations leads to the parental function.

And this function, as such, becomes historicized.

It is necessary that on a contingent basis, whenever required, it be present, sustained affectively. This is especially so in the individual history of each subject through human support, special forms of support with which individuals are united through exchange of the word. Thus, through the word, father, mother, child and even the family in the broader sense are situated across generations. Family ties take shape in one's own generation, and in relation to prior and subsequent generations. The more points of linkage with reality the symbol is able to recover, the more effective this function has been, the more we get into the realm of neurosis.

We believe that psychosomatic illness reflects the failure of that structuring operation, and that in these children this failure is closely articulated to the social, to the vicissitudes that recent history imposed on those families and on all of society.

6   Treatment of children with psychosomatic conditions

Recent research in France, attempting to account for some particularities manifested in the treatment of psychosomatic illnesses, indicates that the dynamic often develops in three moments. One paragraph explains:

> In the first stage there is a harsh separation from a loved one, in childhood. In the second stage, this separation is repeated in reality, or a set of particular signifiers make the subject recall this separation. In a third stage, which is generally manifested less than a year after the previous one, the lesion appears.

"The signifiers that appear allude to dates," on the one hand, and on the other hand another aspect stands out: "A desacralization of one's own name occurs... The subject would appear to have no name of his own, and resigns to this dreaming of a new bodily identity... Having been a witness to a perverse scene... destroys the subject's symbolic references to his lineage." The correspondence between the points mentioned and what occurs in practice seemed significant to us.

As for the time vector, the histories of our patients present the following sequence:

- *1st stage.* Separation from a loved one, generally at a very early moment in life. This corresponds to the disappearance of one or both parents: assassination or passing into clandestinity; exile, with the consequent loss of contact with the grandparents, uncles and aunts, etc.

- *2nd stage.* Return of certain signifiers that re-actualize the prior stage, or repetition of the situation of loss. We allude, for example, to reiterated changes; return from exile; mobilization from the social sphere, having to do with information on what the genocide meant, obtained through political and human rights organizations; confirmation of the death of the disappeared; release from captivity; communications media that address the issue; beginning school, and thus becoming aware one's personal situation.
- *3rd stage.* Appearance of the psychosomatic lesion as such.

In several cases we have found an important antecedent having to do with the response from the body, which corresponds to the moment of loss. This loss does not appear to become dialectical by giving way to a chain of signifiers producing effects of meaning; rather, it manifests itself in the organism. Thus, for example, we find eczema in a child in the first year of life, and asthma at eight years. Let us examine a few cases:

- A. His father went underground before A's first birthday. Disappearance and death of the father. A went into exile with his mother and siblings. At 6 years A returned to the country temporarily. Signifiers reappeared that signified his father's death. Within a year allergic eczema appeared with major lesions.
- B. When B was two-and-a-half years old, her mother went underground and was jailed. Her mother was released when B was 11 years old. A few months later infectious acne reappeared.
- C. C has antecedents of respiratory problems. When he was 9 months old his father disappeared; it was thought that he had died in captivity. The mother, pursued by para-police forces, left him with his grandmother for several months. Some time later C and his mother were living together again, and he lost the bond that had been established with his grandmother, who he did not see again for several years. Soon thereafter allergic asthma appeared.

We will try to further clarify the meaning of the signifiers implied in the organic lesion.

We believe that the question of one's own name is a significant symbolic point of reference. We have observed phenomena of similarity in the sound of the paternal last name (the disappeared member of the family group) and certain aspects of the disease, which appear in the description made by the patient of his suffering, for example in moments of crisis. We have also found signifiers that refer to both the organ in which the lesion occurred and to the disappeared person. Here the role of the grandparents is accentuated; this is highlighted in several essays on psychosomatic affections. In some way, and beyond the particulars, we could say that these children see themselves as

children of their grandparents and parents of their own parents, an incestuous drama that proceeds in silence: speaking could mean dying.

How was the state operating at that time? In a perverse manner, in an established lie, in which the law was known yet routinely violated.

Secrecy and concealment, that which was not said in the family was articulated with what was not said in the society.

It was increasingly difficult for these parents to be parents to their children. Because of political activism and being underground? Because of their own oedipal structure? No doubt this is so; it makes us think once again of the place of a child in the desire of the parents, a desire that alienates but which at the same time is a condition for the possibility of a child becoming a desiring subject.

This is where the social aspect is articulated, where the official discourse and official action systematically proposed the real elimination of these children's parents, with no recognition of or adherence to legal order, in many cases reducing them to the status of NN, no name, an unidentified corpse torn apart from their individual and collective history, in an effort to annul their subjective condition. Moreover, the effects of state terrorism were multiplied and extended to the relatives, friends, and acquaintances of the victim, i.e. those unique people we spoke of at the outset, in whom the parental, humanizing function could take bodily shape and become effective.

Psychoanalysis holds that one must remember in order to forget, for what is not remembered is not forgotten; it repeats itself.

Fostering memories, promoting discussion, and raising questions: that is the purpose of this work.

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SECOND PART

The Development of an Oppositional
Culture Under the Aegis of an State
Terrorism

8

The Horrifying Reality: Psychocultural Effects of State Terrorism in South America

Horacio Riquelme U.

To Jan Gross, on recently turning 60

Because I wrote I wasn't at the executioner's house
Nor did I allow myself to be taken by the love of God
Nor did I accept that men were gods
Nor did I make myself desired as a scribe
Nor did poverty seem atrocious to me
Nor power something desirable
Nor did I wash or dirty my hands
Nor were my best woman friends virgins
Nor was a pharisee my friend
Nor despite cholera
Did I want to smash my enemy

(E. Lihn: *Porque escribí*)

1 Introduction

The establishment of "organized violence" in most of the Southern Cone countries in the last twenty years has significantly altered living conditions.

State terrorism makes its entrance and carries out a concerted, continuous attack on all things perceived as integral and stable (Riquelme, 1988: 39-48). In a premeditated manner, through the mediation of the experience of terror in all daily occurrences, extreme physical and psychological situations are created with the aim of inducing an attitude of apathy and patterns of behavior that lead to the passive adaptation of the affected. Signs of discontent and acts of opposition and rebelliousness, even incipient ones, must be done away with by the reflexive automatism of "playing dead." An effort is made to go unnoticed as an ineffable survival tactic; there are unambiguous threats of "disappearance," which is not a euphemism, and of assassination and torture

carried out under the aegis of "the horrifying reality."

Nonetheless, the use of military rule to maintain hegemony, even at the cost of blood and fire, has not achieved the objective of silencing all voices and intimidating all dissidence; rather, government by the military has gradually had to face a specific social and cultural response that transcends the limits of circumstantial protest and that is emerging as a new form of culture, a response in opposition to fear and silence.

Three factors have fostered the development of a culture that expresses itself as an alternative to organized violence:

First, military rule has proven incapable of articulating and implementing a comprehensive ideological model that goes beyond authoritarianism and of imposing "order and respect," it has not been able to play a leading social and cultural role in the respective nations.

Second, the countries in question have forces opposed to state terrorism that are physically subjugated but which cannot be delegitimized

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1   "The marvelous reality, one of the faces of Latin America. And the other one bloodied, intolerable: 'the horrifying reality' (J. Adown). This violence, manifest or hidden, penetrates the reality of Latin America, and consequently all its literature, from the most concrete to the most elaborate, metaphorical descriptions. Violence has become a new critical category. Imagination and violence, language and violence, are recurrent combinations in his titles of studies on the literature of Latin America. The unifying condition of literature, violence appears as the necessary central problem of every plot, because it is the central problem of all reality. Most eloquent are the images from El Salvador, the lists of the "disappeared" in Argentina; too stable and perhaps thus more easily forgotten are the horrors of Guatemala and Paraguay... But violence is not a historic datum, a sort of unavoidable counterpart to imagination and language. It is the result of a clash that is occurring in history, through growing consciousness, the rejection of and struggle of the Latin American peoples against servitude and plunder. Latin America is constituted —in its own judgment and that of others— in these two images which are at the same time two projects of identity: on the one hand, positively, is the possibility of formulating the world through the word —the imagination, language— and on the other, negatively, as a legacy of subjugation: violence" (Campra, 1987: 82).

2   "The authoritarian regimes of Europe between 1920 and 1945 aimed at the creation of a 'new order,' even a 'millinery reich', as opposed to liberalism and democracy. The military dictatorships of Latin America today are first of all regimes without an ideology. The 'national security doctrine' that those institutionalized military governments share to a lesser or greater degree furnishes a rhetoric that conceals their illegitimacy, rather than providing a new source of legitimacy. That doctrine was above all a way to forge a mobilizing consensus within the military institution around an image that was related to their professional alarmism. Their theories of war, by enlarging magnifying the spectrum of threats and situating them within the nation itself, provided a corporatist basis for the army's intervention in politics, but they did not explain it. They could justify a lasting presence in positions of command in the state, but they did not establish a new power. In brief, the theory of national security in no way takes the place of an ideology, not in its consistency, its diffusion, or its constitutive function" (Rouquié, 1984: 385).

ethically or in relation to the social question. Thus, a process of social and cultural polarization is under way between victors and vanquished, with a vast "no-man's land" in between that is not covered exclusively by authoritarian rule and which nonetheless triggers prior experiences of oppression in the collective consciousness.[3]

Finally, in terms of cultural importance, one can speak of a thematic sensitization and of specific contents already present in the culture of Latin America as far as the situation of totalitarian oppression is concerned. The presence of Spanish and Jewish immigrants, fleeing the wrath of Franco and the Nazis, respectively, struck a deep chord in the Latin American cultural milieu. Thus, one can speak of a degree of anticipatory perception, perhaps not in reference to the direct danger of each dictatorship in particular, but at least with respect to the dimension that terror, when exercised "professionally," can attain. It could be postulated that argued that a greater cultural sensitivity, in particular toward human rights, has evolved and that upon this basis the thematic content of each crime against humanity can be developed with a certain degree of resolution and depth.

"The literature of recent years demonstrated that true art is not a reflection of society, but rather a response to the world" (Mantares, 1987: 9).

This social and cultural response of opposition to the totalitarian project of state terrorism is extremely important in order to facilitate a more in-depth examination of the psychosocial damages caused by the military dictatorships in Latin America, and to develop cultural forms for processing the social experience under these living conditions, thereby fostering a specific awareness of the need for psychocultural prevention.

The slogan "Never again" should be nourished socioculturally by the bitter experience of recent years (Comisión Nacional sobre Desaparición de Personas, 1984).

2   Methodology of complicity reading

The need to communicate across long distances and the partial solitude to which exile led have fostered certain phenomena that are characteristic of the uprooted and tension-ridden situations that the exiles experienced as a result of having been forced to abandon their social project.

One of these is closely following the literature of the subregion. In our

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3   "That is, Chile may be a synonym for a laboratory of barbarism, where the multinationals try out demential plans for the rest of the world; Chile may also —through the multifaceted and sophisticated resistance of the people— be a valid laboratory for liberation, an experiment of humanity possible in alienating circumstances" (Dorfman, 1984: 347).

everyday experience written communication has taken on unprecedented importance for demarcating cultural boundaries and affective poles in the process of understanding the meaning of our future and struggling against solitude and oblivion.

This need to span distances has fostered an interest in systematizing the aesthetic experience of literature, and by posing a series of specific questions, in gaining access to certain emotional and cognitive responses that help us to define our cultural resources and that enable us to gain insight into new perspectives for rebuilding our damaged identity (Riquelme, 1987: 281-295).

With a view to continuing to participate in the culture of South America and making our contribution, it is valuable to: a) consider, in general, how the new situation of organized violence is reflected in literary expression, b) extract the leitmotifs of the accessible literature and relate them to the prevailing psychosocial situation, comparing it, for example, to testimonies and social and anthropological studies of the respective situations; c) dialectically deduce the possibilities of both expression and thematic interpretation in the texts studied, assuming that literature, as a re-creation of social reality, can reveal some fundamental experiences and forms of expression to us that serve as keys in dealing with the almost annihilating experience of state terrorism, and, d) as regards existential solutions, foster preventive activities in the area of psychosocial health[4]; and ultimately, pay tribute to the writers of our subregion, who with their work of profoundly examining their own experience and making an effort to articulate it in literature have renewed the culture, attenuating the fog in which the protagonists of organized violence sought to submerge us; they have given our generation of wanderers an invaluable base of psychocultural support.

3 Theoretical context

In this desire to review the literature from a position of active opposition to organized violence, we find ourselves facing a dual methodological challenge: we must consider both the various aspects of the literary response, including its sociological substance and aesthetic integrity, and its psychocultural aspects, articulating a form of expression that goes beyond the momentary outbreak of protest, creating the bases for understanding the life experience of

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4   "If a poem on sadness had no purpose other than to infect us with the author's sorrow, this would be very sad for art. The miracle of art is that it reminds us of another evangelical miracle, turning water into wine; the true nature of art is such that it always includes a seed of change... Art is to life as wine is to grapes, said a philosopher, and he was right, indicating that art draws its material from life, but offers in exchange something that is not found in the properties of this material" (Vigotski, 1972: 299).

peoples living under dictatorial regimes. Access to a psychocultural semantics of this epoch becomes feasible insofar as the literary products of this culture attain a high degree of transcendence based on life experience, giving cultural expression to the ineffable, articulating in images and schemes the anxieties and horrors of their time, and laying the groundwork for dramatic resolution in the shared tragedy.

As for sociological substance, we agree with Hauser that "artistic production is not a struggle for the presentation of *ideas* , essences, universalities" (Hauser, 1983: 9); rather, it is a matter of recouping substantive life experiences, which are universal because they are authentic, adhering firmly to a perception guided by both the intuition and social intelligence of the respective author, which paradoxically proposes its general validity by the expressive re-creation of that which is uniquely transcendent. In sociological terms, literary activity involves the mediated and voluntary interaction of the writer with his reader, and it leads to the cultivation of new expressive forms in the perception and understanding of oneself for those who participate in this process of communication.

To study thematic integration and aesthetic solvency in literature, we turn to the concept of mimesis as "interpretation of reality by literary representation," a concept set forth by Auerbach, based on dialectical analysis of modern realism, which seeks a multifaceted approach to the literary text. This means an approach based not only on the usual canons of interpretation and analysis, but one which recurs to emotional transference, which is the foundation of the writing/reading process. This explicit introduction of empathy as a medium of interaction with the text makes it possible for the reader and interpreter to integrate the literary experience subjectively insofar as he is seized by the reading as an act that involves emotional and semantic dispute; the reader is not a passive receptacle.[5]

The psychocultural dimension of literature is considered here in terms of its proposals for aesthetic and experiential solutions for extreme situations undergone; for this purpose the keys of interpretation and expression that

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5   ."..well you find in us a constant process of formation and interpretation whose object we are: we try unceasingly to order our lives with its past, present, and future and our environment, the world in which we live, in a comprehensible form to obtain an overview; this overview changes more or less quickly and radically depending on whether we are more or less forced or inclined to incorporate, or capable of incorporating, new experiences. These are the systematizations and interpretations that the writers who we treat attempt to capture in each moment, and not only at one, but at many moments, whether from different people, or from the same person at different times, such that their crossing, complementation, and contradiction might result in something like a synthetic view of the world, or at least a problem for the reader's desire for synthetic interpretation." (Auerbach, 1986: 518).

literary activity has developed under organized violence are examined, as the literature breaks with the silence imposed through authoritarian rule and rebels against taboos that some seek to resurrect through manipulation of the mass media (Cánovas et al., 1987).

In relation to the thematic classification of the many aspects treated in the recent literature of South America, in this study we propose to examine four situations: a) the establishment of state terrorism; b) everyday life under the state of siege; c) alienation as a *modus vivendi*; and, d) exile - *insile*...[6]

4   The establishment of state terrorism

State terrorism was established at different times and in different ways, depending on whether one is speaking of Argentina and Uruguay, which experienced growing systematization of military repression, or Chile, with a coup d'état cunningly premeditated and carried out. The "defeated" on both sides of the Andes found themselves in a similar life situation of persecution and were personally threatened; as a social and cultural group, they experienced a violent break with what hitherto had been their identity and activity as members of society.

La vecina orilla [The Neighbor Across the River] (Benedetti, 1982) provides fleeting security for a young Uruguayan, dragged as it were by generational inertia to a confrontation with the blind order of the military, on the eve of the installation of its oppressive regime and the enforcement of its statement that young people in general are worthy of suspicion and thus preventive punishment. An adolescent prank unleashed a campaign of persecution against the young man, who must go into exile after a stay in prison. Surviving in the neighboring metropolis is difficult, but not impossible. The shadow of repression in near-by Uruguay is projected as a progressive threat through the prison experiences recounted by continually growing numbers of fellow exiles:

> Leonor's husband is at the Libertad Prison. She saw him after coming and says that he had aged 10 years in four months... I ask Laura about Enrique, her brother, who sat at the same bench with me in grade school. "It's been a year since we heard anything about him. He's been wiped off the face of the earth."

The first-person account in an almost colloquial language is permeated with atrocious references: "*No one would say that this year nine hundred have already died for political motives.*"

The intensity of the threat grows. It does not stop at national boundaries;

6   *Insile* is author's neologism.

the young Uruguayan must go underground in the house of "the neighbor across the river." These pages, supposedly written for an affected and arriviste woman friend, document in a self-ironic and sober tone the evolving experiences of practically an entire generation.

Tripulantes de la niebla [Riders of the Fog] (Rojas, 1986) takes place off the coast of Valparaíso in the days just following the coup d'état in Chile . A large number of civilians have been taken prisoner and transferred to a floating jail, the *Lebu*, a vessel that is partially run aground. The abuse of the prisoners is not fortuitous, nor is it focused on certain individuals. Rather, it is aimed at systematically crushing the dignity of them all: "*There I was being put through an immense machine for grinding up men, a detail, a nuisance, an ant...*"

The fog that continues to obscure the horizon appears to augment the sense of isolation, of living in the inner world of the defeated. The first responses to the perplexity brought on by the ignominious treatment meted out to those affected appear to be outbreaks of black humor: gestures and ironic statements deprive the uniformed aggression of its absolute condition; the vulnerability of the dispossessed, described without pathetic references, salvages their humanity. The aggressors are portrayed as imbued with fear of a purported Plan Z; they thus act within the military apparatus unable to understand their own role or that of the forces that manipulate them. The painful irony enables the prisoners to keep alive a certain shared hope, insofar as it helps to examine in depth a wide variety of nuances in the gestures and actions of these "riders of the fog."

The affective abyss separating the members of many working class families whose sons entered military service the same year as the coup is the subject of "*En familia* " [In Family] and "*El resto es nada* " [The Rest is Nothing].

"*In Family* " (Dorfman, 1979) describes the weekend visit of the conscripted son of a working-class family to his loved ones, poor and simple people who are directly affected by the massive repression, before being sent to a concentration camp to guard political prisoners. The family gathering is replete with tension and direct allusions to the military violence. Hunger has momentarily been set at bay thanks to a certain activity of the oldest daughter, which cannot be stated explicitly.

The moments of silence and indirect allusions between father and son are the most expressive, as this is apparently their only possible form of interaction. Since the father and son create tacit channels of communication, it is possible for them to break the stranglehold on communication imposed by their rigid roles, so that they can leave together early in the morning to pick up the oldest daughter/sister.

A more brutal example of this existential conflict is developed in "*El resto es nada*" (Valdés, 1986). A rank and file soldier directly abuses prisoners. The depersonalized form of existence fostered by a military esprit de corps and unquestionable obedience have already become a key part of his everyday

language; his emotions appear to be blocked by having to carry out orders from a direct superior:

> But my corporal did not want to stop. After the necessary placing of the hood and dunking, he began to make the prisoners run along the edge of the gymnasium. If they did not run into the archway, they would run into the walls at the back. And on top of it all, he ordered me: "Each time they pass by here, hit 'em with the butt of your gun, you understand?" I had to try to land two or three blows each time they passed, so they went that much faster, and the corporal got more enjoyment from their heads banging against the concrete.

The brief corollary to this demonstration of cruelty with defenseless people is provided by the presence of the father among the hooded prisoners: *Jacobo*, his old voice says, *"it is better that no one know of this. The defeated should keep silent."*

"*El Día de Muertos*" (Szichman, 1985) begins with the inevitable confrontation of two former schoolmates: Sánchez, who has become a good soldier and obeys his orders, and Reissing, a prisoner sentenced to death by firing squad in a summary trial. In his desperation the prisoner argues, appealing to their earlier friendship, and insults his virtual executioner, stirring up memories of shameful moments of their shared past in school, and appealing to the rules of honor in war: *"There must be 10 soldiers, just so you know, and not these two recruits who've not even completed their training; and the only light allowed is daylight... It's been one hundred years since anyone has been executed..."* Nonetheless, Reissing is killed by a bullet fired by Sánchez. In addition, this shooting appears to emerge in the narration as but a fragment in a larger spiral of violence. The "day of the dead" will not end without the shooting (as absurd as the execution of the soldier?) of a group of people gathered in a private home with no special interest other than hearing the radio broadcast of a boxing match and playing cards.

5 Everyday life under state-of-siege conditions

It would appear that under state-of-siege conditions, daily life would be condemned to incommunication. Organized violence is depicted as omnipresent; an all-out effort is made to target those who do not fear and respect it. Alda Roballo says: *"There is no tongue/word/gesture/that is useful/for communicating with the shadows/of these pallid faces that I know..."* (Roballo, 1987). The threat of ubiquitous interference finds direct expression in *La Composición* [The Composition] (Skármeta, 1982) and *A la Escondida* [Hide-and-seek] (Dorfman, 1989).

An official arrives at Pedrito's primary school to organize an interscholastic match. That day "the composition" is to be written on how the parents live under the state of siege; the children could find that there are two simultaneous

social realities: one of forced regularity and apparent submission, accompanied by the intimidation of kidnappings and detentions; and the other cultivating hopes of change and revival of a social project that has been defeated but not extirpated, maintained alive through the gestures of solidarity in everyday life and from hearing opposition radio stations broadcasts from abroad. In the face of the manifest incongruence of these two realms of reference, Pedrito creates a reality of his own in the composition which he writes for the military rulers.

In *A la escondida* the children of a man who lives in semi-clandestine conditions after the coup constantly play "hide-and-seek." They could, in the candor of their youth, make dangerous revelations to an interrogator astute enough to introduce them to a sinister game of intrigue and lies focused on revealing the identity and activities of their father and his friends. The interrogator posed as an "uncle,"[7] one of many friends the father normally introduced to the children, but now the father and "uncles" have no personal security and the children's trust has also been violated.

The fear underlying the most common family interactions under state terrorism is well-expressed in these two accounts.

The personification of the oppressor in *Retamales de la Hoz* enables the author (Nahuelpán, 1986) to realize a repressed fantasy that culminates in an act of direct vengeance. The narrator's fervent hatred comes through in an ignominious description of the military torturer:

> and you turn around in a not very olympic manner with your protruding belly thinking that everyone, everyone is looking at you and laughing at the color of your dark skin and your father's legacy and how small you are because of your short legs, and on top of it all the terse comment on his large bunions: "It is better that you go... for you have the face of a degenerate."

He takes pleasure in annotated enumeration of the base passions of the henchman, contrasting scenes from his life with those of a clandestine hero with a brilliant history (."..Dangerous extremist and high-level leader..."), known as Gastón, and who, representing so many people humiliated by Retamales de la Hoz et al., personally defeats the corporal and strips him of his authority by unmasking his evident cowardliness.

The threat of "disappearing" becomes a reality for those who do not sympathize and directly collaborate with state terrorism, which is to say, for most citizens. This threat is made openly only from time to time; the episodes in which the participants in *La canción de Nosotros* [Our Song] (Galeano, 1975) get lost and find one another again are permeated with this dark reality:

Mariano says:

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7   In Spanish-speaking countries, close friends of parents are often referred to as "uncles" or "aunts."

One fine day you discover just how easy it is for them to wipe you off the face of the earth. They burn your letters, your books, your things. They kill you or lock you up or make you flee. One fine day you turn around and discover that not a trace is left. As though you had never existed. Now I have someone else's name.

Duelo Congelado [Suspended Grief] perpetuates its emotional havoc in the relatives of the "disappeared," who suffer inevitable pain and tension. *"Como si mi corazón tuviera una ventana rota"* [As if my Heart had a Broken Window] (Echeverría, 1986) directly attests to such a situation:

The night charged with absence —palpitating, tense, and tenacious— is my scaffold. There are no ghosts, everything is very present, indignant, and ready to go into action. I am fearful, but it is not right, I have nothing to lose, what's left here?

My mother says it would be better to put a halt to the investigations, move elsewhere, close up our souls, forget ourselves. Remove you from our memory like a strip of bacon and throw you in the trash. Dawn anew and then walk away, with no punishment. Unbound, virgin, yes!

The police have no leads. The chief of police is a very nice guy. Saturday I'll go to the movies with him; it's not that I'm interested in the movies in these circumstances, but such friendships make things easier. I'm not shy, there are words that lose their meaning, I don't know fear nor am I shy nor do I have scruples; I stopped being sensitive. I believe I stopped being myself...

I used to like love songs, those that take hold of your heart as if it were crying out. Now I have that cramp in my heart, creaking. The days are long, miscarrying between the dirty sheets.

The police captain in the other city promised me he would do everything possible and asked in exchange what others ask for. I pay, I have hope. The only thing that makes me stubborn is hope. At times I feel as if I cannot go on, and that my hope is a little package I carry under my arm: this is my hope, I tell myself, don't leave it behind on the bus seat. And I clutch it before going out, and place it in a chair when I return.

Mauricio Rosencof and Eleuterio Fernández (1987-1988) introduce the reader to their unique extreme experience of twelve years of being kept in solidarity confinement, as "hostages" of the Uruguayan dictatorship, for the express purpose of personal annihilation. Despite the direct and detailed description of arbitrary everyday treatment and torture systematically designed to "drive them mad," the reading of *Memorias del Calabozo* [Memories of the Dungeon] gives the reader the impression of having been invited by both authors to participate in a long discussion over *mate* (herbal tea), in the course of which they unravel memories and associations, constructing a form of expression in dialogue with the anxieties and sorrows of twelve years condemned to silence and systematic terror. This narrative form makes it possible to understand how, through ingenuity and patience, they gradually overcome the physical barriers of incommunication imposed on them at the same time endeavoring to maintain their personal integrity despite the systematic break with references and the continuing psychological pressure and physical ag-

gression of their jailers, intended to break their will. The reader thus shares in Mauricio and Eleuterio's efforts to communicate with one another and to encourage one another through a simple yet effective system of banging; we are able to follow their interaction "in solitary confinement," their discussions, which give them strength and enable them, after their time in jail, to take up once again their communication, sooner and in greater depth than anticipated. Moreover, through their "memories of the dungeon" the reader is also able to perceive and comprehend the "reverse side" of the Uruguayan dictatorship, revealed to us from an otherwise unattainable perspective, while also participating in a reflection —over *mate*— of two lives not truncated, a revenge for the tactic of deterioration and destruction used against them, the prospect of death in life.

6   Alienation as modus vivendi

Alienation finds expression in the obsessive ambience aimed at standardizing consciences, with which state terrorism has tried to perpetuate its social and cultural influence. The psychosocial interactions between producers and targets of ideology should be considered in terms of their symptoms as well as in the way in which specific cultural alternatives are furthered.

Linguistic purism has been upheld as an absolute motto by the self-condemned contrite character in *Deposición* (Gallardo, 1987). In a Spanish free of *"barbarisms, solecisms, vulgarities, malapropisms, gallicisms"* (though not of awkward expression) he relates in detail how he was drawn to the implacable "Command for Defense of the Language," and the effects of this on his activity

> My classes began to lose the sober scientific tone that I had strived for until then, becoming litanies of insults among colleagues and students, who perverted our beautiful language. Those were difficult days, but at least they had the seal of irascible enthusiasm that gives you faith in your endeavors. I stopped visiting certain friends whose Spanish was improper, neglected, or unpardonably impure and offensive...

The following phase of this pedantic vigilance of linguistic purity quickly ensued; soon the author is seen dedicated to aggressively protecting the language, placing himself above the rules of social comity to punish the violators, who constitute, moreover, the vast majority in these societies where the language is so poorly spoken, to the point of achieving a certain notoriety within the organization. However, he is not able to annul completely his self-criticism; the more daring his attacks on propriety become, the more his doubts mount regarding the ultimate sense of an organization that uncompromisingly undertakes to cultivate secondary virtues, and that disciplines its members through fear of being denounced to the authorities. These doubts lead him to suddenly abandon the Militant Defense Command. The author contin-

ues, however, under its compulsive influence; it appears that he can overcome it only insofar as he completes his "deposition" in a language other than his mother tongue. This suggests an appropriate metaphor of the process of subjugation based on codes that appear to be absurd because they are so limited; these codes are used by totalitarian circles to influence their members, subordinating them to alleged absolute principles, which are to be applied to the entire society.

Constanza Lira (1986) gives physical expression to the climate of terror that invaded everyday life after the coup. The fable in *Estante Cama* [Murphy Bed] keenly grasps the split in self-perception implicit in everyday horror, all the more disturbing the more trivial it is. The story is narrated by a woman who, like so many others, lives with her husband in a small apartment and who, according to the account, considers herself a normal member of society, able to explain to herself each of the minute variations in her everyday surroundings. What is new in the apartment is the Murphy bed, which when opened at night reveals its strange capacity to contain corpses of people killed under the reign of violence and thus to bring the latent horror of the outside world into the couple's refuge. The nightmare has thus become an integral part of their everyday life; traditional rituals are not capable of relegating it to the attic of their consciousness. This conveys the sensation of permanent horror imposed by each particular state-of-siege regime; it is perceived that "good customs" can provide no walls or defenses that might eliminate it from our consciousness.

El Intruso [The Intruder] by Elibio Rodríguez (1987) transports us with a quick pace and soft, ironic backdrop to an atmosphere in which there is no respect whatsoever for the right to privacy. The character in question has developed the art of entering the homes of others and remaining inside, unnoticed, for as long as possible, breaking the taboo against violation of privacy. He does not appear to be motivated by voyeurism. His acts appear to document metaphorically a situation apparent to all: anyone at all may have their privacy invaded, seized, and destroyed, with no right to lay claim to anything. And so it is that the intruder is generally treated as an inoffensive madman. If spoliation of the right to privacy is now a real mark of everyday life, the intruder as a person may perhaps be a pretext for irrationality, but at least he is not aggressive.

7   Exile-*Insile*

These are two ways of diminishing the effect of repressive bouts aimed at annihilation. Their psychosocial consequences are complementary insofar as both cultivate resistance to oblivion and promote long-term solidarity. It should be noted that both paths have led to much literary production. Skármeta notes: "It is exile that revealed to me the small importance of the book... Here you

have a case where the vocation to write calls out to recover the country for one writes" (Skármeta, 1981).

The testimony of history truncated is the substance of *Antenor Flores* (Yáñez, 1983). Using a biographical novel, the historical and social future of Chile is documented over the last half-century, through the personal history of a worker. The coup, the military dictatorship, and his exile to West Germany are the last existential stages in the account of Antenor Flores, a recent exile who revives the shared history for another Chilean. The use of simple and direct language faithfully depicts the subject's reflections on his past and his interest in continuing to "look ahead" without losing himself in vague nostalgias and diffuse problems. Significantly, to date this work has only been published in its German translation.

It can also be assumed that the lucid tension of exile has nourished the certain fantasy, necessary for creating the ambience and thematic development of *Los herederos* [The Heirs] (Marra, 1985), a long, melancholic song of suicide stemming from self-denial by a social group that elaborates extensively about its impotence in the face of the terror that they themselves helped to incite. The heirs, two brothers, decide that their presence in the city is ever more superfluous and decide to take physical possession of a rural property that requires several weeks of travel to reach, apparently with little or no contact with the outside world. Seven other people, likewise unemployed, are invited to populate the enclave. The two brothers' maid goes along, as a matter of course. After a hazardous journey to the interior, they set themselves up at the large house they inherited and continue their everyday habits, gradually becoming accustomed to the idea of an indefinite stay in a microcosm of the universe with no major events other than hearing but not believing that a near-by town had just disappeared. Growing apathy begins to be cultivated voluntarily from the time when the place of refuge is invaded by insolent barbarians. One brother instructs the other:

> "Listen closely," he told me gravely, "don't talk, don't protest. Do like the rest, because nothing is happening here and everyone is convinced that nothing is going on, so you, you should act like the rest, normally, as you have been doing until now."

The insinuation is integrated:

> I let time go by, with our meals and customs, and now with the fellows who had recently arrived: after all, and in principle, they weren't bothering anyone. I would dare say that they practically did not exist.

The successive extermination of one's friends is commented on by those still surviving in somewhat monotonous terms: *"Don't you see that nothing is happening, you have nothing to find out, because nothing is happening."* There is a tacit fear of being considered insane, if one openly recognizes what is happening in the full light of day. If something should not be happening, it cannot be happening, even if everything indicates that indeed it is happening.

This sarcastic parable was written by an Argentinian exiled in Sweden.

In sum, the development demonstrated in these four "items" of literature in opposition to state terrorism helps us understand a universe of expression with special characteristics:

1. Defying the insistent instructions to obey and keep quiet, literary communication arises as a vital need of those affected, allowing for the development of their identity, despite all their sorrows and grief.

2. Beyond momentary consolation in the face of personal and collective pain, one finds a consequent cultivation of a critical attitude can be found or discovered as a mood in the writers in question: they thus transcend the "inner world of the defeated" insofar as they maintain a tradition of creative resistance and, in spite of the confrontation with organized violence, transcend barriers of communication and expression, making the experience of that time accessible and communicable.

3. The literary treatment of the horrifying reality in South America does not leads neither to a morbid aestheticism of the oppressor-oppressed relationship, a categorical and ahistorical perpetuation of a very specific conflict; nor to a symbolic attribution to absurdity of the repressive action, personal negation of individuals and their relatives due to the virtual "inhumanity" of the events. To the contrary, the literature of opposition to state terrorism focuses its attention and its thematic and aesthetic development on the search for dramatic solutions in the face of the destructive aggression of organized violence, revealing its workings through its literary re-creation and development.

8 Comment

State terrorism has developed systematic methods for physically and psychologically intimidating people, as well as systematic methods for the psychosocial manipulation of culture, with the manifest intent of subjugating in nascendi any opposition, and to ensure the unhindered development of its socioeconomic model.

In the Southern Cone countries this psychological warfare against the

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8   We agree with Galeano that: "Like a mirror with two reflecting surfaces, literature can show what is seen and what, though not seen, exists; and since there is nothing that does not contain its own negation, it often operates in the form of vengeance and prophecy. The imagination opens new doors to understanding reality and has a premonition of its transformation: it anticipates, through dreams of the world to be conquered, while also challenging the unmoving posture of the bourgeois world. In the system of silence and fear, the power to create and invent constitutes an attack on the routines of obedience." (Galeano, 1981).

general population has sparked more or less specific responses in all areas of social and cultural activity, from new forms of social organization among those affected (Vidal, 1982) to the development of psychotherapeutic practices for the victims of repression.[9]

Thus Latin America constitutes a social and cultural realm with tremendous implications for the task of psychosocial rearticulation. The following aspects are particularly important:

1. The explicit purpose of organized violence to provoke silence and oblivion through the exercise of terror has been thwarted by creative endeavor in many areas of artistic production. In literature, a special effort has been made to find the mode of expression best suited to the various psychosocial forms of pernicious activity adopted by organized violence; this is possible when the horror and its effects on the participants is stated directly.

2. In view of the difficulty of measuring the damage caused by organized violence in "precise figures," access to the semantics of the existential experience of this period has been actively promoted through the literary sources.

3. This existential progress in literary development gives way to insights for understanding life experience, creates new forms of expression, and may: a) operate in opposition to the situations considered thus far as doubly traumatic, insofar as they are extreme and not articulated; b) make possible a process of psychosocial reparation of the experience of state terrorism; and c) help to lay the cultural and social bases for the development of activities for dissemination and psychosocial prevention.

Insofar as the literature of this period bears adequate witness to and channels forms of understanding and expression of life experience under state terrorism, it must be included expressly in the efforts to overcome the psychosocial damage caused by organized violence. The literature of opposition has been and continues to be fundamental in the activities undertaken to expand the democratic bases of a new society that respects human rights as a matter of principle and personal conviction.

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9 E. Lira, E. Weinstein, and J. Kovalskys (1987: 317) suggest: "In our view the individual or group perspective that makes the therapeutic space possible may in a certain sense make it possible to deepen understanding of the effects of the system, both in its acute repressive forms and in its less aggressive covert form. The necessary democratization must per force be a dialectical process between individuals and social processes, but the therapeutic space may be a place for building and anticipating democratic practices and tasks, despite its limitations, ruptures, and exorcisms."

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9

Dictatorship, Democracy, Torture

Mauricio Rosencof

Some time ago I was talking with a German journalist, through an interpreter, who told me he was going to travel to the Americas. He said he was going to go to Brazil, Argentina, and Chile. He was going to be in Chile in November to witness the process of "institutionalization." And he was telling me that the process of "institutionalization" in the Americas and the result of the Chilean elections could contribute to greater protection for the nation's *institucionalidad* [institutionality]. So I was telling him that in this period one might find a "dis-institutionality," and that we sometimes end up consuming highly advertised products —like Coca Cola, which we do not hold in high esteem, but which after all we drink— and that the same thing could be happening with our institutionality. Indeed, I think the same thing is happening.

I told him that for those of us from the Americas democracy is like music that comes in over a receiver or a radio, but with someone else manipulating the volume: he turns the volume up, and there is more democracy; he turns it up a little more, and there's a little more. But at any moment he might turn the radio off.

This is precisely the situation of torture. In torture we are also consuming some highly advertised products. For example, I know that conceptually it is correct to work with the idea of state terrorism. But when we say that there is state terrorism, we are implicitly recognizing the existence of another terrorism. So I wanted to decipher in a few sentences some of the myths being created in Latin America, without elaborating on them. The German journalist spoke to me of recent years experience, asserted that we were marching towards democracy, and somehow he stubbornly persisted in associating torture with dictatorship and democracy with human rights.

First, the problem of dictatorship in Latin America is not just a problem of the last 20 years, or just of this century: it dates back 500 years. With the conquest came the Inquisition, as well as hypocrisy and despotism. For 500 years efforts have been under way to "stabilize" Latin America.

Of course strides and improvements have been made. Somewhat in the style of Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa in *Il Gattopardo* [The Leopard]: "Something must be changed so that everything can remain the same." All this

reminds me of the history of Saint-Exupery's *Little Prince*. The little boy who is the protagonist draws something that he shows the older people and asks them: "Does this scare you?" And the adult responds: "Why should it scare me, if it's a hat?" But the child says no, and thinks no, it's not a hat, it's a boa constrictor devouring an elephant.

For five hundred years first the Spanish boa, then the Portuguese, British, and North Americans, and today the international banking community, are trying to devour Latin America. And the struggle continues between an elephant that doesn't want to let itself be digested and a boa that crushes, that tortures, transforming the flesh of others into its own.

In the case of torture there is also a hand on a dial, a continuum; it is not just a question of dictatorship implying torture, and democracy, respect for human rights. That is, there is also a little device, and someone says "more torture, a little bit more;" then all of a sudden he goes overboard, and there is "massive torture," as occurred in Uruguay. There are no absolute boundaries between democracy and dictatorship, between torture and non-torture, in Latin America. This doesn't mean that one does not prefer democracy. For if it's a choice between being beaten one time or three times, of course you prefer just once.

This is not speculation; it is all documented. And so I would like to refer to a text by a famous terrorist born in Germany, who made his career in the United States. This terrorist wrote his memoirs. He dedicates a couple of pages of a two-volume book to Chile. But first, to satisfy your curiosity, I'll clarify that this terrorist is Henry Kissinger.

These two pages on Chile contain a dramatic progression. First, the State Department considers that there is a possibility that the Popular Unity coalition, headed up by Allende, may win the elections. The first measure, in the framework of democracy, is an injection of funds to Allende's opponent, and an anti-Allende campaign, with a very large flow of dollars. But Allende won just the same. The State Department's second concern: to prevent Allende from taking office. Allende took office. Third concern: eliminate Allende. And he describes the generals' offers to assassinate Allende as if it were the most normal thing in the world. Finally Pinochet's great "solution" was imposed. All this is retold with absolute impunity.

A few months ago a document related to this matter was made public. There is an international federation, a school of torture, which operates in different democratic settings. I wish to cite the document, for it bears on our present and future situation: it is the famous *Santa Fe II* document. The original —*Santa Fe I*— group brought together Reagan advisers from California, who presented a draft policy for Latin America. *Santa Fe II* was produced by the same team, this time for Bush.

These people are very concerned about cultural and ideological issues. They even cite Gramsci, noting that economic determinism is not the only determinism; cultural factors are also determinants.

These terrorists are trying to have it both ways, to make the military understand the importance of institutional stability. That is, you should have governments that are civilian, legal, and democratic; yet at the same time they manifest a secondary interest in those governments which, they say, are transitory structures, since when a government comes to power, and four or five years later is replaced by another one. These people are transitory in their posts, not such a big deal. Therefore, they say, priority much be placed on the permanent bureaucracy, the permanent structures: the professors, teachers, and bureaucrats. Journalists and writers must be influenced. But those whose chances of being won over should be eliminated.

They believe that the most important thing is the military apparatus: actions must be aimed mainly at strengthening relations with the military. And to this end they propose increasing economic assistance and ideological assistance. Among other things, they propose as a solution to the problem of political prisoners that political prisons be established under the military, prisons that belong to the army, to the armed forces. And so it is that we'll have a democracy, with prisons for political prisoners within a democracy, under the custody of the military. That is what they propose.

And now let us turn to Uruguay, and the specific problem of torture in my country.

Uruguay is a small country, 185,000 km^2, with a population of 2.8 million, and an army of 70,000 soldiers. Uruguay has 9 million head of cattle, three per capita. We have abundant fisheries. And we also have 31% infant malnutrition, according to UNICEF; 1,200 children die from malnutrition each year. It is like all Latin America; this figure is the subversive datum of the region. There is nothing more subversive than hunger. In Latin America a child dies from malnutrition with each passing minute. It is as though three Hiroshima bombs were being silently detonated each year in Latin America. This produces convulsion, and a response, as has been the case for the last 500 years. First came the indigenous leaders, Tupac Amaru, then the liberators, from Bolívar to Martí, then the revolutionaries, from Sandino to *Che* Guevara and Sendic.

In Uruguay in the 1960s this response took the form of working class struggles, student mobilizations, and the armed action of the National Liberation Movement - *Tupamaros*, under a democratic government that offered specialized courses on torture, to prepare the way for the future. A technical staff member of the Agency for International Development, which usually provides agronomists and similar experts as part of technical cooperation, came to Uruguay. Under this cover a rector from the university of torture was brought in to police headquarters. He gave some courses that included prophylaxis, theory, and practice. In practical classes, for example in a room with the presence of army officers and police commissars, they used beggars without families and a prostitute. Using them as guinea pigs, the instructor explained to which organs the electric prod should be applied, where to strike blows, etc., etc. The three human beings used as guinea pigs died.

And this teacher became disgusted by this. This teacher who had already created a death squad, which is a para-statal agency, not a paramilitary group, within a democratic structure, to do the dirty work, became disgusted with these three deaths. It disgusted him because of his philosophy of torture, which set the guideline for massive torture in Uruguay. He formulated this philosophy, which is drawn from a psychologist; the forces of repression also have their psychologists. He said:

> I take this as a full-fledged profession: if a prisoner is taken to the extreme in interrogation, such that he believes he is going to die, he closes up, and there is no possibility of getting anything at all. You always have to leave a little door open, a slight possibility that if he collaborates in the interrogation he can save his life.

And this was a characteristic of torture in Uruguay where, nonetheless, many were killed in torture, many were murdered and disappeared, even children. In 1972 the armed forces participated in the repression, carrying out massive arrests and inflicting prolonged torture, which could last months, even years. And we were not living under a dictatorship! In 1972 there were 20,000 political prisoners in Uruguay; the dictatorship officially took power in mid-1973.

One of every 54 Uruguayans experienced torture and the dungeons. They filled the barracks, the police stations, and the common jails with prisoners. And they inaugurated the first military prison, called the "Freedom Prison." On the walls of Montevideo young people wrote: "The only freedom that exists in Uruguay is that of the prison."

I will not describe the techniques of torture; they are universal and well-known. There are documents that bear witness to the fact that there is an international organization of torture. I have spoken with persons tortured in other countries, and the techniques are absolutely identical, with slight variations.

But I wanted to tell one anecdote that I take as a most poignant symbol. The first group of prisoners were taken from a common prison located in Punta Carretas. They took the first prisoner to the military prison in the presence of the prison authorities; they were going to put on the first uniform, an important symbol. It was grey, manufactured by a British factory. The number was 001. Putting on the first uniform was a full-fledged ritual; all that was missing was the band. But they made a poor choice of the first candidate: they put the largest uniform on him, and he burst through it. The uniforms did not fit!

One fine day, in late 1973, nine of us who were leaders of the MLN-Tupamaros were taken from the prison to be held absolutely incommunicado in cells measuring two meters by one meter; we were kept incommunicado for eleven and a half years, during which time we did not see any faces, or the sun. Throughout this time we received no information, had no reading, could not write. Often they would not give us water, we drank our own urine. They would not give us food, or when they did, it was a half ration; we chewed insects,

toilet paper.

The objective of all this was stated to the press by the colonel in charge of the operation (which was denounced in 1976, before the United Nations Human Rights Commission by Amnesty International). This colonel said: "Since we couldn't kill them when we captured them, we're going to drive them mad." One of the nine died in the dungeon; two went mad. And I could say like Cervantes, "The shipwrecks that can be counted have not been all that bad" for those who can count them.

Throughout this period no organic activity went unaltered, nor was any sense of our being unaltered. It was all part of a technique of torture. For example, we could go to the bathroom once a day. Having to hold back from urinating made you feel your organs had been twisted up and rearranged: I had the clear sensation that my bladder was in my head.

Now I want to say a few words about the senses. Diet has to do not only with nutrition, but also with taste. For example, we were served nothing but boiled tripe for two years. So it seemed absurd that one of our requests was to be authorized to have salt.

The other sense, sight, was altered because the maximum distance you could look was two meters. When we remembered space, we would lose ourselves in the emptiness.

All the prisoners were kept under a sack, a hood, sometimes for months at a time. The day he was removed, one of my colleagues recorded the event with this short poem:

> Today they removed the hood from me
> Now
> Just now
> That I feel like crying.

In this context I wish to refer now to something that has to do with the presentation by the psychologists from Copenhagen: the sense of hatred, which further tormented the prisoners and the entire population.

When God created man —of clay, on a Thursday— instead of shaping him as a potter would do, he pounded out the clay. Among the many things he forgot was to put eyelids on the ears.

Marcel Proust makes a most intelligent observation in *Remembrances of Things Past*. The protagonist comes home cold. He serves himself a cup of linden tea and soaks a daisy in it. The aroma of this daisy reminds him of a far-off aroma, it awakens his neurons. Dormant memories are triggered, and at the end of the account he says that the entire novel has emerged from the aroma of the daisy. Proust takes up this theme in another passage, this time with respect to sound. A teaspoon falls during a dinner and this sound reminds the protagonist of the fall of another teaspoon related to an event that he proceeds to narrate. I remembered this when the psychologist from Copenhagen spoke of the women who were raped. She stated a percentage of rape cases,

something like 7%. I would say that this percentage could be applied in biological terms, but not in real terms. One must be careful with statistics, and even about the different value some words may have depending on the context in which they are used. For example, when visiting political prisoners, representatives of the Red Cross asked if they were receiving medical care. That is, they applied values based on normality to an abnormal situation. To give you an idea, it's as though a prisoner at Auschwitz were to ask for a doctor because he's not feeling well, and then having Josef Mengele as the attending physician.

The same is true of rape. In everyday mentality, one associates rape with a pack of depraved men who kidnap a girl, take her off to the woods, and rape her three or four times. But rape in the context of torture is something else. I am not going to narrate it; I'll have a political official narrate it, who has now gone into exile in Stockholm. He wrote a book in which he describes one of the rape scenes.

They had arrested some adolescent women who were passing out leaflets and all of a sudden from the detention center were heard frightful shouts, which surpassed normal shouting. He went to where the noises were coming from and found they were raping a girl. One of the police clubs had been inserted in her anus, another in her vagina. One must have an idea of what rape is, of what torture is, when using everyday terms and statistics. This is why I hold that it is not true that 7% of the Uruguayan women prisoners were raped. I hold that they all were. There is no woman in any political prison worldwide who has not been raped.

Because a women held prisoner in a dungeon with a guard who describes what has happened to other women, who were really raped physically, and announces to her that it will be her turn that night or the next, and tells her what they did to the other one and what they are going to do to her, is being raped. For each time a woman prisoner feels footsteps approaching, the lock opening, the bolt being slid aside, she is feeling the proximity of rape.

Finally, all the political prisoners in Uruguay have left their testimonies in the form of a poem, a story, a novel. In a way they paraphrased a famous man of these lands: "when I hear talk of pistols, I take out culture" (nazi leader, J. Goebbels).

I wish to end with a poem. It is a poem for all women prisoners, wherever they may be:

> I never know if I will finish
> The verse I write to you
> One afternoon it will be left in suspense
> The word that is left hanging,
> And its letters will be
> But cold ink.
> But you will understand my love,
> Even in the verse
> That does not speak.

10

Emotional Climate, Mood and Collective Behavior: Chile 1973 -1990[1]

Darío Páez, Domingo Asún & José Luis González

1   Introduction

In this chapter we will review the concept of emotional climate and of collective mood, specifically applied to the situation in Chile during the years 1973-1990. First of all, and in order to infer the types of interactions which predominate in different emotional climates, we will mention some of the existing literature on the social functions of emotions. We will define emotional climate as the chronic accessibility of a group of emotions in the collective mood during a certain period of time. This chronic accessibility would be related to a particular social representation or view of the world and of the future, that will impregnate the subculture of a category or social class. By reviewing the ideas posited by some classical authors in political theory on different moods found in mass movements, we will be able to clarify the relationship between emotional climate and collective behavior. Secondly, we will present a synopsis of the sociopolitical periods in Chile and of the changes in emotional climate which took place in each of these periods. To do this, we will use available data from social and political history. Later on, we will undergo a more detailed description of each period, and using objective type data, interviews and polls, show the evolution in social climate. Finally, we will draw some conclusions from our research, and their possible future use in the study of the problem of emotional climate.

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2 Emotions as social relations. The social functions of basic emotions

2.1 Emotions

DeRivera (DeRivera and Grinkins, 1986) defines emotions as structures of relationships between subjects, which always arise socially. In a similar vein, Kemper (1984, 1987) suggests that emotions show the specific state of relationships, in terms of power and status, between different social parts. Thus, fear, would be the consequence of an interaction in which one of the parts is subdued by the other part due to their power. Anger would result from interactions in which the usual and fair status of a subject has not been respected or has been questioned by another subject, who is perceived as responsible for the loss of status. Sadness would be an effect of those interactions in which status has been denied or totally lost, and in which the subject considers himself responsible for the loss, or feels unable to repair it. With regard to the influence of social structure on emotions, results of a large transcultural study conducted on the experience of emotions, show that subjects in poor countries, recalled less recent, longer and more intense emotional experiences. These subjects ascribed the cause of those events to fate and to other people's acts, while people in rich countries ascribed it more to themselves (Wallbot & Scherer, 1988). These same authors point out that one way of understanding this data could be in the vein of classic Marxist theory: life conditions, conscience and the quality of the emotional experience are determined by the economic structure.

The explanation would be that in poor countries people have to face more severe, and less controllable affectively charged events, as shown by their causal attribution to others and to fate. As a result of this, there is a higher intensity of the emotional experience. We must point out that in our present research, we compared links between variables at a social level (income per capita against the overall average of each country in the transcultural study). This means that, apart from re-affirming the link between social structure and emotional experience, our study also tries to show the heuristic value of research conducted at a collective level.

According to Kemper's sociological theory (1984, 1987) there are 4 basic emotions with an innate physiological basis: fear, anger, happiness (satisfaction) and sadness (depression). These emotions have an adaptive value: fear and anger energize the organism towards adapting itself in the face of danger or threat. Kemper (1987) and other authors (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987), have stated that anger is linked to the perception of an obstacle towards achieving an objective; with a tendency towards action in order to get rid of this obstacle; with the function, as an internal signal, to restore progress towards a goal; and with the interpersonal function of bringing about a change in the other person's behavior.

Fear is associated with preserving integrity; with the fact of realizing that

it is possible not to achieve the goal unless protective measures are taken; with the tendency towards a perceptive orientation action; with a signal function aimed at getting information from the environment; and with an interpersonal communication function: to communicate the wish to "get into" a relationship, and to consider any future action.

Happiness facilitates the pursuance of important activities for survival. Happiness, would be associated with realizing that the goals are being achieved; with an approaching tendency; with the reinforcement of success strategies and trying out new skills and new challenges in the direction of the internal signal; and with the interpersonal message of continuing or starting an interaction.

Sadness, would be associated with the perception that the goal is unobtainable; with non-commitment as a trend of action; with energy saving and re-orientation of plans in the direction of the internal signal; and also with the search for support in the interpersonal communication. Sadness brings about in people responses of protection and care towards them, and also social cohesiveness. Finally, when a social position is lost, the withdrawal from social contact associated to sadness facilitates adaptation, by means of preventing new losses and helping the organism to adapt itself to a lower status, until the person regains the capacity of getting involved again (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987).

Apart from the adaptive value, Kemper argues that the basic character of these emotions is that their facial expressions are transculturally recognized, because they emerge early on in the ontogenesis process, and in that there are certain differentiated autonomous patterns associated to them. This line of argumentation is similar to that of the Neo-Darwinist theorists (see Campos and Barret, 1984).

Kemper (1984) states that emotions, as Durkheim had already noted, have a social function at a global level, reinforcing social cohesiveness and attachment to values. He also says that emotions fulfill integration or differentiation functions on an inter and intra group level. Emotions can function on a macro or micro level, differentiating (e.g. anger, disgust, fear, envy, jealousy) or integrating (loyalty, pride, love) groups and individuals (Kemper, 1984). Negative emotions such as hate, envy, jealousy, etc. reinforce commitment towards certain values and certain social practices. Jealousy, for instance, can serve the function of reinforcing the norms about private, sexual and general property (Davis, 1936, in Gordon, 1987). The same can be said of envy (reinforce the commitment to socially desirable objectives) and of hate. "Hate towards the enemy" not only reinforces the commitment to the social group values, but it also justifies and reinforces the differentiating and discriminating practices of a given community (for instance, the "resentment" felt by the Germans or French against immigrant workers) (Armon-Jones, 1986).

We could consider that one of the central social functions of emotions is that of differentiating and justifying certain aspects of intergroup relations. Empirically, Dijker (1987) studied, using a polling technique, the relationships between contacts, attitudes, drive towards action and self-perceived emotions

in relation to groups of immigrants (Surimanese and Turkish) in Holland. His results confirmed this association. Positive emotions were associated with a search for contact. An irritation factor was associated with a tendency towards hostility and aggression. At an emotional level, it was associated with disgust and anger, and on a cognitive activity level, with "mental aggression." A third anxiety factor was composed of fear and the tendency to keep one's distance. These results confirm, in some aspects, that specific ways of intergroup relationships are associated to specific emotions.

2.2   Emotional climate and social functions of emotions

DeRivera (1992) generalizes the idea of the global social functions of emotions by coining the concept of emotional climate. DeRivera has defined emotional climate as a social fact, based on the relative predominance and salience of a group of emotional scenarios. A series of affectively charged reactions and interactions would predominate during a specific sociopolitical period, and would permeate the social relationships. An emotional climate would be more stable than a given emotional situation or than an episodic collective emotion. Although it would be more variable than the emotional culture: the affective patterns which characterize a society for long periods of time. We will personally define emotional climate as a state of collective mood, characterized by the predominance of certain emotions (for instance, happiness and anger versus sadness and fear), by the predominance of a social representation or group of beliefs held about the world (positive, trust, versus negative, mistrust) an of the future (optimistic, hope, versus pessimistic, despair) shared by a specific subculture; and by the predominance of certain action tendencies that will permeate the network of social interactions. The emotional climate is a collective phenomenon, it is not the mere result of adding up individual emotions. It is an emergent phenomenon which includes new elements and is distributed among the population. As we shall see later on, in a social group anger and rebellion will be predominant for some people, while for others fear and apathy shall predominate, although both groups will experience fear.

When we say that a climate of fear and frightfulness was vanishing, as in Chile during the protests, we are referring to the dominant social ambient among the popular sectors of the population. And like in a cocktail, when we mix contradictory attitudes and emotions, a new result will emerge, which is more than the basic and simple ingredients. But nevertheless, one specific collective emotion will be more important than others. In Chile, during the period 1973-1990 fear was the predominant emotion.

Two elements which we find in the study of social movements reaffirm the difference between individual emotions and collective judgments and emotions. First of all, it has been shown that egoistic relative deprivation (referring to oneself), and feelings of individual injustice, are not associated with strong

political participation. But on the other hand, fraternal deprivation and injustice evaluated with regard toone's reference group, does show signs of a relation with political participation (Guimond & Dubé, 1983).

Secondly, the individual calculus of cost-benefit is, generally, not a good predictor of political participation. The acceptance of the collective goods or objectives, or the acceptance of the social reasons (expectancies of the others reactions) do, on the other hand, predict participation better (Klandermans, 1984; Páez, Echebarría & Valencia, 1988; Valencia, 1990). The same happens when we contrast aggregated or global scores of development and economic well-being: on a global scale, these predict fairly well the rise and fall of the government party (party in office). while when we use a cost-benefit logic, purely on an individual voters basis, the prediction is not as accurate (Lau, 1990.

These empirical results reaffirm the idea that the judgments, feelings or emotions with regard to groups, or obtained on the basis of aggregated results, are different from the emotions and judgments made about oneself. It is also true that these judgments and emotions about collectivities have a stronger association with the emergence of social movements.

Because the emotional climate is more stable, lasting, subtle and diffuse than the collective emotion, it is closer to the concept or idea of collective mood. It is, because of this, why it is interesting to review some of the ideas proposed by classical authors on the relation between collective mood and collective behavior.

2.3 Collective mood and social movements

Several classical Marxist authors in political theory (Trotsky, 1953; 1974; 1979a; 1979b; Gramsci, 1977) have stated that the collective mood was a mediating explicative variable of the dynamics of social movements. These collective moods would be caused by important institutional and social changes (economic crises, wars, ideological re-orientations, revolutions, etc.). These moods would continue beyond the conditions which created them and would be associated with certain forms of collective behavior. For instance, the collective mood typical of mass movements after defeat, which is characterized by pessimism, fatalism, individualism and mystical flee from reality, would last beyond the objective power relationship situation. This collective mood would continue to predominate even if the social conditions were less negative (Trotsky, 1953; 1974; 1979a; 1979b). As an example, apathy and lack of mobilization in Chile persisted despite the relative decrease in repression and economic improvement. The processes of change in the collective mood are subtle and difficult to detect, and thus the move from fatalism to activity generally catches the observers by surprise. This is something which happened in Chile in 1983, when the scope and spontaneity of the collective behavior surprised even the organizers of the first protest actions (Tironi, Martínez & Weinstein,1990).

The collective moods described by these classical authors are, in general, those of elation or mobilization: optimism, happiness, hope, exaltation of passions, anger and rebelliousness, sudden changes in public opinion, fusion of individuals with collective projects, festive and cathartic climate. All these are characteristic attributes of the mobilization collective moods. Exhaustion, pessimistic realism, loss of collective illusions, disappointment, sadness and grief, apathy, disorganization, individualism and a predominance of "mysticism and erotism," are the features that exemplify the collective mood after the failure of a mobilization (Trotsky, 1979a; 1979b; Gramsci, 1977). The great historical defeats are linked to a withdrawal from radical ideological beliefs, and to a loss of confidence in the capacity for collective mobilization and social change. These great defeats bring out a pessimistic and fatalistic mood which is predominant for a long time, until new changes —generally external, institutional and macrosocial— shake this apathetic mood off. A whole generation of a concrete social class and category may be lost for future collective action (Trotsky, 1953; 1974; 1979). As we shall see in the case of Chile, these statements are confirmed by the available data obtained from polls.

This can be shown as follows:

- Period 1.-
    Important Social Changes: Political and/or Economical.
- Period 2.-
    Collective Emotion 1; Collective Emotion 2; Collective Emotion 3
    Construction of an Emotional Climate
- Period 3.-
    Long lasting changes in Collective Behavior: Tendencies
    towards action 1, 2, 3...

2.4   The social basis of revolt and violence

Sociological studies carried out in Chile during the dictatorship, confirm that a young educated minority, which showed higher levels of deprivation, of coercion by the regime, and which rejected submission, constituted the basis for the violent protests. A retrospective evaluation made in 1988, with working class youths, in relation to the protests which took place in Chile in the years 1983-86, indicates that around 40% of the subjects associate these protests with destruction, 22% think they were useless; but 32% think they helped force Pinochet to leave office. For those individuals close to a left-wing orientation,

this last opinion goes up to more than 50% of the subjects (Weinstein, 1990).

Most people from working class areas reject the idea of revolt and protest, only 14% of the subjects in working class areas versus 18% in middle class areas showed a high tendency towards violence. Left wing sectors make up around a third of the sample studied by Weinstein (1990) and they were more willing to engage in collective mobilizations. The participation of young people in the institutional mobilizations during the years 88-89 (plebiscite, elections) was lower and slower than their participation in the violent protests that took place during the years 83-86. The paralyzing effect which fear of repression has, was confirmed by the fact that the members of activist groups, compared to a base line sample, showed a lower incidence of social fears, and a higher incidence of personal or psychological fears (Lira and Castillo,1991).

2.5   Poverty, unemployment, renouncement and conformism

Different studies have found a link between individualism and renounce-ment-conformism. Working class subjects with higher apathy or renounce-ment-conformism levels, are those who have been unemployed for longer periods of time, confirming the idea that permanent frustration and poverty leads to demobilization, rather than to mobilization (Martínez, Tironi & Weinstein, 1990). As another indicator of the recession in ideological radicalism, we can mention that in 1969 32% of a working class sample agreed with the idea of achieving social change through violence, whereas in 1986 only 8% agreed with that same idea (Martínez, Tironi & Weinstein, 1990). Fatalism and resignation seem to predominate in these working class sectors, which do not differ from the middle classes with respect to their tendency towards confor-mism, disposition towards violence and other attitudes, although they do present slightly higher levels of frustration:

> Depolitization, "individualism," not perceiving possibilities of change, all this converges into scarce political radicalism, and into a marked rejection of the legitimizing arguments which are stated in favor of revolution and violence as a way of obtaining a new social order in the marginalized urban areas. In fact, 70% of those interviewed clearly stated their opposition towards the use of force as a way of achieving political changes. Moreover, more than half stated their preference for not having any change at all, if change meant social unrest. Only a fifth were willing to tolerate unrest in order to modify their current socio-economic situation. (Martínez, Tironi & Weinstein, 1990: 156-157).

3. Sociopolitical periods and emotional climates in Chile

3.1   Methodology

We will describe different periods in Chile, characterized by various repressive, political and economic events, which brought about with them a change in the emotional climate. Emotional climates are emergent processes, which have social functions and can be reconstructed using macro objective and subjective indicators. Thus, for our study we need to establish collective units of analyses, in the case of Chile, we used relevant political groups (left, center and right). We also need to use, in order to analyze at a collective level the associations between emotions and collective behavior, aggregated data and macropsychological indicators. Research on emotional climate will be able to show the social function of shared emotions, and this will demand collective behavior indicators which could be compared with aggregated survey data or social perceptions of the predominant emotions which different groups have in different historical moments. First of all, we expect to show the congruent validity between experts' judgments of emotional climate and objective indexes. In order to do so, we asked two social psychologists to give scores to the prototypical right, center or left-wing subject on the levels or degree of basic emotions (fear, anger, sadness and joy) during the period 1973-1990. As objective collective indicators of collective behavior, we have the number of civilians killed by Army members, collective violence (riots, demonstrations, etc.), and the number of Army members killed for political reasons (Rettig, 1991; Tironi, Martínez & Weinstein, 1990). Finally, we need to work with in-depth interviews. The motivational, dynamic and processual elements of the emotional climate phenomena can be better studied using qualitative methods (Schwartz & Jacob, 1984; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

The research on emotional climate has the aim of converging quantitative and qualitative perspectives in the study of the social functions of emotions. In-depth interviews, with some limitations, allow the triangulation of empirical results. Triangulation between judges' responses on social perception of the predominant emotion in social groups, aggregated data on collective behavior, and content analyses of in-depth interviews can confirm that some emotions were accessible and distributed in the Chilean social life. These emotions, either positively or negatively, should be related to collective behavior (See figures 1, 2, 3 and also Appendix: Table 1 with data on collective violence (fig. 1), civilian deaths (fig. 2), and military deaths (fig. 3) by year).

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

In order to define periods of collective behavior not intuitively, but with an algorithmic and intersubjective (replicable) approach, we used a semi-explora-tory data analysis procedure (Quick Cluster SPSS-PC 4.0). For the years 73-87 (there was missing data on collective behavior for the years 89-90), a six cluster solution maximized the explained variance between clusters (three to eight cluster solutions were evaluated (see Appendix: Table 1). Only objective or aggregate data level were used in the cluster procedure. Then we saved the year cluster pertenance and applied a discriminant analysis procedure, using the cluster as group variable, and the experts judgments on the level of basic emotions as predictor variables. Multivariate differences were significant between periods for emotions held by left-wing subjects (first discriminant function Chi square (20)=42.3; p), emotions held by center-wing subjects (first discriminant function Chi square (20)=36.9; p) and non significant for emotions held by right-wing subjects (Chi square= 26,79; p). Univariate differences (see table 2) were significant for fear left and sadness left, joy center and anger right. Marginally significant results were found for anger center, anger and joy left. The profile reported by the results were globally congruent —anger of the right is related to repression against the left, fear by the left is related to level of civilian deaths, etc.

    High collective violence is associated to lower sadness and fear, and higher

anger on the left. Correlations suggest that the associations are stronger for fear and sadness with repression, than for anger with political violence. The development of emotional climate by year, using cluster centroids, for the left-wing subjects, shows a coherent profile. First of all, high negative emotional climate is related to massive repression. Secondly, an intermediate negative emotional climate was related to selective repression. Thirdly, a period of less negative emotional climate, was related to "calmness," absence of social mobilization and recovery from a traumatic event. Fourth, a period of less negative and more negative emotional climate, was related to weak social movements. In fifth place, a more positive emotional climate was related to strong social movilization. And finally, after the relative defeat of these social movements, there was a return to a less positive emotional climate, but, not so negative as during the first years of the military dictatorship (see Figure 4, below, and Appendix: Table 3).

3.2   Data

Figure 4

(*) High scores = high score in anger and joy and lower score in sadness and fear

We will briefly describe these nine periods and the predominant emotions which can be found in them. After this, we will examine them more thoroughly using sociohistorical elements and intensive data (secondary data, in-depth interviews).

3.3   Periods

- (1) 70-73: Strong social conflicts. A climate of anger and anxiety was installed in the society.

(The following six periods were defined by Cluster Analysis.)

Dominant emotion: Fear.

- (2) 73: Coup d'état and Terror. Cluster 1.
- (3) 74: Mass repression and imprisonments. In center and right-wing sectors there was a climate of hate-pride. In left-wing sectors: a great deal of fear and sadness; state of happiness was low. Anger: medium-low. The world was seen as insecure. The future was viewed as pessimistic. Cluster 2.
- (4) 75-76: First recession, actions underwent by the DINA, disappearances. In center-right sectors there was a climate of hate-pride. In left-wing sectors, a high level of fear; sadness= medium-high; happiness= low; anger= low; World is seen as insecure. Future is seen as pessimistic. Cluster 4.
- (5) 77-82: Economic boom of the years 1979-1981. DINA dismantelment. Creation of the CNI. 1980 plebiscite. In center-right sectors= climate of high happiness; fear= medium; anger= medium-low; sadness= low. In left-wing sectors= fear= medium-high; sadness= medium-low; happiness= medium-low; anger= low. World seen as somewhat insecure. The future is less pessimistic. Clusters 5 and 6 mixed.

Dissipation of the Climate of Fear

- (6) 83-84: Economic crisis of 1981-1982 as antecedent. Protests in 83-84. Massive break-ins again. Dissipation of euphoria and the start of a climate of anger-rebeliousness. Reactivation of the intimidation climate. In right-wing sectors: anxiety-fear=medium-high; anger=medium-high; sadness=low; happiness=medium. In those sectors considered as center: anxiety-fear=high; sadness=low; anger and happiness==medium-low. In left-wing sectors: anxiety-fear=increases; anger=high; sadness=medium; happiness=medium. The world is seen as less insecure. The future is politically seen with optimism (1986 is the "decisive year"), but with pessimism with regard to the social aspects. Cluster 3.
- (7) 85-87: Decrease in protests. In right-wing sectors: fear-anxiety=medium; happiness=medium; sadness=medium; anger=medium. In those sectors considered as center: fear=low; happiness=medium-high; anger=low; sadness=low. In left-wing sectors: fear-anxiety=me-

dium-high; anger=medium; sadness=medium-high; happiness=medium-high. The world is perceived as safer. The future is seen with a medium degree of optimism. Cluster 5 (partial).
(End of the periods defined by Cluster Analysis.)
- (8) 88-90: 1988 Plebiscite. Victory of the "No" to Pinochet. 1989 elections. Campaign. Climate of partial institutional failure of the dictatorship.

Dominant emotion: Hope.
- (9) 90: Victory of the opposition in the elections. Moderate changes. Continuist economic policy. Decrease in the repression. Rettig report (official report on deaths and disappearances during the years of dictatorship).

Before the military coup, the emotional climate was that of a flux of social movements and of an affective polarization (1970-73).The coup and the massive repression which took place in 1973 established a climate of terror, which lead in 1974 to generalized fear and to socio-political apathy. The selective repression and the economic crisis deepened the social reflux during the period 1973-1977 and established a climate of fear and intimidation, which linked a diffuse anxiety in response to the possibility of punishment and the labor and economic instability, with the sadness produced by the traumatic events of 73-74. The end of the selective repression in 1977, and the economic development will enable the establishment of a climate of "normality and calm," built upon the silence and denial of the traumatic events, and supported by individual mechanisms such as consumism and social mobility. The economic crisis of 1981-82, after the growth of 1978-81, and the decrease of the repression during the years 77-81, will culminate in the protests of 1983-86. The dissipation of the climate of intimidation will be associated with the development of anger and rebelliousness. The new massive and selective repression will try, without success, to re-establish the intimidation climate. The failure of the social movements to overthrow Pinochet and his success in imposing institutionalizing mechanisms, although paradoxically they will later turn against him (victory of the NO to Pinochet in 1988; defeat of the Pinochet candidate in the 1989 elections) will create a climate of hope, but also of certain disillusion.

4   Emotional climate during each period

4.1 Social mobilization, polarization, climate of anger and anxiety

Different forms of radicalization and social polarization took place during the years of the Unidad Popular:

> One of the meanings which Unidad Popular had as a celebration, was that a large portion of the sectors involved in it lived it as cathartic. The workers

kicked out the "exploiting octopus" and took over the factory, without bothering to think whether or not the action was convenient for the process' global rationality; farmers prevented landowners from entering the farm premises, sometimes without even allowing them to rescue the family belongings. In this way, the celebration took the shape of a cathartic claim or restoration, expressed as the revenge for years of suffering, silence and impotence. It was not a happy one; it had the seriousness of those rituals in which the people take up the role of judge. Even though the opposition demonstrators built barricades, burnt tyres and shouted strong and heated slogans, they didn't pose any danger. The real war wasn't being fought in the streets. Rather, it was here that the celebration was taking place: it was a scenario in which to let one's energy out, for the expression, for the self-affirmation of ourselves in the fight. Chile was, between 1970 and 1973, a mobilized and dynamic society in which many individuals lived conscious of being actors of the historical process. It was a society where it was possible to express oneself freely, but also a society full of conflicts triggered off by government actions; therefore, it was a country torn by passion (Moulian, 1982: 32-33).

Intergroup anger and hate were accompanied by strong sociopolitical mobilization:

All the factors we have described, before and after 1970, led, more or less around 1973, to a climate objectively conducive to a civil war. This meant the acceptance of the possibility, and perhaps the unavoidability, that inno-cent opponents might suffer both physically and morally. This was the price to be paid for what, in a climate of civil war, was supposed to be at stake: the predominance of a type of society (each side having its own) which was claimed to be the only acceptable one; the preservation of basic and unalien-able rights; life itself... "Us or them." "To kill or be killed." "The cancer has to be expelled." "You can't make an omelette without breaking some eggs." "These where at the time typical statements, reflecting deep feelings which could not contribute to any kind of peaceful coexistence and which, on the contrary, paved the way for the fear which brings up hate which leads to brutality and to death (Rettig, 1991:I:38-39).

Anxiety characterized this emotional climate (for some it was the fear of losing privileges; for others the fear of a military coup):

Extract from an interview with a member of a center-right family:

Just in front of us they had taken over a farm and we all thought that any moment it would be our turn. Besides, around a kilometer behind the house they were digging up an irrigation channel and, when there was a take over, they took all those people away in a bus and carried them to the fight. They were almost on the farm yard, that increased the thought of a take over. One day they came very early to fetch my old man and he had to go and defend another farm. My ma was very worried and afterwards they said that they had even fired at each other. The landowners had organized a surveillance system for this sort of events [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1988:147).

Anger was also typical, because of the opponents' activities and the day to day problems caused by the social crisis :

Interview extract with a member of center-right family:

> For them, the Unidad Popular was a terrible thing. I myself had certain images deep in my mind. I remember the black bread and how my dad was enraged by it. One day we were having lunch, and he threw it away. He shouted "I can't stand it anymore!" [The date of interview was 1984 -1986] (Politzer, 1988:147).

Happiness and pride were also very evident, because of the socially expressed strength, the achievements obtained from the mobilizations and the social changes:

Interview with a left-wing subject, extract:

> My dad used to go to a lot of meetings and watched over the house where the JAP (people's committee) things were kept. I used to spend whole afternoons queuing for water; because I was small, I could get into the bucket and waited [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1988).

4.2   Coup d'État, massive repression, terror and the establishment of a climate of fear

The coup d'état was characterized by a early predominance of the Arrmed Forces:

> It happened on September 11th, 1973, the Armed and Security Forces achieved their most immediate objective in very few days: effective and real control over the country, without armed resistance pockets from the deposed regime supporters. It can be truly said that those actions were scarce; irregular in their location, method and weapons used; uncoordinated, and without the slightest chance of success, not even at a local level. In this way, out of the thirteen regions the country was divided into, only in three of them were there reports of armed incidents and actions of any relevance against the new regime (Rettig, 1991:I:107).

The initial repression was massive and non-selective, creating a climate of terror. This repression was justified by the existence of a so called *"Z plan,"* according to which the left-wing parties were preparing the imminent massacre of both the military and right-wing party militants:

> The profuse spread of the so called *"Z plan"* contributed to the atmosphere of political revenge and to the deaths mentioned in the two previous points. Nevertheless, the *Z plan*, by way of rumors and intentioned news reports, became a detailed list of people opposed to the Unidad Popular, who had to dissapear. It had regional and local variations, and new listings for each village, even the smallest one. An internal excuse for killing was accepted, you could let your enemy die, because he had the same idea (Rettig, 1991:I:115).
> The fear of being declared an enemy of the new regime, with all the consequences that this might have, the surprise provoked by the swiftness of the events, and the lack of knowledge of what was going on, were some of the most important reasons for the lack of social reaction. As the events became known, large sections of the public allowed, tolerated, sympathized and even validated the violations of the human rights of members who

> belonged to, or sympathized with the Unidad Popular. Justifying their attitude on actions supposedly committed or to be committed by those people. It was quite frequent to state the circumstance that those people had planned to kill their opponents, from which it derived that the repression was explained or justified, not as much for what the victims had done, but for what it was said they were going to do. (Rettig, 1991:I:412)

In those parts of Chile where the change of government had taken place without confrontations, the dictatorship later imposed a climate of terror:

> In certain regions the killings were concentrated on the first days after September 11th, 1973. In others, as we shall see, there were hardly any until the start of the "toughening-up orders," which will be mentioned at the end of this part, in the middle of October 1973. In the entire country, killing and disappearances decrease from November onwards. (Rettig,1991:I:114)

> It is difficult to calculate the death toll, but, according to a recent official report there were around 1,200 civilians and 25 military deaths. The collective representation was much more extreme, and the dominant picture was that of mass massacres: it was said that between fifteen to thirty thousand people died. This representation, together with the rumors and the aggressive propaganda displayed by the military regime, which called for extirpation of the Marxist cancer and to denounce guerrilla fighters, spread fear and fright, and during the climax of the coup and the mass home break-ins it was associated with collective panic. This emotional climate is linked to collective behavior such as inhibition, paralization, apathy and avoidance. (Neuman, 1986)

There were massive break-ins and arrests. It is estimated that between sixty to seventy thousand people were arrested in the period between the coup and the first half of 1974 (Lira, 1990a). The political parties were declared illegal or paralyzed. The same happened to the trade unions. In 1973, around twelve thousand people sought asylum in foreign embassies (Rettig Report, 1991: I; Rodríguez, 1990).

Amongst people in the right and center of the political spectrum, and who supported the coup, this fact caused happiness and was associated with the discharge of anger against the defeated. The center and right-wing political parties supported and justified the coup and, in general, a climate of hatred towards the defeated was created:

> Extract from an interview with a member of a center-right family:

> At home they were happy with the coup. I clearly remember that morning, we were getting dressed to go to school when the news broke out on the radio. My dad cried out of joy and so did my mom. [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1988:147)

Yet, even amongst the supporters of the regime, the climate of pseudo-war and the widespread repression also caused fear:

> Interview with a right-wing subject, extract:

> That same day, the 11th, I was getting ready to go to the Female Power, when we heard on the radio that Allende had been overthrown. It was such a big

thing for me, I started crying out in joy! That's the honest truth. It was rather awful to walk the streets, but at the same time, it was an enormous happiness. Everybody in the block got together at some neighbors house, because around here everybody felt like us, everybody was absolutely democratic and antimarxist. We all took something with us and it was a demonstration of great joy, although it couldn't last long because we were all frightened to death lest the curfew begin and catch us on the streets. After that, there were several days in which we could not go out at all given the circumstances of the moment. You could hear many shots and we were very frightened, but at the same time we were terribly happy that they had overthrown that man [The date of the interview was August 83 - July 84] (Politzer 1990:149).

Finally, the victory of the coup and the expectations of economic improvement that the Pinochet government brought about in those sectors, were associated with collective emotions of pride ("We have defeated communism and we are building up a new country").

Amongst those people with a left-wing orientation, different emotional reactions took place. First of all surprise and disbelief were widely widespread. Which is a reason why several well known leaders died. To prove this fact we must remember that most left-wing militants who held a post and were called for by the military, turned up to relinquish their posts. They were arrested, deported or killed. The following extract from an interview exemplifies the surprise and denial felt by many Chileans:

Interview with a left-wing subject, extract:

Flavián (a socialist leader killed in the year 1973) honestly believed in the promises they made to him. There were many people who, like him, did not as yet perceive the real dimension of the coup. Many people were not aware of the murders being committed in the towns, neither had they seen the corpses floating down the Mapocho river. Many of them believed that the tales of monstrous tortures were exaggerations [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1988:87).

Fear and impotent anger were also widespread reactions:

Interview about September 11th with a left-wing subject, extract

I felt safe under the bed. But this fear didn't go away for a very long time. I could hear the planes and I would feel it again. The same happened to the rest of us. Two or three years went on and every time people heard a helicopter, they were shit scared. Myself, apart from fear, I also felt anger. I could hear the shootings and I thought it was an unfair and unbalanced fight. There were people who were killing and people who were dying, who were not defending themselves. They were just dying [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1988:37).

Sadness because of the defeat, and guilt for not having been able to foresee and confront what had happened were also quite frequent.

Interview with a left-wing leader, extract:

Where did I spend the night of September 11th?... It is not easy to remember... those were very difficult moments, very bitter, distressing. A whole world of hopes and utopias was crumbling down. The most distressing thing was

the total collapse of everything we had believed in and fought for so many years. It was a complete defeat. I heard the shootings, I imagined thousands of people dead everywhere and I thought of Allende's death [The date of the interview was June 89] (Politzer, 1989:48-49).

Terror was also quite frequent in the most repressed working-class areas. Extract of an interview with a left-wing subject:

I had to say that. If I'd have told him that they had thrown me into the river, he wouldn't have opened the door or helped me. Everybody was frightened! Some people could have saved their lives, but their own neighbors gave them in... because of fear, because of the terror they felt that they themselves could be killed. Many of them died [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1990:25).

4.3 Massive repression, economic recession and intimidation 1973-1974

From 1973 onwards, and in order to escape repression and the economic crisis, around one million Chileans went into exile: 10% of the total population at that time. Of these, 200,000 are registered as political exiles. Moreover, thousands of workers and employees were accused of being left-wing sympathizers and were expelled from the public administration: a total of 100,000 until 1978 (Tironi, 1990). The same happened in the private sector. Apart from this we must add that the dictatorship's neo-liberal policies will cause the re-structurization of the nation's industry, which will end bankrupt, and that a recession in the years 1974-1975 will provoke very high unemployment figures (around 20% according to official figures).

Between 1971 and 1982, the working classes decreased to less than half; the number of those working in agriculture decreased in 40%. The number of the redundant, unemployed and first-time job seekers got to be a third of the whole working force in 1982 (years of crisis). In the countryside, the agricultural reform was dismantled and there were massive processes of redundancy and re-structurization. 46% of the expropriated land under the agricultural reform, is returned to its former owners. The rest is given to farmers on an individual property basis. The lack of support will mean that 40% of them will sell those properties before 1981 (Echenique, 1990). The percentage of union members amongst the working population decreases from 28% in 1973 to 11% in 1982 (Tironi, 1988).

4.4 Selective repression, economic recession and intimidation. (Period 1975-1976)

After the first stage of mass repression, a period of selective repression started, although a policy of intimidation of the popular sectors of the population still went on:

Interview with a left-wing subject, extract:

> Afterwards they committed other sort of violations. They surrounded the village and searched those who wanted to get out. I was a kid, they opened my bag, tossing everything to the ground and they even searched my pencils. They threw the older folks to the floor with their hands on the back of their necks, and their legs spread open. They weren't too tough on me, but they pointed at the grown-ups and spoke to them harshly. They even knocked down the cocky ones making them shut up! I was always afraid, I felt a huge and painful emptiness inside. I thought those people didn't have any feelings and, when they let me through, I again felt like being stronger [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1988:38).

A centralized political police was created in 1974 (DINA) and a policy of "disappearances" of active militants from the left and extreme left associations was applied. This execution of opposition militants, who's associations had been declared illegal, was publicly denied, although, at the time, there were information leaks about "confrontations" in which inevitably left-wing militants died. Between 1974 and 1976 the outlawed political apparatuses of the MIR, PC (Communist Party) and PS (Socialist Party) were decimated. The MIR, an extreme-left organization, saw how a third of its militants "disappeared," another third were jailed, and a third went into exile. It was an organization which in 1973 had four to five thousand members. By the end of 1976 only a few dozen militants were left.

The more massive character of the PC and PS prevented such extreme results, but, without any doubt, their organizations were enormously weakened. (Preparatory document of the MIR congress, 1986; Rettig report, 1991). In order to exemplify the climate of selective repression we will quote from the 1991 Rettig report:

> In general, it was not possible yet to observe a significant reaction from the whole of the social body which would show an open disposition o solidarity towards the victims of the violations, maintaining, on this point, a somewhat indifferent or skeptic attitude. Nevertheless, a slow and gradual awareness on this subject, started fueled by events like the discovery in a pit at Lonquén, of the bodies of a group of missing prisoners which the government, in information given to international organizations, had claimed to be dead and that their bodies had been given to the Legal Medical Institute five years before (Rettig, 1991:I:745-746).

The emotional effects of the mass and selective repression were complex. We will now quote several extracts from testimonies of people with missing relatives which exemplify these emotional effects:

- *Guilt*: "I told my son to give himself in, that nothing would happen to him. I feel guilty."
- *Ambivalence and shame*: "I asked him many times to give it up..." "For some time I hated my husband, because he was killed for getting involved in politics. I blamed him. I felt he had chosen his ideas instead of his family." "I was fed up of being asked about my father, I was

convinced that being the son of a prisoner who had disappeared was a very bad thing."
- *Hatred*: "Since they found the remains and I was sure he had been killed, a huge feeling of hatred dawned on me. Before this we had the hope of finding him dead or alive, but of finding the whole body. But now we have to content ourselves with one bone. It was as if they were laughing right in our face."
- *Fear*: "Fear does not disappear..." "We couldn't eat, we couldn't sleep, we lived really scared. You live as if you had a mark on your forehead" (Rettig, 1991:II:774-775).
- *Impotence*: "Justice hasn't been served in such clear cases as that of Orlando Letelier. What can we expect ourselves?" [The date of interviews was May 1990 - February 1991] (Rettig,1991:II).

Mass redundancies are the other element which will mark this period. They affected more than a third of the adult population in working class areas (Tironi,1990; Benavente, 1985; Klein & Tokman, 1985).

Manual workers and redundant employees, will enter a dynamic of lack of self-esteem, of margination from the work market, alcoholism and domestic violence, as well as disorganization and political and trade union apathy:

Extract of an interview with a center-left trade union leader:

> The older people were frightened, many of them didn't even attend the assemblies. Some criticized them because they didn't bother, because of their indolence. But fear was rooted deep inside them. It is because of a missing or beaten-up relative, or because of someone who has suffered it all. And, above all, the worst of all your fears is redundancy, because the mates go to their villages on holiday and there they can see that terrible poverty. This started changing with the arrival of people who began talking about their problems. Young people who started getting involved, and then, others who were not so young, also began to participate. The old workers were glad when someone talked about these things: "This fucking kid has got guts!, they said" [The date of the interview was August 83 - July 84] (Politzer, 1990:174).

All the different labor problems and troubles will generate a view of the future, and of the social world, as threatening and insecure:

Extract from an interview on Job Uncertainty:

> Above all, when one doesn't know how long work will last, because one is working now, but perhaps tomorrow at 9 in the morning one has been sacked. You live in a permanent state of anxiety. I am even undergoing treatment because of stress problems, for a possible surmenage. Too much work, too many responsibilities. Not knowing when one might make a mistake, and the mistake means dismissal. And dismissal means the street, not having any money, it means a sad world, to say the least! [The date of the interview was August 83 - July 84] (Politzer, 1990: 82).

In order to fight unemployment the dictatorship established the Minimum

Employment Plan, which offered minimum wages to do secondary urbanistic tasks. The militarization and hierarchization of the State apparatus became more and more general, creating a climate of authoritarian social control in the street, at school and at work:

Interview with a left-wing working class subject, extract:

> Pinochet ended all that. Never again were occupations made, never again did teachers miss any lesson, never again did we go for new-year walks or had a party. Even the most normal things ended. At school, you could also feel an almost military regime, everybody was shit scared.
> The population changed radically after the coup. It was one of those villages where the streets were full of people in the evenings. They would play ball, talk, have a drink. None of that happened again for years.
> After the 11th, nobody ever talked again about bosses or directors. The military came and they ended all that about being comrades, and the gossip and family quarrels started. Nobody expressed their opinion, nobody bothered anybody and the meeting places weren't the social centers anymore, but the illegal bars. It seemed that meeting other families meant having a Marxist attitude [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1988: 109).

A general climate of intimidation was created by a series of factors such as the use of selective repression, the economic crisis, the employment uncertainty, or the daily authoritarian control. This can be seen in the following extract:

Interview with an left-wing ex-prisoner woman:

> But my children are afraid of defending themselves. They are always afraid. They haven't understood their rights, they say they are going to die as their father did. They believe all political activity is a crime, that it is because of the politicians that things have turned out so bad. Because the most important leaders —my son says— didn't know how to lead the nation.
> I don't do anything because nothing appeals to me, I'm just not interested. I do things because I have to, but otherwise... [The date of the interview was August 83 - July 84] (Politzer, 1990: 37).

A state of anxiety and insecurity, avoidance behavior, social isolation, social uncohesiveness and an inhibition of confrontation behavior were predominant in the society (Neuman, 1986; Lira, 1990; Rojas, 1984).

Associated to this we find an ideological change towards more moderate positions as is stated in the following example:

4.5   Ideological effects of repression and fear

> ... the intellectual who suffers political persecution suffers the terror he had never suffered before. He suffers in his work. His possibilities of social improvement disappear, as well as his always latent political possibilities, all this comes to a halt, alongside his possibilities of intellectual development. For the intellectual, the dictatorship is a disaster. It is the only unbearable disaster and this, I think, tames him quite a lot. After this, he only longs for the return of democracy, the formal one, the old one, the one he had once shouted at, saying it was useless, rubbish [The date of the interview was

86-87] (Barrios and Bruner, 1988:62).

After the initial moments of shock, mobilization and social support, a period started in which left-wing and working class sectors inhibited communication with regard to those negative events. It is frequent not to speak about the ill-treatment or problems one has faced.

Many people start forgetting their past as a left-wing militant or sympathizer, and try to obtain individual social mobility. Social support towards other people who are in trouble is less and less frequent, and an individual survival attitude predominates. People retreat to their primary nuclear family.

Individuals marked by the repression suffer loss of status, discrimination and stigmatization:

> Relatives state with desperation that it all had to be added up: the pain caused by the death, and the harm which the victims, as well as themselves, suffered from the ill-treatment they received from society, the state and its institutions. This has provoked an alteration in their relationship with the outside world and has shaped in them a feeling of having become marginal and marginalized beings (Rettig, 1991:II:780).
> After the death or disappearance of a relative, a long history of marginality follows. Families are discriminated in the job market, children in their access to schools, universities and State institutions. The stigmatization is so strong that families, when sensing the rejection from the outside world, sink into ostracism and deep isolation. They only feel comfortable with those who share their experience (Rettig, 1991:II:782).
> My father was a councilor. He was detained and brutally tortured for three months, he came back home in a very bad state. After having been a figure of authority in the village he was forced to work as an office cleaner, and washing up bottles. He died some time later [The date of the interview was May 1990 - February 1991] (Rettig, 1991 II: 783).

4.6   Economic development. Aftermath. Dissipation of the intimidation and relative normality: 1977-1982

During this period, selective repression decreases, the political police is reorganized (the DINA is transformed into the CNI), there is a limited economic development along with an increase in consumption of certain goods. The past is denied and traumatic events are forgotten. There is an inhibition and avoidance of negative affective events.

An emotional task of mourning takes place. A climate of relative calm predominates, marked by the fear of the dictatorship and the consumerist euphoria:

> The fear, which those who have won experience, has been sublimated into a consumerist orgy, in the illusion of a future that will finally erase the possibility of going back to the past. The acceptance that if there were costs to pay today we are well off, but tomorrow we will be even better off (Garretón, 1990).

In 1980, the dictatorship, by means of a plebiscite, sees how its "protected

democracy" constitution is approved by a majority of the population. Those sectors considered to be in a center position in politics, started to move away from the dictatorship.

Public silence, the lack of social confidence, the inhibition of communication, and apathy, characterize this period, which can be considered as the golden era of the dictatorship. The climate of "normality" is described in this statement by a member of the opposition:

> After a few years, everything seemed normal: that kind of conscious fear, the one that makes your heart beat, had disappeared. But everyone was isolated with his feeling of impotence and guilt, of one's own weakness. You couldn't see any future (Parissi, 1990; 330).

The last selective repression took place in 1977 and the massive break-ins ended in 1975. As is known, extreme violence, torture and rape provoke, in around 30-40% of the victims, post-traumatic stress symptoms. In cases of rape, this percentage goes up to around 60% (Echeburua, 1992). We must remember that repression affected 10% of the entire population of Chile. Nevertheless, not all the victims shared and communicated their experiences. In relation to this, it can be pointed out that only 30% of the concentration camp survivors communicated their experiences once they were already living in the USA after the Second World War. Their reasons for not doing so were that they wanted to forget, that nobody would pay any attention to them, and that they did not want to upset their close ones (Pennebaker, 1990). In Chile's case we also think that there was a certain collective silence dynamic.

This was reinforced by the social denial of what had happened, the stigmatization of those who had been affected, and the real risks involved in denouncng what had happened. The following interview extracts exemplify the isolation, silence and/or voluntary forgetfulness reactions:

Union official n° 1:

> ... When they returned they explained how they had been treated (in a concentration camp). It was hard, and they said that they didn't feel like remembering it again (Politzer, 1990:91).
> The majority of them were jailed, they were detained for several years and they came out very shocked. A friend of mine who was an agricultural civil servant asked me, two or three years after the coup, not to get anywhere near her, because I didn't know the state she had got out of jail in.
> You don't know, Victor —she told me— the sort of things I went through in there; I could even be an informer. So, please, don't come over to talk. (Politzer, 1990: 162).

Union official n° 2:

> ... People didn't talk because of fear... Some people, whom I knew for sure had been tortured, insisted, when you met them, that they were all right [The date of the interviews was August 83 - July 84] (Politzer, 1990: 228).

On the other hand, half those people who face negative stressful events and collective disasters, such as those linked to mass repression, go through a series

of different stages. In the first stage, lasting approximately six months, people mobilize themselves in relation to the event. There is a high physiological activation, an obsessive type of thought coupled with an anxiety and anger phenomena. From the sixth month to eighteen months later there is a more stable state, with a decrease in the physiological activation and thought. In this stage the task of mourning and depression takes place. Finally, after one and a half or two years, the acceptance process ends, and the affective impact disappears. These periods are shorter for those people with previous experience and social support (Pennebaker, 1990). The phases which have been found in other studies conducted in Chile with relatives of people who had been killed or had disappeared, confirm these above mentioned phases. Other studies confirm that the affective mourning takes place around the two year period and that around 3 to 5 years are needed to reconstruct a coherent self-image, and a coherent image of the world and of the future (Jacobson, 1986). Similar results were found in Chile in relation to the experience of job loss. An initial stage of six to nine months was marked by anxiety, anger and mobilization. Later came a second transitory stage lasting for one to two years, and finally a phase in which adaptation takes place. In this last stage there is a predominance of acceptance of the event, sadness and evasive strategies, such as alcoholism and begging (Lira & Weinstein, 1983).

With all this data, we can then say that between the years 73-75 (for those victims of mass repression) and the years 75-79 (for victims of selective repression), a process of confrontation took place which ended with the acceptance and mourning of the trauma. But we must point out several limitations to what has been said before:

First of all, in the case of relatives of the missing or of people who had been shot, the mourning is long and uncertain, and people are not sure whether to mourn or not.

Secondly, "normal" mourning rituals do not take place in many cases because of repression.

Thirdly, not everyone who has suffered traumatic events goes through the same process. In fact, Silver & Wortman (1989) found that half the subjects coped with what had happened without going through anger-anxiety and intense sadness stages, and they felt psychologically well several years later. 18% were in a chronic grief stage and 3% in a postponed grief stage (the subject did not express the feeling at the beginning, but there was a strong alteration afterwards). Only 30% followed all the proposed stages.

Finally, people who look for social support in order to be able to face traumatic events usually have difficulties getting this actual support. Listening to extreme repressive actions is linked to physiological activation, and sharing the depressed people's experiences induces a negative mood. Thus we can assume that people avoid those experiences. The search for social support under these circumstances "burns out" their social network and increases their difficulties. It is also quite frequent to find that people who share the experience

of a traumatic event cannot support each other, due to their different rhythms and styles of grieving. It is quite frequent, for instance, for couples who have lost a child to get divorced. Furthermore, if we consider that people around them do not know what to say, avoid talking to them, or wait for the victim to start speaking, it is possible to imagine that the social support and confrontation task in relation to these events is rather difficult (Pennebaker, 1990).

In Chile's case we can assume that these phenomena are reinforced by repression, internalized fear and the disintegration of social networks. Economic mobility due to the change in the industrial structure and the political and economic exile also reinforced the disintegration of social networks. Becker and col. (1989) indicate that it seemed that recalling traumatic events was linked to fear, guilt and confusion, and that the predominant view in Chile during those years was that of not remembering or recalling those events, and in such a way, reinforcing the existence of the belief in a burn-out of social networks, and the avoidance of the social sharing of these affective events. Justification, silence and avoidance, and abandonment were the usual reactions to the events. To illustrate these different reactions we will quote from the Rettig Report (1991). Even within the same family there were different reactions to the death or disappearance of one of its members. 1) Some expressed their solidarity with the situation and tried their best to inquire about what had happened, or to eventually find them; 2) Others thought that it was not such a terrible thing; 3) Others justified it; 4) Others kept silent. Mistrust grew amongst them and it provoked a clear deterioration in the family ties.

For instance:

> I never had my parents' support. I am their only child, they cheered the government, they forced me to sell my home so that in case my husband came back I could not live with him again. My parents told me: "It is because of that idiot of your husband that we are in this situation" [The date of the interview was May 1990- February 1991] (Rettig, 1991:II:776-777).

Needless to say, there were also cases of solidarity and support:
Interview extract with a missing prisoner's wife:

> My children made me bring out all the strength I had within me and which I didn't even know about. I had to try my best to keep them from being harmed. It was very important to know that I could count on people who had suffered just as I had [The date of the interview was May 1990 - February 1991] (Rettig,1991:II:783).

It is difficult to be too exact or precise on how the different responses such as solidarity, abandonment, denial, etc. were distributed. As an index, we can state that in 1975 the Association of Relatives of the Missing, grouped a third of all the relatives of those listed as missing (Rettig Report: II:613).

The main response during those years was denial and silence. Many people found that the best thing to do was not to talk about the repression and human rights violations (Padilla & Comas-Díaz, 1986). Although there is no epidemiological data, the data we have from clinics suggests that the overwhelming

response, even among the direct victims, was that of silence (Faúndez, Hering & Balogi, 1990). More or less the same was found in a research conducted amongst the sons and daughters of Jews who had survived the concentration camps, and amongst sons and daughters of Nazi criminals (Sichorovsky, 1987). Social history also suggests that those "defeated" forget the failures, even those such as agricultural strikes that failed, which are much less traumatic than tortures and deaths (Ferro, 1989).

This mechanism of cognitive and communicational avoidance can be explained if we bear in mind the available data on types of response in the face of collective catastrophes. Pennebaker (1990), by comparing two communities which suffered a collective disaster (a volcano eruption), found that in the community not affected by the volcano, but which could be affected in the future, people were more reluctant to being interviewed about the event and declared that they were affectively altered, while in the community which was further away from the volcano people did talk and answer questions about the eruption, and also felt more secure.

For those people who are right in the middle of an unfinished task, in Chile's case this was facing a situation of selective repression and diffuse fear, the best thing to do is to inhibit feelings and thoughts. This is Pennebaker's interpretation, based on laboratory studies comparing subjects who have undergone similar tasks, but who have different expectations. The group which is made to believe that they still have work to do said that they were less tired than the group which was told that they had finished the task (Pennebaker, 1990).

The fact that inhibition of feelings, thoughts and communication about negative events is adaptative in an environment such as the Chilean dictatorship, does not deny the fact that it has its costs. In fact, epidemiological data reviewed by Pennebaker (1990), suggests that this communication paralysis and inhibition is linked to higher community mortality and morbidity rates. This is what exemplifies Chile during this period. The whole climate of intimidation and relative calm, which represents the work of collective mourning through inhibition, will change after the 1981-82 economic crisis and the political protests of 1983.

The positive effects of the first demonstrations in 1980 are exemplified in the following extract:

Extract interview with a white collar centrist subject:

For me, the opposition gathering which took place in November at O'Higgins' Park was a huge surprise. I went along with about thirty people from the bank, we had never before done anything, and it was amazing to see that people were beginning to lose their fear. I was terribly scared! I think we started off in a large group, because we were all very frightened. We were afraid of being detained, or beaten-up, and of course if we were jailed the bank would have sacked us. It took us a long time to make up our minds and go; I started feeling safe as soon as the gathering ended and we were quite a few blocks away from O'Higgins' Park [The date of the interview was August 1983 - July 1984] (Politzer, 1990:86).

This extract is an example of how a successful collective demonstration ritual will bring about a positive, proud and secure collective emotion, which will contribute to the modification of the emotional climate. Nevertheless it will not be until the massive demonstrations and protests of 1983 that positive collective emotions will appear that will make the emotional climate suffer a considerable change. As a paradox, the rise in mobilizations will take place when a great deal of past militants of left-wing parties had finished their ideological dwelling. With this we mean that the militants had abandoned their militancy by some of the following mechanisms: a) dissonance decrease by way of abandoning their left-wing ideas and forgetting the past (affective withdrawal from the past). b) Changing the militancy into a "private religion," into a private value commitment with no public expression. c) Idealization and having a fixed idea of the past: "remembering the golden era, the good old days," but having no plans for the future. A minority is still active "denying" reality and stating that the dictatorship is "about to fall" (Páez, 1982). Although there is no available data from the "inside" of Chile, qualitative researches carried out on the topic of Chilean political exile, show that at around 1980, most of those people suffering exile were "adapting" to their new context and were abandoning political activism (Vásquez, 1990).

4.7   Economic crisis, social protests and the beginning of a change in the climate of fear: 1983-1984 and 1985-1987

At the end of 1981, an economic crisis took place which made unemployment rise from 15% during the 78-81 period to more than 20% in 1982. During 1983, the coordinated national unions and the Copper Mining Federation called for a national protest. This protest had an impact even in middle class areas, spreading to the working class areas, and as a consequence of this, widespread street riots took place. Between 1983 and 1986 there were a series of protest days. As an example of their impact, the following interview is of great help:

Interview with a center-left trade union leader, extract:

The first protest left us very impressed. It exceeded all expectations: everybody was out on the streets. It was too big for us, we didn't do anything, neither barricades nor anything else. The cops didn't expect it either, because they didn't even show up. Everybody went out on the streets banging pots. Everybody was happy, it seemed like it was carnival time, they jumped, messed around, played guitar, anything was right; it was crazy, as if Chile had won the World Cup. It was one of the most incredible situations I have ever been in! [The date of the interview was 1984-1986] (Politzer, 1988:47).

The dictatorship responded with renewed mass break-ins, selective repression (murders) and mass repression. Around one hundred people will die during the repression of these protests. Between 1980 and 1987 one hundred thousand people were arrested, several thousand deported or went into exile, and 1.500 were tortured (Foxley, 1988). In 1984, the dictatorship mobilized around 18.000 soldiers to put an end to the protests. The PC (Communist Party) became

more and more radical, and armed groups organized themselves and attacked the police. Their actions reached a peak in 1986 with the failed attempt of executing the dictator.

These protests will contribute to the decrease in fear and to the expression of anger and rage:

Interview with a center-left trade union leader, extract:

What impressed me most when I returned, was the people's lack of fear. For ten years fear had been the dictatorship's greatest ally. Any action one wanted to organize didn't work because those who had a job were scared of losing it, and those without a job were afraid of repression, of being beaten up or imprisoned [The date of the interview was August 1983 - July 1984] (Politzer, 1990:306).

A young minority sector participated in those protests. Around 50% of the entire population supported conventional types of action against the dictatorship, while 8-13% of the people supported radical actions (Hunneus, 1987). In working class areas, only 16% of the adult population expressed their agreement with the protests (Valenzuela, 1987).

Table 4.   Comparative table on the degree of participation in different types of collective action[2]

| | APPROVAL OF UNCONVENTIONAL POLITICAL BEHAVIORS | | | | | | |
	USA	Germany	Netherlands	Britain	Spain	Basque Country	Chile
Strikes	13%	9%	20%	13%	38%	56%	46%
Occupying Buildings	15%	6%	42%	14%	9%	17%	18%
Stoping Traffic	7%	12%	22%	14%	3%	15%	13%
Damaging Properties	1%	1%	1%	1%	3%	7%	8%

The failure of the protests, which did not achieve their aim of overthrowing Pinochet, and of the armed organizations, which were repressed after 1986, along with the change in politics and an economic recovery, marked the end of this period. The negative impact of the protest failure can be seen in the following interview:

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2   In the case of Chile causing damage to properties means causing black-outs because of attacks against electric towers or plants. In the case of the U.S.A.; F.R.G. and the Netherlands, strikes are illegal strikes. Sources: Germany, USA, Netherlands and Great Britain, Barnes & Kaase,1979; Spain and Basque Country: Linz,1981; Chile: Huneeus, 1987.

Extracts from an interview with a union leader:

It was a terrible disappointment (the failure of the Copper strike in the 1980's). It was very hard, those workers who weren't sacked seemed as if they had seen someone with a contagious disease when they met someone who had been on strike. They avoided us, people didn't go out. There was an atmosphere of disaster. Uncertainty began, and so did the fight to prevent them from sacking us and to force them into paying up what they owed us... Those of us who stayed until the end were left very much on our own. Those who had been sacked were scattered all over the country. They were redundant, borrowing, spending the few pennies they had saved after years of work... I have suffered a lot because of this... It is not a personal suffering but I do suffer for the others, for what's waiting for them after the fight (Politzer, 1990: 182-183).

For the ruling classes and right-wing sectors, the ghost of social rebellion reappears, and collective emotions of anxiety also come back to them. We must also add that the unequal economic development which has characterized Chile reinforces class differences and brings about an increase in delinquency: well-off sectors live isolated and with the anxiety of being burglarized, assaulted, they feel insecure on the streets, etc. This phenomena affects all social groups; statistics show that one in three Chileans has been a direct victim, or has a relative who has been a victim of theft, assault or violence (Foxley, 1988).

During those years the first large opinion polls take place. There was confirmation that the Chilean society presents high levels of fear towards certain social problems (Lira & Castillo, 1991, p.199). Furthermore, social problems are the ones that worry them most, and a factor analysis of these polls confirms that the social dimension is different and more important than the political one (Alaminos, 1991).

Table 5.   Ranking the social impact of national problems

	Factor 1	Factor 2
Decreases in wages and salaries ...	.79016	.19371
Lack of homes	.72847	.13742
Increase in redundancies	.72174	.25315
Rise in prices	.71481	.17906
Increase in terrorism	.07255	.80587
Political disorder	.10552	.78080
Civil war	.29878	.70289
Rise of delinquency and drugs	.31723	.55307
Increase in repression	.40132	'.51487

The first large opinion surveys will confirm that the dictator is the worst thought of president in Chilean history, although Allende's evaluation is also

a bad one. It is also confirmed that the dictatorship has brought about an "ideological decline." 28% of the people do not answer a question of ideological self-positioning and 14% declare themselves to be left-wing sympathizers in 1986, versus 44% in 1973.

Table 6.   Ideological distribution of Chileans

Question: Do you feel closer to the Right, Center or Left?

	1958 %	1961 %	1964 %	1970 %	1973 %	1986 %
RIGHT	31.4	23.8	17.4	26.6	21.9	16.6
CENTER	17.8	28.2	29.0	24.2	26.8	41.2
LEFT	24.5	26.5	32.0	26.0	26.8	14.2
NO ANSWER	26.3	21.5	21.6	23.2	42.9	28.0
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	8.4	100.0
					100.0	

[Source:Huneeus,1987]

"The Chileans will be pessimistic about the future and only a minority will be satisfied with the economic development of the country" (Huneeus, 1987: 31-33). The conclusion obtained from a comparative opinion poll was the following:

> The negative evaluation of the country's current situation also includes its future. As an answer to the question of whether the situation would be better, worse or would remain the same in the next years, 31.3% thought it would be better, 27.2% thought that it would be the same and 30.2% said it would be worse. This means that Chileans are pessimistic about the future.
> Pessimism can also be perceived when we establish a historical comparison: data has shown that pessimism is now even stronger than it was during the democratic period. Indeed, the marked contrast with the polls conducted since 1958 is quite significant. In all of them there was a higher percentage of people who perceived the future positively.The difference with regard to the February 1973 poll is even greater since, despite the deep economic crisis and the situation of high political conflict, almost 50% of Chileans thought that the future would be better, 12% thought it would be the same and there was a lower percentage (than in the 1986 poll), which thought it would get worse (Hunneus, 1987: 32).

We should point out that in Chile, at the time, we could find a positivity bias: in general, those people interviewed considered that their own situation was better than that of most other people.

The majority of people were conscious of the inhibition, apathy and social isolation characteristic of the Chilean society. 80% of them agreed with the statement that "people are suspicious and think twice before saying what they think" (Lira & Castillo, 1991: 202).

4.8   Failure of the protests, institutionalization of the dictatorship. Pinochet's failure in the plebiscite and in the presidential elections. Dawning of a climate of hope:1988-1990

The impact of the protests, and their relative failure, are associated to the fact that the dictatorship started its institutionalization plans. In 1988 a plebiscite is held in order to keep Pinochet in office as head of the government. He loses the plebiscite. Presidential elections are held at the end of 89, when the candidate of the center spectrum of the opposition wins with 54% of the votes. Even though the new government has to accept a series of institutional limitations and that Pinochet is still in control of the Army, a parliamentary democracy is reinstalled. After the failure of the protests a certain reflux and sadness caught on. The feeling of anger and the mobilizations decreased:

> ... there is also the influence of the repeated failures of the political mobilizations under the authoritarism (as in the case, for instance, of the *protestas*), which had strong backfiring effects because of the force of the repression with which they were punished. This brought fear, and fear brings along inhibition, passiveness, avoiding information or events that may bring back feelings of anxiety and fear. While at the same time it helps the rationalizing denial mechanism —politics is useless (Martínez, Tironi & Weinstein, 1990: 156).

Nevertheless, the relative institutional failures of the dictatorship creates a climate of relative hope. Even though it is still dominated by the fear of a new military coup and this climate will tend towards a sense of disappointment.

The climate of hope, and the residues from the climate of intimidation, will explain that despite the fact that serious social problems are still awaiting to be solved, there will not be large social mobilizations.The public acknowedgment of tortures and repression is only partially done and the perpetrators of the crimes are left unpunished. This reinforces the sense of disappointment. This ambivalence is expressed in the following statement by a relative of a missing person when the center right opposition wins the 1989 elections:

Extract of an interview with a person who has a missing relative:

> I felt joy and sadness when Aylwin won. I knew it was the end of an era: that of silence. But it was the start of a more difficult one, the need and the obligation to do something [The date of the interview was May 1990 - February 1991] (Rettig, 1991:II:785).

During the years in which an intimidation climate predominated, the most frequent answer on behalf of the relatives or victims who had survived the repression was of denial, as a way of coping with the trauma. But during this new period, the reactions will be based on a phase of mobilization and hyperactivity (people do and sign all kinds of petitions, people talk a lot about what had happened, etc.) (Becker et al., 1990).

5. Conclusions

From all that has been stated in the previous pages, our theoretical conclusion is that certain combinations of relatively stable basic emotions will maintain social stability at a given time. At least in relation to the goals of certain dominant social groups. The emotional climate will be made up of an aggregate of the four "basic" emotions, and a specific view of the social world and of the future. This group of emotions and representations will be associated with specific ways of social interaction, as well as with a specific predisposition towards action. This emotional climate will persist beyond the socio-political conditions which created it, and will maintain a given situation in society. Our case study of Chile tried to exemplify this point of view. First of all, we showed the congruent validity between experts' judgments of emotional climate and collective behavior indexes. Correlation between judgments of emotional climate and collective behavior were globally congruent: anger in right-wing sectors is related to repression against the left. Fear in left-wing sectors is related to level of civilian deaths. Strong collective violence is associated to lower levels of sadness and fear, and higher anger in left-wing sectors. Correlations suggest that associations are stronger for fear and sadness with repression, than for anger with political violence. There is a consensus amongst researchers in accepting the idea that fear was the dominant emotion in Chile during the dictatorship. This particular climate isolates people from each other; it makes them inhibit communication; it makes them deny or avoid thinking about certain events, and it also leads to apathy (DeRivera, 1991; Lira and Castillo, 1991). Nevertheless, we believe that fear, and anxiety as a more diffuse form, were associated during the years of dictatorship, and for the members of the defeated groups, with high levels of sadness and low levels of happiness, and also with low or inhibited anger. On the other hand, for the members of the opposition to the Allende government (center and right-wing sectors), the climate was made up of high levels of anger (although it was eased by means of hating those who were defeated), high happiness (although later, for some people at least, this would shrink due to economic problems), low fear, although initially fear was also felt due to the "war" situation, and finally low sadness. This syndrome of emotions suffered an evolution as we have seen before. We also showed that the climate of fear/intimidation, at least as it was expressed by means of collective behaviors, continued beyond the objective conditions which contributed to its creation (the political apathy was very high during the years 1978-1981, even though repression was less intense than in previous years). In the same way, a dictatorial period, along with the climate of fear and intimidation it creates, achieves an ideological recess, which has as a consequence that a large percentage of a generation is lost for social activism.

The initial climate of terror in Chile, and the climate of intimidation which followed, would fulfill the function of establishing and stabilizing Pinochet's dictatorship and of allowing a certain economic recovery which would satisfy

the ruling classes. The terror/fear/intimidation emotional climate made Chile's economic development and growth possible. Chile's economy rose from an income per capita of 700 (U.S.) dollars in 1970, to an income of 3,000 dollars in the 1980's. This will benefit two million people out of a total population of 12.5 million. Whereas this part of the population increased their share in the income distribution, the average wage during the years 73-80 was lower than that of previous years (Foxley, 1987; Jalée, 1974).

If we take into account the social functions of the "basic" emotions (anger-rage-hate; fear-anxiety; sadness, and happiness), we can state that the climate of anger/hate which the dominant classes felt, should be associated with a stronger social differentiation, a justification of repression and with a change in the behavior of those dominated populations, all of which are social and interpersonal functions of anger. The climate of fear and sadness of those who supported Allende and of those classes which were worse off, should be associated, in the case of fear, with an adaptation through escape or flight, and with transmitting a desire to get in touch with someone. In relation to sadness, it should be associated with adaptation through the acceptance of a loss of status, preventing further losses, and a lack of commitment to relationships and objectives, coupled with seeking support. Low levels of anger would also be associated with abandoning objectives and with not trying to change other people's behavior. Low happiness would be associated to the lack of contact and social interaction, which would annul the search for support, linked to sadness, and the search for getting in contact with someone, which is related to fear. In this climate of high fear and sadness, some behaviors typically associated with them, such as establishing contact and seeking support, did not appear. These behaviors only appeared associated with anger and only when happiness once again reappeared.

On the other hand, the evolution in social conditions (relative economic growth, decrease in repression, institutional political activities, renewal of the old generation "hit" by repression) will help to dissipate the intimidation climate. A series of macrosocial events (economic crisis 81-82; protests 83-85) will shake off the fear/intimidation climate and will create a climate of anger and rebellion in some sectors of the population, especially in the young and working class. The failure of the protests, the institutionalization initiatives on the part of the dictatorship, which lost the 1988 plebiscite and the 1989 elections, will provoke a climate of hope and partial disappointment. Durkheim's notion that successful collective rituals reinforce social identity and cohesion was reaffirmed by the positive impact of the collective protest episodes. It is also important to stress that certain intense and circumstantial collective emotional events such as the collective protests and the above-mentioned opposition demonstrations, represent the starting points from where the emotional climates originate. As an example we should remember the massive repression as responsible for creating a climate of terror. And the protests making it possible to dissipate the climate of intimidation.

Finally, it is important to point out the strong relationship between emotional climate and emotional culture: the Chilean culture, marked by a strong sociability and positive interactional rules, was deeply affected by the dictatorship period. A stronger self-control and social isolation developed. This fact, linked to an unequal, though real, economic development, has led the Chilean people to consider themselves now as "colder" and "European," and less Latin. Seeing themselves again as the "English" of South America (Godoy, 1975). This fact can be observed in the stand which represented Chile in the 1992 World Exhibition: an Antarctic "iceberg," which exemplifies both the economic and technical efficiency and the "gelid" Chilean character.

This study is only a case research. Our data does not allow us to reject the idea that the collective emotions described before are just an effect of other social processes. Only the confirmation of the predictive aspect of different emotional climates would allow theoretical and empirical advances. As pointed out by DeRivera (1992), the study of the emotional climate will allow us to study the macrosocial functioning of emotions, and this will demand collective indicators which could be compared with opinion polls on individual well-being and social perception, as well as with experts judgments, in-depth interviews, and group discussions on the predominant climate in different social and historical moments.

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Appendix

Table 1

Mean basic emotion prototypical left subject

YEAR	JOYL[3]	FEARL	ANGERL	SADNL[4]
70	3.50	1.50	2.50	1.00
71	3.50	1.00	2.50	1.00
72	3.00	2.50	3.50	1.00
73	1.00	4.00	2.00	4.00
74	1.00	4.00	2.00	4.00
75	1.00	3.50	1.50	3.50
76	1.00	3.50	1.00	3.50
77	1.00	3.00	1.50	3.50
78	1.00	2.50	2.00	3.00
79	1.00	3.00	2.00	3.00
80	1.00	2.50	2.00	2.50
81	1.50	2.50	1.50	2.50
82	1.50	2.00	3.00	2.00
83	2.00	2.00	3.50	2.50
84	1.50	2.00	3.50	2.00
85	1.50	2.00	3.00	1.50
86	1.50	2.50	3.00	2.00
87	1.50	2.00	2.50	2.00
88	2.00	2.00	2.50	2.50
89	3.00	2.00	2.50	2.50

Mean basic emotion prototypical center subject

YEAR	JOYC	FEARC	ANGERC	SADNC
70	2.50	1.50	1.00	2.00
71	1.50	2.50	2.50	1.50
72	1.50	3.00	3.50	2.00
73	3.50	2.00	3.50	1.50
74	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.50
75	1.50	2.50	1.50	2.00
76	1.00	2.50	1.50	2.50
77	1.00	2.00	1.50	2.50
78	1.00	2.50	1.50	2.00
79	1.50	2.00	2.00	1.50
80	1.50	2.00	2.50	1.50
81	1.50	2.00	1.50	1.50
82	1.00	2.50	1.50	1.50
83	1.50	3.00	2.50	2.00
84	1.50	3.00	2.50	1.50
85	1.50	3.00	3.00	1.50
86	1.50	3.50	3.00	1.50
87	1.00	2.50	2.50	1.50
88	1.50	2.50	2.50	1.50
89	3.00	2.00	1.50	1.50

3 JOYL= level of joy for prototypical left-wing subject, etc
4 Scores on levels of basic emotions (fear, anger, sadness and joy) attributed by two experts to the prototypical right, center or left-wing subject. High score means high fear, sadness, joy and anger. Range from 1=low level to 4=high level.

Mean basic emotion prototypical right subject

YEAR	JOYR	FEARR	ANGER	SADNR
70	1.00	3.50	1.00	3.00
71	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.50
72	1.00	3.00	3.50	2.00
73	4.00	1.50	3.50	1.00
74	4.00	1.00	3.50	1.00
75	4.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
76	3.50	1.50	2.50	1.00
77	3.50	1.50	2.50	1.00
78	3.00	1.50	2.50	1.00
79	3.00	1.50	2.50	1.00
80	4.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
81	4.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
82	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
83	2.00	1.50	2.50	1.50
84	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.50
85	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00
86	1.50	2.00	2.00	2.00
87	2.00	2.50	2.00	1.50
88	1.50	2.00	2.50	2.00
89	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.50

Analysis of variance between cluster of objective collective violence and conflict.

Variable	Number of Clusters	F	Prob	Number of Clusters	F	Prob
DEATH	3	389.4302	.0	4	761.2103	.000
ARMY		18.0312	.000		12.6515	.001
COLLVIO		3.1919	.077		4.5175	.027
DEATH	5	1514.8834	.000	6	1895.3403	.000
ARMY		35.8313	.000		18.0670	.000
COLLVIO		7.9534	.004		16.3482	.000
DEATH	7	1438.3899	.000	8	1274.0621	.000
ARMY		14.3197	.001		10.8234	.003
COLLVIO		19.6015	.000		16.2382	.001

MEANS

Year	Cluster	DEATH	ARMY	COLLVIO
73	1	1261.	30.	85.
74	2	309.	2.	10.
83-84	3	80.4	9.5	57.4
75-76	4	131.	1.7	5.1
79-81-85-87	5	31.1	4.8	61.0
77-78-80-82	6	14.3	0.6	15.4

Meaning of year and cluster

Cluster 1
75   Putsch High collective violence (before) and deaths
            (after)

Cluster 2
74   Mass repression and lower army death and collective
            violence

Cluster 4
75-76   Selective Repression, lower army death and the lowest
            collective violence

Cluster 6 (partial)
77-78   Aftermath and "calm", lowest civilian death and the
            lowest army death

Cluster 5 (partial)
79   Intermediate civilian death and army death year of
            violence by minority members

Cluster 6 (partial)
80   Similar to 77-78 "Calm"

Cluster 5
81   Similar to 79 minority violence

Cluster 6 (partial)
82   Similar to 77-78 and 80 "calm"

Cluster 3
83-84   Period of social movements "protestas". Higher civilian
            and army deaths during the dictatorship period

Cluster 5 (partial)
85-86-87 Similar to 79 and 81 minority violence and collective
            violence, protestas continue at a lower level

Table 2. Means for basic emotions and univariate f's by clusters of collective violence

Level of Basic Emotion
Center Prototypical Subject

CLUA	OYC	FEARC	ANDERC	SADNC
1	3.5	2.0	3.5	1.5
2	3.0	2.0	3.0	1.5
3	1.5	3.0	2.5	1.5
4	1.5	2.5	1.5	2.5
5	1.4	2.6	2.4	1.5
6	1.2	2.2	1.7	1.8

Variable	Wilks' Lambda	F	Significance
JOYC	.06895	24.31	.001
FEARC	.60309	1.18	.387
ANGERC	.35337	3.29	.057
SADNC	.48491	1.91	.187

Group means
Level of Basic Emotion
right-wing Prototypical Subject

CLUA	JOYR	FEARR	ANGER	SADNR
1	4.0	1.5	3.5	1.0
2	4.0	1.0	3.5	1.0
3	2.0	1.75	2.25	1.5
4	3.75	1.25	2.75	1.0
5	2.4	1.8	2.1	1.5
6	3.37	1.25	2.25	1.0

Variable	Wilks' Lambda	F	Significance
JOYR	.42404	2.445	.1154
FEARR	.6000	1.200	.3817
ANGER	.17797	8.314	.0035
SADNR	.51724	1.680	.2349

Group means
Level of Basic Emotion
left-wing Prototypical Subject

CLUA	JOYL	FEARL	SADNL	ANGERL
1	1.0	4.0	4.0	2.0
2	1.0	4.0	4.0	2.0
3	1.75	2.0	2.25	3.5
4	1.0	3.5	3.5	1.25
5	1.4	2.4	2.2	2.4
6	1.1	2.5	2.75	2.12

Variable	Wilks' Lambda	F	Significance
JOYL	.35756	3.234	.0603
FEARL	.16143	9.350	.0023
SADNL	.29944	4.211	.0299
ANGERL	.35721	3.239	.0601

Table 3. Convergent validity of the emotional climate indicators and
collective behavior

Canonical Discriminant Functions evaluation of Group Means (Group
Centroids) by Cluster of Collective behavior

Year	Center	Right	Left
73 Putsch High Soc.Movilization	8.8	4.79	4.33
74 Mass Repression	6.5	4.31	4.33
83-84 High Coll.Viol. Intermediate repression	-0.27	-1.35	-2.5
75-76 Select.Represion Lowest Social Mov.	-0.89	1.48	2.66
79-81-85-86-87 High political violence and intermediate Social Mov.	-1.04	-1.1	-0.29
77-78-80-82 Aftermath and "calm"	-1.84	-0.95	-1.88

(High centroid scores means high anger and joy and lower sadness
and fear for the center and right groups. High centroid scores
means the opposite for left groups (high fear and sadness and lower
anger and joy).

Correlation	JOYC	FEARC	ANGERC	SADNC
DEATH	.7034**	-.2499	.5372$	-.1170
ARMY	.6802*	.0544	.6668*	-.3732
COLLVIO	.3203	.1367	.5436*	-.5085$

Correlation:	JOYR	FEARR	ANGER	SADNR
DEATH	.3602	-.1229	.6924*	-.2298
ARMY	-.1922	.3489	.2462	.3134
COLLVIO	-.3939	.3999	-.0935	.3833

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Correlation:      JOYL        FEARL       ANGERL      SADNL

   DEATH        -.2526       .6187*      -.1466       .5490$
   ARMY          .2246       .1035        .3042       .0521
   COLLVIO       .3203      -.3028        .3877      -.3297

Minimum N of cases:      17
Signif: &  .10   $ .05   * -  .01   ** -  .001
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11

Violation of Fundamental Rights; Individual and Social Reparation

Elisa Neumann, Angélica Monreal & Consuelo Macchiavello

1 Introduction

This reflection is based on our therapeutic experience at FASIC, the Social Aid Foundation of the Christian Churches. We begin by focusing on the individual process; we then consider some of the aspects of the social process most relevant to our therapeutic task. We conclude suggesting future tasks.

2 The Individual Process

Since 1977 we have provided care to nearly 6,000 victims of human rights violations. We have taken on their processes of pain and suffering linked to experiences of destruction, loss, and grief.

This is the case of the relatives of the detained and disappeared. They must deal with the doubt as to their loved ones' fate. They are not sure if their relative is dead, but they still must live with his or her real absence.

The relatives of those killed for political motives must elaborate the pain associated with the awareness that their loved one died brutally. The horror and impotence this awareness awakens in them have not diminished with the passing of time. The family's tainted reputation and the unlikelihood of finding out the exact circumstances of the loved one's death make elaborating the pain all the more difficult.

Kidnap and torture victims have suffered a degree of trauma hard for anyone to imagine. The offenders usually succeeded in their attempts to destroy and disintegrate the victim's personality. Therefore, these victims must elaborate the grief felt for their losses and humiliations.

Finally, exile and the return from exile involve successive losses and vital restructurings.

For Freud, grief is the pain and sorrow caused by the death or loss of a loved one or of an abstract equivalent, such as one's homeland, liberty, or ideals.

Grieving is a dynamic and complex process. It involves the whole personality, demanding a great deal of time and psychic energy. Reality forever shows the subject that the object does not exist, but the object remains alive in the subject's memories and expectations. The subject must therefore experience acceptance to re-organize his or her internal and external world.

For those we work with, the grief process is doubly distressing, for the subject must accept the loss in an aggressive and destructive context. Chilean society ignores the subject's trauma and distorts the traumatic event by blaming it on the victim.

These dramatic border experiences reveal the very intimate association between subjective suffering and social damage. The events at the root of the subject's grief are political, but the loss involves an event that is at once personal and social.

Just three of the many ways that society leads the survivors and their relatives to privatize the damage are: denying the facts; tainting the reputation of the victim's family; and promoting confusion as to the facts. These and other social practices lead the survivors and their relatives to feel that a loved one's torture and death or disappearance are the victim's fault. This is precisely one of the aims of political repression: to cause supporters of an alternative political project to interpret the aggression against them as a personal loss and subjective impoverishment.

These traumatic losses do indeed involve private and individual psychological damage. Yet their complete elaboration requires that society as a whole recognize their sociopolitical origin.

Present conditions are not at all conducive to the normal development of grief. Normally, the sorrow and distress of grief constitute a process, not a state; but in the cases we have attended to, the suffering is a state: the subject grieves within the social framework of ongoing violence, arbitrary events, and cover-ups that keep justice from being done.

According to Bruno Bettelheim, in these conditions the death instinct prevails and could lead to self-destruction. He notes the weakening or loss of trust in our peers and in the institutions charged with regulating social relations, which makes it more difficult to resist situations of extreme aggression and violence.

Our therapeutic experience with victims of human rights violations confirms Bettelheim's observation. Convinced that no one cares about their pain or death, they experience feelings of great deception, abandonment, and despair.

3   The Social Process

It is well-known that the Chilean dictatorship systematically violated human rights. To assert social control, it manipulated information with a

double standard and dual purpose: to instill terror, the dictatorship publicized torture, disappearances, and executions. But to avoid domestic and international discredit, the dictatorship distorted and denied news of the events. Chile has absorbed this terror and ambiguity.

The dictatorship used State terror and misinformation to control every kind of independent individual and institutional social expression, and to promote silence and denial. Political parties and social organizations gave in; so did the members of the judiciary. Under the reign of State terror, the whole society has pretended to be deaf, dumb, and blind to the systematic violation of human rights, but deep down people know what happened.

The 16 years of systematic violence and aggression resulted in significant and vital losses. Some of the most noticeable of these are the alienation of social individuality, the ruin of personal projects, and the deviation of the relationship of each individual with himself or herself, with others, and with their reality.

Unable to deal with the crisis, not trusting their reparative impulses, people resorted to archaic defense mechanisms to protect themselves from the pain and despair. In this part of our reflection, we shall touch upon what we have detected as the three most significant and frequently used of these archaic defense mechanisms. They are denial, dissociation, and projection.

Denial is a highly ineffective mechanism, especially when what the subject is negating is potentially destructive. By denying it, the subject does not take the appropriate means to protect himself or herself from the danger, thus leaving him or her more exposed and vulnerable.

Many people used denial to convince themselves that things could not get worse. When things did get worse, people often expanded denial to cover a broader array of situations. Inevitably this kept them from taking other measures such as uniting with others, demanding that justice be done, fighting back, and so on. Too often it was easier to deny reality when facing up to it meant having to take unpleasant, difficult, or costly measures.

Fear of the adversary's vengeance and anger sustain the social mechanisms fostered by denial and the unhealthy desire to forgive and forget. This is where feelings of guilt for having kept silent in the face of atrocious acts of social violence are projected. Doing nothing, out of selfishness, provokes guilt feelings. So, to avoid feeling guilty, the subject denies reality, thus apparently making life easier for the moment.

For Melanie Klein, the basis of guilt feelings is in the subject's fantasy that his or her own aggressive impulses caused the loss or damage of the object. In a chaotic, uncertain and threatening reality, the guilt feeling originates not only for the subject's having committed an aggressive act in the fantasy, but also for recognizing our weakness and impotence, as we did nothing to prevent the loss.

The second of the three most often used distancing strategies under our consideration is dissociation. This occurs when people refer vaguely and

generally to "a situation of repression" to hide the violence and losses that particular persons suffered.

We also see dissociation taking place when the subject uses technical terms instead of our everyday terms to separate the emotional from the intellectual experience. Examples of this abound: instead of saying "assassination" or "murder" people speak of "unnecessary violence;" instead of saying the authorities "detained and disappeared" the loved one, they speak of "forced disappearances;" instead of saying "torture," they speak of "illegitimate punishment."

Before reflecting on the tasks that lay ahead, we should mention projection, the third significant and frequently used defense mechanism. Often, the subject projects onto others his or her own power, fury, aggressive ability to defend oneself, and responsibilities. Of course, not all of us are responsible for all that happened, and there are degrees of responsibility among the wrongdoers. But projection allows the subject to put onto others these negative aspects while fully absolving himself or herself.

In the weeks, months, and years that lay before us, coming to know the truth about what has happened in Chile since September 1973, and doing justice, are important for the victims of political repression. It also necessary for the whole of Chilean society.

4   Future tasks

The constant and repeated acts of social and individual violence were unprecedented in Chilean history. Never before had so many strata of our society experienced such profound trauma. In a way, the immediate victims of the repression and their relatives are but exacerbated manifestations of something that affected the entire population. Vast sectors of the population responded only with silent complicity and by not getting involved.

Chile must integrate the horrors it lived through and stop saying that human rights violations are someone else's problem. Human rights pertain to all of us, either as victims, agents, or witnesses. We must admit that we have silently lived with the horror for these 16 years; then we must deal with our emotional guilt and complicities.

Our therapeutic experience in FASIC has taught that we cannot just keep on living with the horror. The experiences must be integrated, emotionally elaborated, and reread in the social context. We must do this to keep them from becoming an absolutely overwhelming burden that drives us to privatization, self-blame, and dissociation.

We understand that society, like a group, is "the object" of representations and affects organized by certain individual psychic formations that possess group properties. Society takes on the characteristics of individual psychism, and group psychism.

A group that fosters or reproduces individual representations assures mediation between the intrapsychic and the social universes; such a group becomes a transitional apparatus.

In the individual, this encourages the personal experience of accompaniment, agreement, and credibility. It allows the subject to find his or her alter ego. It also promotes networks based on points of identification that are ultimately helpful in the elaboration and integration of odious, unpleasant, and painful situations. When the members of society take on this task and carry it out, they enable the subjects to feel represented, or to reinforce their identity.

It is in this sense that the groups of victims of political repression have helped to elaborate grief. These organizations have offered spaces for social support and validation of their traumatic experience as well as ways to overcome impotence in the face of arbitrary events and injustice. Though they seldom win, these groups continue to present denunciations and appeal rulings in the national and international justice systems.

This process must be involve a large part of society, and should include symbolic points of reference for the group. We must restore the dignity of the Group of Relatives of the Detained-Disappeared, the Group of Relatives of the Politically Executed, and other human rights groups. Contact with these painful events of our history is a source of insecurity, frustration, fear, deficiency, and so on. It is the group that has the answer and offers the possibility of re-uniting by restoring the internal and external equilibrium and recovering the collective identity.

Participating in social mobilizations and the struggle for truth and justices enables us to regain some of our projected capabilities. By doing this, we once again feel strong, powerful, and able to influence and change reality. This same social process could be used to alleviate magnified and omnipotent guilt feelings, which many have denied and avoided by projecting them on authority. Simply put, supporting truth and justice allows one to understand the sociopolitical significance of the events as well as to find a constructive outlet for the emotions stemming from these traumatic events. Rereading the events means that society must judge both the power structure that has made the violation of human rights possible and the ideology of National Security, which has sustained it.

Knowledge of these traumatic events is not enough. Chile must take on the task of determining guilt and complicity and it must sanction and punish the guilty. This will allow us to mend the social fabric and assure spaces for elaborating the pain and for social solidarity. Just knowing the truth, without doing justice, could deepen the differences and polarizations; it could till fertile ground for more violence and vengeance.

To comprehend the significance of the events and to take on the pain and responsibilities constructively will make possible social reparation in the search for justice, a search for justice that will be doubly reparative.

For the individual process, it opens the social space for the victim's own

demands and those of his or her relative who, in addition to being tortured or assassinated, was also stigmatized through these years as an "enemy of the homeland" or a "dangerous extremist." This space will make it possible "to put things in their place," to receive the social solidarity so necessary to relieve the pain, to recover trust in society and its institutions, so necessary to overcome impotence and recover hope.

For the society, its institutions, and various social sectors, including the armed forces, the search for justice opens the way to determining responsibilities and damages and to generate the moral, material, or penal sanctions and reparations that will make it possible to heal wounds and recover our national identity.

In and of itself, the struggle to attain justice, as a social value and a utopia, has a constructive and reparative significance. But it creates a way to channel anger and impotence as well.

By struggling for justice, we can clarify the repressive events and figure out precisely what happened; what made it possible; and who the perpetrators were. This will allow us to determine who is responsible, to put things into proper perspective, and to objectify the repressive events. Doing this will alleviate persecutory anxieties and make way for the elaboration of the pain and feelings of depression, thus making possible real reparation.

Struggling for justice opens the way for creativity and sublimation through the effort to rebuild and develop truly democratic ways of living together.

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12

State Terrorism as a Phantom

Juan Jorge Fariña

This essay is an attempt to summarize some key aspects of our work experience since 1982 in the Movimiento Solidario de Salud Mental (MSSM) providing psychotherapeutic assistance for persons affected by human rights violations in Argentina. This work was done in cooperation with the organization Relatives of Persons Disappeared and Detained for Political Reasons.

Throughout those years of clinical/institutional work, the psychotherapeutic task was continuously affected by the changing sociopolitical situation in Argentina. Thus various manifestations arose in patients undergoing treatment and in the entire community affected by state terrorism, which were always included as variables in the therapeutic strategy.

This implied the need to construct a theoretical framework and a clinical approach that would effectively account for the particular nature of the demand and which at the same time would make it possible to capitalize on existing resources to provide professional training to the therapists working in the program.

At the same time, a permanent and parallel research effort had to be undertaken, as well as arduous debates within the clinical team of the MSSM, and with other mental health professionals, to formulate a scientific response to the difficult articulation between the sociopolitical situation and its impact on treatments. This impact had to do with both technical aspects and issues of transference and countertransference.

Our work in the areas of clinical, community, and research psychology leads us to recognize in the psychological issues associated with human rights violations in Argentina a phenomenon heretofore unknown in terms of both its traumatic magnitude and the extent it reached among different social strata

The hundreds of clinical histories that we have observed clearly indicate an exceptional reality situation from a social psychological standpoint: those directly affected are the exacerbated expression of a symptom that affects all Argentinians.

The peculiar sociopolitical characteristics that led to the escalation of trauma explain the depth of certain psychological formations, and above all their persistence.

Forced disappearance of persons as a method of repression has already been widely condemned inside Argentina and abroad; indeed, the Junta's policy has been described as including crimes against humanity. Nonetheless, there is not yet sufficient awareness of the profound repercussions and psychological effects of this policy, a policy that cannot be separated from social events as a whole and the particular methods used.

Understanding this psychosocial articulation is necessary for analyzing the situations observed. Its value is determined by the interplay of various factors, which can be summarized as follows:

1. The actual number of direct victims: 2,000 people were assassinated from 1973 to 1975; two million were exiled under the military government; and a dramatic and still unknown number of persons disappeared from 1976 to 1982, with various sources reporting 10,000 cases attested to by witnesses.

This supports our earlier point that disappearances and other violations of human rights are a socially widespread problem affecting large numbers of families. In certain social sectors and geographical areas almost all members of a community had some relative, friend, or acquaintance who was detained, interrogated, or kidnapped by the army or security forces.

2. The characteristics of the operations, including public kidnappings, often in the victim's very place of work or study, in the presence of eyewitnesses. In all cases the deployment of men and arms was totally disproportionate to the objective, which was to detain citizens who were absolutely unarmed and engaged in routine activities. The effect of this deployment, often accompanied by searches and raids, was to infuse in the public a collective sense of the presumed danger posed by the person detained and at the same time to intimidate the entire community by producing an effect of paralyzing terror.

3. The conditions of imprisonment and methods of torture used on the person kidnapped. The action that complemented this system of detention was imprisonment in concentration camps (known as *"chupaderos"*), the systematic use of torture, and the physical and psychological degradation of the victim and his or her family.

4. The distortion of information provided to the general public regarding the situation, especially the contradictory and schizophrenia-inducing message conveyed to the direct victims and their relatives: this has turned out to be an important factor for understanding the psychological impact and the scope of the traumatic situation. The media exercised social censorship and covered up what was happening. At the same time, the responses of the military authorities to the demands of relatives reiterated denial of the facts. The formula used for these cases was the reiterated and invariable response of the military authorities when recourse was made to *habeas corpus*: "Person has no record of having been detained or being sought by the police under the Ministry of Interior."

5. The ever more widespread assumption that the vast majority of citizens kidnapped in impunity were assassinated, likening the Argentinian

experience to genocide, with the destruction and disappearance of the corpses and the evidence of mass burials of "NN" (anonymous corpses) at various cemeteries.

All of these elements resulted in a situation in which families in which one or more members had been victimized by forced disappearance would become social outcasts. This marginalization meant that in families strongly rooted in their communities there was a collective withdrawal in which the doors of the neighborhood were closed to the successive cries for moral and economic support, and even for basic human solidarity.

This phenomenon was an effect of the continuous official publicity, which described all the disappeared as marginals, implying that they were to be looked down on socially. The community reacted, protecting its supposed healthy members through its lack of commitment, thereby isolating them from the so-called "subversives."

These situations, repeated often during the first years of the military regime, resulted in different sorts of feelings and behaviors toward the affected families, including open solidarity with one's companion, neighbor, or lifelong friend, irrational hatred and open indignation towards the member kidnapped, shock and paralyzing terror, and even silence. The community showed in its responses that the problem affected everyone, and that whatever the attitude one adopted, the successive mechanism of denial was a social defense mechanism in the face of the panic that stemmed from the effects of military repression, from the certainty of the still latent danger.

The psychotherapeutic assistance program had to take on group and family cases, immersed in this overall reality in which a whole social discourse often articulated the vicissitudes of each individual drama.

In recent years this context changed markedly, as all Argentinians increasingly resisted the regime, until democracy prevailed. The community then had greater access to information on what had occurred in the worst years of the terror, and the disappeared and their families could reclaim their lost place in the society that forgot them under the prevailing censorship.

Nonetheless this new situation, which is part of the framework of almost all clinical treatments underway, far from turning out to be in itself a therapeutic element, often represented a new challenge for the relative, which was not always resolved successfully.

The inner co-existence of the segregationist strategies of the past with this novel social recognition, which nevertheless did not resolve their individual drama, led to several cases of organic and psychological breakdowns.

This bitter reality led the therapists to adopt different strategies, which included being on call 24-hours a day, from December 1983 to February 1984, when most of the emergency cases occurred.

The clinical implications of these extreme cases and, in general, in all of the persons assisted, led at one moment to uncertainty as to the fate of the disappeared relative, an uncertainty that is shared by the patient, the therapist,

and the entire community. Indeed, this matter remains unresolved. The psychical drama in relatives of the disappeared, provoked by the social damage implicit in being held clandestinely, is closely related to the way in which official information and discourse handled this imprisonment. In this sense, the decision of the military regime to make detentions and investigations clandestine, and to enforce long periods of captivity, set in motion a unique and extreme psychological and social process. The relatives affected found themselves facing a totally new form of social torture: the government was not only denying them the possibility of making contact with their loved ones, but instilled in them a novel mechanism with a great potential to render them psychotic: the systematic denial of reality.

The dictatorship used absolute control of official propaganda and an indiscriminate exercise of political power to introduce a counterweight in accordance with the importance of the evidence of the reality that they endeavored to hide and deny.

To psychically constitute a normal or neurotic reality, it is essential that the data from experience are reflected in different manifestations, most particularly in language, the articulator of all representations of our collective reality.

Of the declarations included in the 1979 report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in the most recent report (1984) by CONADEP, and based on material drawn from clinical histories observed, it clearly emerges that there has been a persistent open contradiction between the testimonies of relatives and persons detained, and the response from the various agencies of the military government to which these events were denounced. This contradiction is based on absolute denial by the government of its participation in the events, which can be clearly traced in the speeches of the time and in the files of the Ministry of Interior.

The effectiveness of this technique of concealment and lying is based on the fact that the government apparatus exercises a power of authority over the population which, in general, is independent of its degree of popular support. Governmental decisions have the power of law, which is unconsciously internalized, independent of, and often despite, the greater or lesser sympathy with which any given law is received.

Therefore an entire community silently echoed utterly false statements which came from the state and were reinforced by a permanent bombardment of profuse and tendentious propaganda. An imaginary space was thus generated that attained a high degree of traumatic effectiveness, strengthening this denial of reality through legal mechanisms and official discourse.

A series of psychological formations were instilled which, in the form of denial of reality, which is at the root of the pathological models observed in several of the cases of the affected individuals.

The fact of the detention and later disappearance of individuals was not recognized for many years by any social entity; the only such recognition came when there was evidence of the disappeared person, and through identification

of relatives of the detained-disappeared with one another.

This explains, from the psychological standpoint, what is already a socially-demonstrated fact: a greater degree of ego strength and an attitude of seeking to change reality is observed in the relatives who have organized in various human rights organizations, especially groups of persons who have been directly affected. In this way they constituted an identity-space that enabled them to maintain their ideals and convictions in an atmosphere that was hostile and traumatizing for many years.

Clinical experience has shown that in the face of an equivocal and contradictory reality, a subjective category is created which, on becoming separate from its real elements, becomes a sort of "phantom," an imaginary scene that represents, in a more or less distorted manner, the recurrent desire for the absent member to reappear.

The slogan "Appearance of the detained-disappeared alive" became one collective means of identification that made it possible for a social group to find some kind of non-psychoticizing recognition. The groups of persons in similar circumstances who form relatives' organizations have been, de facto, forms of therapeutic elaboration insofar as the unifying factor of struggle brought them together around a political and social reality.

In any event, and beyond the various individual or collective resolutions, psychotherapy has been and continues to be irreplaceable when a relative takes on the challenge of facing his or her own history.

In therapy there is a permanent redefinition of the bonds that associate: one's own suffering with that of the disappeared person; somatic suffering with the phantasmagoric presence of the other's body; the figure of the beloved relative with social phenomena and the discursive effects that evoke him or her.

Many have already given up the hope of knowing something about the real death; now, life and death are for them effects of discourses of desperation, discourses woven by social denial of the power structure.

In some cases the hypothesis of reparation was long associated with a supposed commutation of the sentence already served; for others, freedom awaits as an effect and fruit of the permanent and uncompromising struggle; perhaps in the best-informed and clearest-minded people it is no longer a question of the disappeared appearing alive, but of upholding all the human rights represented by the symbol of the absent relative.

13

Memory, Exile, and Return: An Uruguayan Experience

Marcelo Viñar

1   Introduction

This subject can only be treated in the singular, for there are as many texts and authors as there are people who address it. The story varies in detail and intimacy with each case.

I do not intend to develop or uphold a thesis. I just want to provoke you and make a proposition to you. It is a proposition that seeks a reply, that is aimed at counter-discourse.

Memory, exile, and return are the three poles that I have to bring together. Who responds, the expert or the exile who returns, after 13 years?

Because for a Freudian the subject —as an abstract theme— deals with a special and central point of the theory that we ask ourselves about in each case, with each of our patients and with ourselves, every day.

The subject Memory, Exile, and Return, in its content and its timeliness, suggests a questioning of or appeal to my friends; it is an implacable interview or word of mission as unavoidable and necessary as it is terrible, a crossroads that imposes itself obliging me to speak from a very particular situation, between *algos* (or pain) and *logos* (or reason), between a testimonial or symptomatic discourse and one that is reasoned and communicable. What can be said in public about the intimacy of this process?

For in the dark labyrinth of the soul, in its galleries, Machado would say, where the decision to return is plotted and woven, the knowledge, the lucidity to which one turns, is based more on anguish than reason. Using reason we can all make arguments, duties, ideals, and pleasure, either solemnly approving of the reasons for return, or expressing disapproval. A caricature would be somewhat as follows: "A political exile should return because Uruguay and Latin America are his homeland, his culture, and his projects (in terms of ideal and pleasure, i.e. of ethics or of erogenous body)." And from here lucid and reasoned arguments could be developed for a behavioral, clear, and conflict-free definition. The quality of the conscious truth thus obtained cannot be

questioned. But human truth, if it exists, is always relative, contradictory, and controversial.

So beyond the conscious and behavioral truth that an act sanctions (I return or I stay), beyond that, what can one say? Here there is a problem that is difficult and poorly-addressed in theory. How does one go from thought to action, and vice versa? What is the shared material and the moment of disruption (of disjunction) between thought and action?

In Freud, two complementary and contradictory concepts of 1912, *acting out* and *elaboration*, open up one aspect of the problem in relation to transference. And many of us Freudians work well with "Daddy's recipe" as if that always gives the right answers. The kitchen recipe is good: you think, reflect, ponder, and through a gradual process and a successive process of structuring, chooses a "model of the obsessive." Postponing the act, suspending its realization, they say, is healthy; undertaking the action is acting out, mad, crazy, or neurotic. This simple or idyllic scheme is a lie. No one doubts that action requires reflection, but it is a lie that suspension and time bring one closer to a good decision. Obsessive pondering reaches the absurd, and brings on suffering, even when its results are positive.

It is not just a question of denouncing the insufficiency of this scheme, but of assuming its function of covering up or concealment. There is an illusion of a harmonious continuum between the elaboration and its solution; but this is a lie. If people were like that, I would die of hunger, for example. There is something tormenting (romantic) in tumultuous debate, and above all in the constitutive opacity that makes for a considerable dose of ignorance in the bridge from thought to action. Hannah Arendt has said: "There is no opposition in our world as clear and radical as that between thought and action." The apparent scandal and the absurdity of this sentence from Arendt made me think of many things.

Thought is by definition, by axiom, a simple or baroque nuanced construction that allows for contradiction, paradox, and ambiguity. The act is cybernetic, it is zero or one, white or black, it is radical, binary, all or nothing; act and thought are vitally counterposed.

Thus, face-to-face with the dimension of return, an act, a statement, mute or explicit, sanctions a decision that the subject and his surroundings judge and assess in very different ways. But beyond the act, one could ask, for example, what is it that is really decided upon? Who is the one making the decision? These are obvious questions that I will try to address.

I begin by inviting you to consider an image: when my mother and father conceived me I was not there, nor did they consult me; I could not give my opinion. Ergo, I was absent and excluded from the fundamental decision that inaugurated my existence.

René Mayor, who knows Greek better than I, says that in the Odyssey when Ulysses responds to Polyphemus to the question, "Who are you?" he answers "no one" (*oudeis* in Greek, which is close to his own name, *Odysseus*). It is

this area between myself and no one that I want to highlight to point out the anxiety-arousing quality of one who makes a radical decision regarding his destiny.

The substantive subject of the decision is not —as conscious voluntarism would have it— a single, lucid subject conscious of itself; rather, it is in the confines of the being (like what we know from dreaming, or falling in love), where something at once our own and alien, familiar and strange, pushes us in a certain direction, drawing us away from something else. This process leaves a mark, a universal and necessary trace —and with this, which appears to be a joke but is not, I am giving a key definition of the Freudian theory of memory— something from which I am absent and excluded constitutes me and traps me.

For memory and return, that which is intimate is absolutely eccentric to what we ordinarily call subjectivity or inner world. It is something intimate but which calls us from outside, which appeals to us as an exterior aspect which, while external, is at the same time of oneself.

This is a founding and constitutive alienation that does not prevent me from feeling and believing myself to be the master and owner of other crucial decisions associated with my existence and my destiny, and that may involve extended reflection or stunning gestures that lead me to opt, to choose, and to accept certain alternatives while rejecting others, even to theorize on this succession of gestures in terms of freedom and free will. But this conscious choice and the ethic it reflects represents a second, later moment, which is always founded on an enigma, a world of darkness. Hence anxiety is a constitutive part of all legitimate decisions regarding destiny.

The foregoing, which I have tried to lighten in a playful exercise, is neither joke or prologue, but the very core of the subject I am addressing. I try to describe that knot in which the memory that stimulates return intervenes between servitude and creative liberty. In sum, my main point is that the decision to return is not, as is sometimes thought, the result of lucid and rational calculation, but the fulfilling of a destiny, with the inevitability, uncertainty, and enigma necessarily associated with destiny.

I realized after writing this text, which in appearance outlines an individual and intimate process, that it is also a semiology that also refers to something dramatic and painful about the Uruguay of today, the Uruguay of the post-dictatorial period and for a long time to come.

The differences and conflicts among those who go and those who stay, outside of and within this grieving land, are replete with affronts, confrontations, and resentment. A coherent axiom on exile and return from exile is revealed in the claim to have clear ideas on good and evil, as absolute values. A voluntarist behaviorism is sought that clearly accounts for the matter and that concludes in a religious discourse (whether stated by a priest, a layman, or a liberal, in the name of the homeland, its emblems, its culture, or its political or scientific ideals). But it is not a question of the distance between a pluralist

liberalism or dogmatic rigidity, but of the limits of a self-conscious individual and the consequences of these limits for the ethics and religiosity of his or her conduct.

Daniel Gil taught me at a very special moment in my life that a man cannot choose where he is born; but at times one can choose where to die. (Die is not used here in the sense of a final and tragic act, but in the Heideggerian sense of a responsible choice to lead a fragile and ephemeral existence). And from this perspective what is done is valid, whether it be to return or to remain. There are no standards, no guidelines, that say that good or evil lies in returning or remaining in exile. Nor is there any guarantee —beyond oneself— that the decision made will be the right one, and will avoid contingencies in personal, family, political, professional, or scientific conflicts on returning and remaining. All ethical acts pay a price in suffering or in idiocy.

In this second and final part I will move away from the *pathos* of exile, and attempt to outline a somewhat more erudite and intellectual approach, as is befitting of a psychoanalyst.

The vast scope of the issue and the short time I have allow me and oblige me to be schematic. This is not a bad idea for eluding my ignorance of a difficult subject, in which I am not a specialist.

What memory is it that return and exile address? What is kept, what is lost? How and why? What succumbs to the usury of forgetfulness, and what is kept?

In the consciousness, which Heraclitus and Yupanqui both described in metaphorical terms as the flowing of a river, is an implicit idea of linear time as the physical time of stars, or of biology. But psychical time is another matter, it has other qualities. There is a progressive movement of everyday experience, but psychical time can never be reduced to the linear confines of the river metaphor. If a geometric figure had to be sought to represent psychical time, one would have to think of a circle or spiral. I like the metaphor of the farmer's time. The farmer measures a time in which he plows, another in which he sows, another in which he irrigates, another in which he waits. He anxiously awaits success or disaster. And the crop, if there is one, is uncertain, mediate and distant. There is always a possibility of failure, of ending up with nothing. It seems to me that this metaphor better accounts for inner time or psychical time. To explain the relations of this inner time and memory, Octave Manonni recurs to an analogy (with his brilliant and eloquent simplicity) and says something like: the first time a child sees a bird, it is likely that he or she registers this as a surprise; the second time what is inscribed is the relationship between the two experiences. Hence the image and concept of bird is the latter one, and for our purposes is more accessible. I have little and poor knowledge of cognitive psychology, but as a Freudian (or psychoanalyst) I would say that the most elementary experience is not an experience per se, but rather is gradually constructed in experience. Thus, the analogy of memory as a tape recorder, photograph, film, or any form of archive results from a naive and poor scheme of an oversimplistic empiricism.

Little by little as we escape from that hollow academicism we know that there is a conscious memory: an infantile landscape of smells, colors, faces, and experiences, and the sonorous bath of a language we call the mother tongue, whatever the language of our actual mothers. This suggests that here the designation "maternal" points to a bridge between family and cultural community, to a memory which is first of the body or the senses, and that is later populated by cultural specificities (history, ideals, music, landscape, emblems). This is the memory that belongs to a nationality, as a linguistic, historical, and cultural community, and is today inherent to all persons. But there are other disciplines better suited than psychoanalysis to address all these matters, and persons more enlightened and qualified people than myself. I would thus like to limit myself to echoing what is relevant to our subject of the search for and discovery of Freud. And after much reflection I decided that to address Memory, Exile and Return, I would work on three points: a) the interval between conscious and unconscious memory, i.e. the notion of a memory trace, and how it operates; b) the function of pain and loss in psychic experience; c) the dialectic in psychical experience, between that which is of oneself and that which is of others.

2   The memory trace

In Freud's reflections and writings, his effort has been aimed at justifying and characterizing the existence of an unconscious memory. But stating it thus it may seem to be an oversimplification. I wanted to elude the notion of unconscious memory and the concept of memory trace that underlies it, even though it is somewhat embarrassing or pretentious for a Freudian to want to speak of memory without addressing these concepts. It is an obscure and equivocal concept, with no simple definition other than recurring to the epistemological falsehood of ontologizing the unconscious. Nonetheless, Freud recurs to this notion a thousand times over without ever giving a precise definition. Let us say at least that it is not a natural and observable object, but that like the black holes in astrophysics, it is not detectable by any method of observation. Its existence is postulated to explain the effects of the consumption of matter and energy.

So the notion of *memory trace* is a meta-empirical construction that Freud postulates because of its conjectural and heuristic value. Freud tries to explain the points of fixation with which his patients make explicit the conflict and symptom (today we should add choices and destiny).

The memory trace is the mark of the past that emerges in the present (out of conflict and choice) and defines the styles of insistence in existence as the virtual common denominator, repeated in the face of anxiety and surprise. When faced with a situation that arouses perplexity or anxiety, or just surprise, there (and only there) we become aware that "something previous" and

internal incites us, pushes us, and compels us to respond in a certain way, only in that way and in no other, in a fixed, tenacious, and reiterative style. And in this way a style is produced, a way of organizing or reorganizing experience. This repertory of responses is thus quite fixed, reduced, and monotonous. This line that orients the reorganization of experience as a bridge between the present and childhood makes possible or imposes the conceptual conjecture that there, before, there was something that was registered; that is what Freud calls "memory trace."

Two particularly brilliant moments of this tireless traveler of thought may illustrate the nature of this notion. One is the spool or bobbin game; the other is the experience of satisfaction. (Explaining what constitutes satisfaction based on observations of his grandchild, bond amidst an absence, passage from a symbiotic universe to one mediated by symbols in the form of gestures and words). This is well-known to analysts.

Of the two observations or constructions that I come to speak of, the evidence that I would like to bring out is that without the experience of pain and loss, there is no memory. If there is no exile, there is no return.

3   Pain and loss as driving motors of the psychical experience

Beyond what can be detected by the conscious memory, there is always the grief of childhood that tinges or impregnates all later experience. Adult exile only redoubles and revives the founding childhood losses.

Grief from childhood means here giving up one's mother, perhaps both parents, as possessions. They become instituted as lost love objects. This first exile is founding and structuring; any adult exile revives and reinforces it.

Whoever has lived through such an experience, the criollos say, has fallen from the nest; in French there is a term that cannot be translated, niais, which coincides with the Latin American expression of falling from the nest. For it is known that the etymology of exile includes jumping out, as a dispossession of that which is one's own, of what in one moment was a constitutive part of the being.

So what is the "within" to which this jumping out of exile refers? For there to be memory and return there must be an experience and pain of loss, which Freud considers a universal and inevitable structuring and subjective experience, that stems from all physical, spatial, and geographical contingencies. Without loss there is no return, there is only symbiosis, love of annexation and possession in which there is only one absolute truth, but which involves no thought.

Return is the reappropriation of a loss, it is the experience of reconquering the glow of something that has vanished or extinguished. It may be an act, such as my return, in which I win a home, friends, land, and ideals, but it may be a

poem, in which I restore that which was lost, without involving any physical presence.

And as I noted, appealing to Freud, that all return is tinged with infancy, my next step will be to tell you what we make of this term.

We think of infancy not so much as chronological time, but as a founding horizon, like the mythical time of the genesis. (To this end one may follow Rilke: memory of infancy is not only memory of what it was, but also, and above all, memory of what it wanted to be but could not be; memory of the illusion or of the fear, as much or more than the biography). Memory or the recollection and memory of forgetfulness (this is the flash point of the Freudian notion of *trace*: a "knowledge" about ourselves that we do not have, that is foreign to us and inaccessible, and that in the course of one's life appeals to us and besieges us, forces us to seek a before, imposes on us the question of where do I get this from. It is as if a seed buried germinates without our being aware of it, and then turns into a plant or tree or herb that must be cared for or destroyed.

This circularity of inner time, which technically we call retroaction or après coup, following Freud, is accessible to any attentive and motivated observer, but analytical tools and experience serve as a magnifying glass or enzyme to amplify the phenomenon. Memory is thus the forgetfulness that can be recognized a posteriori in its effects and consequences, which takes us to an original horizon where certainty vacillates between recollection and invention.

But is there any autobiography that does not draw on both recollection and invention? He who seeks origins finds or fabricates a myth. This, which psychoanalysis highlights, is not unique to Western culture, according to anthropologists; it is universal, across all cultures and time.

Mythical time of the genesis, with its certainties and its opacity, which in this case go hand in hand. All intelligence is controversial except that of infancy, where opacity results in the blind conviction typical of certainty.

4 The dialectic between that which is of oneself and that which is of others

Freud postulates in a classic text of 1915 (*Impulses and their destiny*) that one primary and basic operation of primitive psychism is incorporating and assuming as one's own that which one considers good, and distancing oneself from, spitting out, or projecting what one considers bad. The good that is one's own and the bad that is of others operates as a first level of discrimination. Tomás Bedó, a German-speaking Uruguayan colleague, says in his latest article that a key word in our work —interpret— is *Deutung* in German, whose etymological root coincides with *Deutsch* (German) *deuten*, which translated means "comprehensible to oneself," "to the other," "to all." In other words, that which is comprehensible begins by being self-referring.

Certain primitive tribes reserve the labels "human" and "good" for their own tribe, while neighboring tribes are referred to in less honorable terms (for example, lice eggs, subhumans, etc.). The phenomenon is conceptualized in anthropology by the term "ethnocentrism;" the semiotics of ethnocentrism are heated and complex.

I don't have to convince anyone of what I learned here in Uruguay (at least in the Centenario Stadium), that my physiognomy and the phenotype of my genes that you see include my "glorious *Charrúa* blood," [The *Charrúa* were a tribe that inhabited the north coast of the River Plate, in an area including what is today Uruguay. Th. T.] which is amusing until we think about the fate of the indigenous peoples of this land that we enjoy. It is worthwhile, given this recourse to joking and the absurd, to stop and ponder this "evidence" of an identity in relation to a belonging. Then one begins to feel unease when questioning it. Saying "I am such and such," the statement and the truth thus expressed, its proximity with the sacred, causes discomfort, anxiety, and even violence, when questioned.

And when applied to persons living in marginal situations (or the minority), the definition of knowledge is made a qualification (value judgment).

For example, it is difficult for being Jewish or communist to be characteristics of belonging like others: depending on the prevailing winds, they may be an insult and accusation, or represent complicity in heroic passion. The very reality of being may appear as either freedom or persecution.

This short exposition illustrates effectiveness and hitherto unknown power one's symbolic support system and origins in shaping the outcome of the dialectic between that which is of oneself and that which is foreign.

The fragile and arbitrary effort to weave the imaginary support for the symbolic plot of one's origin is sometimes surprising. When examining the substantive aspects, the essence of the belief, what does it mean when someone says: "I am... such and such a thing, I am Uruguayan, a psychoanalyst, a communist..." defining oneself on the basis of nationality, profession, or politics. My Charrúa or indigenous Uruguayan blood produced in Odessa is one example that I note with humor to illustrate briefly and telegraphically the ambivalence I wish to highlight. Though humor is dangerous in this regard, because it touches the sacred, and may be taken as arrogance from one who returns from abroad, especially when it's from Paris!

What is absurd and arbitrary about designations of origin, whose polysemy and equivocation may be played with by specialists in subjectivity, is halted in the tragedy of persecution and extermination. The point of horror in one's genealogy (associated with a historical trauma) and its effects on the individual and the family, has become an area of research for many of us.

But humor is necessary for steering clear of fanaticism. Because that thing of "I am from here" is what leads to deaths in clashes stirred by nationalist sentiment. When considering what lies at the root of belief or myth, we cannot help but find ourselves caught between dogmatic belief and arbitrary hypothe-

sis. The only solution to this dilemma is to keep alive the paradoxical movement of belonging and withdrawal.

This telegraphic incursion into the ethnology of criollismo, of what it means to be Latin American, which itself would merit an interdisciplinary study, is just to note but not to fill the gap (which has more mysteries than valid explanations) between the individual subject and the political person or person in the community, between individual and collective myths. So I leave it with you, just outlined as an issue between that which is of oneself and that which is of others, between the familiar and the foreign.[1]

Who can assure that the memory of infancy (founding memory) will be confined to an individual psychism? How many contemporary people and persons of future generations are condensed in the memory that precipitates the decision to return?

In my childhood memories, how much is mine and how much was told to me or impressed upon me directly, in my flesh, like the law and punishment of Kafka's machine? How much is my own and how much was said by my mother or father, by my aunt or grandmother? (And I include so many female figures because it is women above all who play the key role in this dynamic of transmission).

And when my grandmother speaks to me and tells me stories and seduces me, does this tell me about myself or about her?

Thus it is clear that the memory of return is not limited to the private universe of an individual, but that the subject of the decision is cross-cut by many other subjects, from before and from now. It is as certain as it is absurd to say that I return because I decided to do so; it would be like saying that you imposed it on me and imprinted it on me, or perhaps my ancestors did as well, to lighten the responsibility you must bear.

I offer a final personal and self-referring testimony to situate horror as the key point of memory and return. I am the son of a religious Jewish mother and an atheist Jewish and free-thinking father, who never renounced his origins, though he always fought religion.

They came early in the century fleeing the pogrom (and also avoiding the Nazi extermination 40 years later). They came to this land fleeing the horror, and almost by chance, for the Argentine reply arrived in Odessa before the mail from Palestine, which was another possible destiny. They populated this land and founded this nation, which was even more unpopulated after the extermination of the Indians, a horrible crime that Thodorow call the "greatest genocide in history."

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1 I recommend three texts of Freud that address the subject for anyone interested in further examining the psychoanalytical bibliography: *Instincts and their Vicissitudes*, 1915; *The Uncanny*, 1919; and the posthumous text *Moses and Monotheism*, 1938.

I learned to live in and enjoy France, and will always feel endless gratitude for that land of asylum. There —and not here— I also learned what it meant to be a Jew and a foreigner. I was taught this, among other things, by my son, who was ashamed at the way I spoke French.

So the story that you make up for yourself to flee or combat horror and suffering also plays a major role in memory and exile. I don't know why I never felt called by the Zionist return, but I know I am Uruguayan and Latin American, among other things because my hair stands on end and I cry the most when I learn of another crime in Chile or the genocide in Guatemala; although I know rationally that the crime in Poland and the genocides of Kurdistan, Armenia, or Cambodia are just as important in the history of humanity.

The personal anecdote can be forgotten by everyone but myself. It is not essential for history with a capital "h," but unavoidable for my own history, for my loved ones, that is, it has to do with me and my offspring; and it defines my actions, my choices, my anxieties, my ways of accepting and fleeing from moments of destiny. Horror and death are crossroads, the unavoidable nexus in the history of the generations. They are a pitfall, a knot, where we will always become waylaid, stuck, bogged down, or shipwrecked.

This, which perhaps the comfort and bucolic peace of the Uruguay of our childhood might have saved us from and hidden from us, taught it to us, marking the dictatorship with fire and exile. And in some way it was left inscribed as a mark, as a *trace*, not only in ourselves but in our descendants. Implicit in this *pathos* is a concept of *memory* akin to that of the distance between dreaming and transmitting. Teaching is in the domain of pedagogy and generates conscious memory. Transmitting is a more complex, rich, and vast, going beyond pedagogy from early childhood to university; it is what is given not only knowingly, but in spite of oneself. Transmitting engenders unconscious memory, which is the foundation or pillar for the design and organization of our entire discursive self. (The transmission of horror as the nexus of transmission became the central point of research for many of us for our entire lives, thanks to the dictatorship.)

In the recurrent inner time (line or furrow of the memory traces, Freud would say), the decision to return is repeated infinitely; verbal time is transformed and the question "why do I return?" becomes "why did I return?" or "why did I stay?"

Inner time is occasionally or always isomorphic with the time of the generations. Let me explain: we saw and experienced in Uruguayan exile, as in all grieving ghettos, an exacerbation of painful memory, evoking Uruguay as something sacred and lost, as an earthly version of paradise, a political version of religion.

This was passed on from parents to children. You can imagine the result: some young people swallowed it whole. Others, suffering indigestion, had to vomit it up and did not want to hear any more about Uruguay (as happened to

me with Zionism).

The memory of return is a memory of the future, a memory of the project, a memory of the ideal and the illusion. In one thousand intimate reflections on return, you think of your age, the useful life remaining to you, the difficulty starting all over again. You tell yourself you can be useful, as a teacher or transmitter of a culture which, if you did not succumb, was at least damaged in the dictatorship; and as in the case of ants, as Viglietti says, you no longer count or you're not important.

In France I had no memory of the future; here I do. But then you have children, and must face the rising threat of fascism, unemployment, and cultural deterioration. Many of those who stay in more advantageous positions say "My choice is not for me, but for them;" and they are right. In my case, in our case, the message that our children sent back to us, certainly through the message that we send them, was that it was necessary to return (this cross-generational message is circular, like inner discourse). And from this day-to-day experience comes the simple point on which I culminate and conclude my remarks. Return is in the future, in the project, and is not in an inner or subjective world; it cuts across the generations.

14

The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America: Some Obstacles to its Perception in Europe

Wilhelm Kempf

In my studies on the formation of cross-cultural understanding, I have repeatedly encountered the difficulties that we Europeans have when it comes to recognizing the immense injustice done to the people of most Latin American countries, which are kept in a state of underdevelopment, or when it comes to understanding their struggle for human rights and for liberation on their own terms, without that struggle being interpreted as yet another expression of the East-West conflict.

These difficulties in understanding do not occur by chance but are produced systematically by the mass media in their news coverage. There is a clear political purpose behind this, as the former assistant secretary of state of the United States, Elliott Abrams, has recognized:

> With respect to human rights situation in Nicaragua under the Somoza government or to the present situation in El Salvador we must not think only of the internal conditions. We must also think of how the country in question fits into the system of East-West relations. I can only confirm here that the government considers its policy on human rights in the context of East-West relations (Gottwald et al., 1988: 20).

But the difficulties involved in creating a basis of cross-cultural understanding are not only the result of a political program that is indifferent to the political and social rights of Latin Americans and which takes up the question of human rights only when it can be used as a weapon in the East-West conflict. These difficulties are more fundamental. They have their starting point in our efforts to understand the resistance to oppression and exploitation in Latin America in terms of our own prosperity and to make the Latin American situation fit into our own ideas on social peace and harmony.

Consequently, it is difficult for us Europeans to understand the words that *"Che"* Guevara wrote to his children in his farewell letter: "Above all, always be capable of feeling most profoundly any injustice committed against anyone in any part of the world. This is the greatest virtue of a revolutionary" (Guevara,

1985: 392). This profound feeling for all injustice that *"Che"* describes is much more than the mere moral indignation and "concern" which are so much in vogue nowadays as an acceptable form of emotionality. It implies, above all else, the ability to distinguish between justice and injustice in the first place, not understanding them as purely abstract opposites, but as aspects of life with a real social content.

In my presentation I wish, therefore, to refer to some of the psychological and ideological barriers which must be overcome in the effort to foster an awareness in Europe of the social situation of the majority of the people in most Latin American countries.

Overcoming these barriers in Europe is necessary not only in order to understand fully the extent of exploitation, repression, and organized violence to which most of Latin America is subjected. It is necessary, above all, in order to practice solidarity and to provide reliable support for the resistance to that oppression. This solidarity must be maintained not only when such resistance is defensive, i.e. a mere self-defense of the victims against injustice and dictatorship, but also when that resistance takes revolutionary forms aiming at a positive reconstruction of society, i.e. when it sets out to eliminate the roots of injustice and to develop democratic participation hitherto denied to the majority of the population. These forms will not, of course, always take the form of the parliamentary democracy familiar to us and will certainly not be designed to satisfy our ideals or to serve as a backdrop for the projection of our needs.

It is when we reach this point, at the latest, that Europeans' efforts to understand always fall short. Gabriel García Márquez has pointed out some of the reasons that lead to this failure. In the speech he delivered on receiving the Nobel prize for literature in 1982 he attacked the Eurocentrism present in our way of seeing things and noted that interpreting the reality of Latin America with conceptual structures imposed from outside succeeds only in making Latin America less understood, less free, and more isolated (García Márquez, 1982).

For García Márquez the problem is that the intellectually gifted Europeans obsessed with the consideration of their own culture have still not found any valid method of interpreting Latin American reality, because they insist on measuring it with the same yardstick with which they measure society on their side of the world, without considering that suffering and harm to life are not the same for all.

The imposition of alien criteria for the judgment of Latin American reality that García Márquez criticizes has even worse effects when we try to attain some kind of supposedly scientific objectivity. Collective resistance to repression and the use of organized violence as we know it today in countries such as Chile, Guatemala, and El Salvador, can only be understood in the light of their relationship to their own culture, society, and current situation. The same holds true for revolutionary projects in countries such as Cuba and Nicaragua.

But, in accordance with the bourgeois European scientific ideal, "objectivity" demands abstraction from the context in which subjects act.

Furthermore, the schematic descriptive categories that science draws on cannot provide context-free descriptions of actions. They merely place the actions described in a context that is not reflected on and which, as a rule, is different from the context in which the actions actually took place (Schwemmer, 1987). Thus far this is no doubt a general methodological problem associated with the understanding of actions. But when it comes to creating a cross-cultural basis of understanding, the problems involved have more serious consequences. In creating an intracultural basis of understanding it can be assumed that the schematic categories set the actions and their interpretation within the culturally normal context (thus providing a basis in reality). This is no longer the case with a cross-cultural basis of understanding. What in a developed country may be merely a question of moderate reform, for example, may be a revolutionary act in a Latin American country, a project to overthrow the dominant system.

Among the conditions that pose difficulties in the process of creating a cross-cultural basis of understanding between the members of an industrial European society such as the Federal Republic of Germany and the actors involved in a social revolution in an underdeveloped Latin American country, the first that should be mentioned is the extent of the socio-economic differences. These must be considered from several points of view.

First, the difference in socio-economic conditions between the industrialized and the underdeveloped countries is of such magnitude that members of an industrialized European country have no yardstick for measuring and judging revolutionary social advances in a third world country. For us, for example, it is almost impossible to grasp the significance of gains such as the supply of basic food products or of literacy for the people of a third world country who have been kept in a state of misery and ignorance.

Second, prosperity, high living standards, and social welfare services have become so much a matter-of-course for the average West European that he is largely unaware of these conditions of his everyday life and thus has no standard by which to judge them.

The meaning of processes of social revolution for all those who experience them or play an active part in them can only be understood, however, through an awareness of the factors and conditions determining their existence. The same is also true of the resistance movements, as in Chile, Guatemala, and El Salvador. In fact, it applies in general to the understanding of all activities of Latin Americans.

If we do not take into account the historical, social, and cultural preconditions and conditions of these societies, it will in principle be possible for us to approach an understanding of the socio-cultural structures regulating Latin American society. But our approach will necessarily be different from that of the Latin Americans themselves, since it is not practical but only the result of

theoretical efforts. This also holds true for European social scientists who spend long periods of time on field work in Latin America.

The German writer Hans Magnus Enzenberger draws erroneous conclusions when he writes that, although one could demand that each community be described and judged only in terms of its own preconditions, such a thoroughgoing relativism would presuppose the existence of an observer able to put down his leaving his own cultural baggage at home (Enzenberger, 1982). A relativism thus understood would not be capable of advancing a single step in the direction of improved cross-cultural understanding. Even if some Europeans become Latin Americans, this does nothing to promote European understanding of the true reality of Latin America.

On the contrary, in order to contribute to the process of understanding, we have to insist on the difference in our socio-cultural starting points, for the effort to understand the reality of Latin America on its own terms always means that we Europeans must consciously create the context in which that reality can be understood. Therefore, our understanding of the Latin American situation can in no way be a simple copy. Its validity can only be demonstrated as an act of cross-cultural transfer. As such, it can only be negotiated in an intercultural debate in which the different preconditions of understanding in both societies, Latin America and Europe, must themselves be made the subject of a discourse in which the participants are on equal terms.

Only if and when we are ready to begin such a discourse will we Europeans have a chance to recognize what García Márquez has pointed out so insistently: that the immense violence and immense suffering of Latin American history are the result of centuries of injustice and innumerable bitter experiences and not of a conspiracy hatched out three thousand miles away (García Márquez, 1982).

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Abstracts

The Effects of Institutionalized Violence: A Psychoanalytical Contribution to its Understanding

Silvia Amati

In psychotherapy with persons who have suffered extreme situations, the therapist has to work through basic ethical problems. I use the concepts of ambiguous position and ambiguity (Bleger, 1972) to give a psychoanalytical explanation of this kind of defensive regression that takes place in individuals and the group in social situations of institutional violence. Under survival conditions this affective regression, with its ambiguity and indifferentiation, represents a basic defense against catastrophic anxieties, and at the same time an adaptation mechanism that makes it possible to gain familiarity with the uncertain outside world. This defense through ambiguity may develop into a state of alienation when brought on deliberately by an abusing and alienating human agent. Feelings of hopelessness, futility, and loss of meaning that may appear during the therapeutic process are considered signals of the patient re-living moments of loss of continuity and coherence during the traumatic events. Feelings of shame are interpreted as a signal of the patient recovering his or her capability for discrimination and internal conflict in his or her process of de-alienation.

Human Rights and Psychosocial Health in South America

Horacio Riquelme U.

For more than 20 years the armies of most South American countries have been waging a psychological war against their own populations by using practices aimed at maintaining the unjust status quo through intimidation and subjugation, through the imposed passive acceptance of authoritarian power structures and, in the case of dissidence or opposition, by generating a feeling of helplessness and existential threat in the person affected. The three main areas of this "organized violence" are: 1) the disappearance of opposition members; 2) the systematic use of torture; and 3) intervention in and control of the mass media. The psychosocial consequences of this intentional violation of human rights can be documented in detail; the significance for society as a whole cannot be judged. In the midst of these everyday atrocities a psychosocial practice has been developed which resolutely carries out the task of dealing with victims of the organized use of violence and strives to gain knowledge to be applied to the process of real democratization.

Sexuality as a Tool of Political Repression

Inger Agger & Sören Jensen

Torture is employed in 1/3 of the world's countries. The use of psychosexual methods of torture has increased, since these methods are more difficult to trace and more effective in breaking down the personality. The article is based on data collected by political prisoners in El Salvador. All prisoners had been subjected to torture, on the average 19 different forms of torture, and 3/4 have been subjected to one or more sexual torture methods. The aim is to pacify the political opponent by inducing strong feelings of shame and guilt. Methods are used that can provoke active sexuality, thereby activating homosexual anxiety. A biopsychosocial frame of reference is introduced in which the symptoms presented by the refugee can be understood by the therapist. This frame of reference is also valid in establishing a model of treatment. The problems presented by the refugee are viewed as an entity into which experiences from neighboring fields should also be applied. Perspectives of transcultural sexological treatment models are discussed.

Extreme Traumas, Processes of Social Reparation, Political Crisis

David Becker & Hugo Calderón

This essay focuses on the consequences of political repression in Chile. First, what happened to the direct victims is defined as "extreme traumatization." Next, an analysis is presented of specific characteristics of the process through which political repression became part of the psychic structure of the people and thereby a central element of collective behavior. Next, the characteristics of the so-called "process of transition to democracy" are discussed. Finally, on the basis of this analysis the prospects for social reparation are discussed.

The Similarities and Differences in Psychopathological Problems Associated with Political Repression

Mario Vidal

The differences are determined by the non-psychological category "political praxis." Political repression is a consequence of the repressive policy. It has a rationality of its own and is functional to the interests and needs of the dominant groups. The traumatic event (torture, imprisonment, exile, mourning for an executed or missing relative, etc.) has a political meaning and expresses, at a personal level, the power relationship and contradictions in a historically determined society. The victims of repression belong directly or indirectly to different groups that oppose a political regime. In Latin America these opponents must face despotic regimes that normally violate rights and values essentially linked to human dignity. Hence, political praxis meets with an objective ethical dimension which will be expressed in the form of a new feeling: indignation. The dynamics of indignation can help to understand part of the behavior of many victims of political repression. The nature of the psychopathological reaction is not entirely determined by its political specificity. As in other traumatic experiences, one must wonder why a specific person undergoes the trauma

in a particular way, and not in any other. For a better comprehension one should also study the patient's biography, character, his or her identity groups (and the hierarchy among them), life project, and the role played by his or her political commitment. The therapeutic approach must assume this dual character in the psychopathology observed among the victims of political repression. Within this framework one can discuss the role political trust will play in the quality of the therapeutic bond, in the problem of "professional neutrality," in the "psychotherapeutic environment's" flexibility (in Balint's sense) and in the necessary multiplicity of resources to be employed combining different psychotherapeutic techniques, the need for a therapeutic team, etc, with the purpose of healing the psychological damage, its somatic concomitants, and its repercussions on the family, as well as on social, labor, and eventually political reinsertion.

The language of Fear: Collective Dynamics of Communication Under Fear in Chile

Héctor Faúndez

This paper describes the treatment of some communication mechanisms of a population under the action of state terrorism, the Chilean population from 1973 to 1988. The main aim of repression under state terrorism is to alter the population's mentality. To achieve this aim, state terrorism makes use of many fear-imposing mechanisms. They produce serious psychopathological states and result in social phenomena such as the "pact of silence."

"Is it Nice to Be a Grown-up...?" Different Moments in the Treatment of Children of "Desaparecidos"

Victoria Martínez, Mónica Marciano, Marta Pechman & Susana Zito Lema

The article develops three aspects of clinical practice with children affected by the detention-disappearance of their parents. A discussion of the importance of using body techniques in therapy with these children is presented. The physical disappearance of their parent(s) has required an elaboration that involves representations both in the child's discourse and in her/his body. We describe the dynamic that occurs in group therapy when the problem of disappearance is present. More specifically, the article discusses the importance of drama techniques in this context and the level of involvement of the therapists both with their own bodies and in their mechanisms of countertransference. We also analyze the presence of psychosomatic illnesses related to this particular form of representing/erasing the body of the other. The article concludes with reflections about the future that can be expected for this generation in the absence of social responses to the individual drama of each of these children.

The Horrifying Reality: Psychocultural Effects of State Terrorism in South America

Horacio Riquelme U,

The establishment of "organized violence" in most South American countries during the last two decades has affected the living conditions of the population in these countries in a substantial way. State terrorism has developed systematic methods for intimidating people physically and psychically and to manipulate the psychosocial culture, seeking to repress any opposition from the outset in order to sustain its own socioeconomic model: the "horrifying real" becomes an institution. The repressive and totalitarian order is reflected in specific existential aspects of the literary production of this subcontinent in the last 15 years. In this essay four of these are addressed: a) the implementation of state terrorism, b) everyday life under state terrorism, c) alienation as a modus vivendi, and d) exile-insile. The psychocultural study of this literature allows us to reach a zone of perception and of social and existential analysis where the experience of oppression, torture, exile, return, etc. becomes explicit and where it transcends the individual level. The literature is breaking down taboos and silence for setting the grounds for a specific culture of creative opposition against state terrorism; and it is creating a semantic context for an integral reflection on recent history, which is so necessary in the process of democratization in Latin America. Key words are: promotion of human rights, opposition culture, limit experiences, psychocultural semantics.

Dictatorship, Democracy, Torture

Mauricio Rosencof

This paper is a transcription of spontaneous remarks made at the symposium. The author reflects on the subject of democracy, dictatorship, and torture, and explains the diffuse limits of their relationship in Latin America. He speaks of his own experience as a political prisoner in Uruguay, eleven years in isolation, but also about the everyday experience of solidarity among the prisoners in their struggle against dictatorship.

Emotional Climate, Mood and Collective Behavior: Chile 1973-1990

Darío Páez, Domingo Asún, & José Luis González

DeRivera (1992) has defined emotional climate as a social fact, based on the relative predominance and salience of a group of emotional scripts during a certain sociopolitical period. An emotional climate would be made up of an aggregate of the four "basic" emotions, together with a social representation or view of the social world and of the future. In order to contrast the social functioning of shared emotions, we compared collective behavior indicators with judgements given by experts on the predominant emotions which different groups have in different historical moments. Two social psychologists gave a series of scores on levels of basic emotions (fear, anger, sadness and joy) to the prototypical right, center or left wing oriented chilean subject during the years 1973 to 1989. Results confirm the congruent validity

between experts judgment of emotional climate and objective indexes of collective behaviour (civilians killed by the army, riots, demonstrations, and number of army personnel killed for political reasons). Anger in right wing people was related to repression against the left. Fear in the left was related to level of civilian deaths. High collective violence was associated to lower sadness and fear, and higher anger in the left. Both these results and other analyses of indepth interviews suggest that the emotional climate of terror/fear/intimidation in Chile fulfilled the function of establishing and stabilizing Pinochet's dictatorship and at the same time allowing certain economic growth which would satisfy the ruling classes.

Violation of Fundamental Rights; Individual and Social Psychological Reparation

Elisa Neumann, Consuelo Macchiavello & Angélica Monreal

This essay is a reflection based on therapeutical practice with people whose human rights have been violated. This practice has been with processes of grieving and suffering linked to experiences of destruction, loss, and mourning. These limit experiences fully bring out the close association between subjective suffering and social damages, and in the present conditions, the difficulties elaborating normal mourning, the defense mechanisms used in these situations, and the disturbing consequences both in the individual and for society as a whole. Finally, in addressing the subject of psychological reparation we pose some inevitable future duties: elucidating the repressive actions, distinguishing responsibilities for these actions, evaluating these actions in a broader social context, searching for justice in its dual reparative function for both the individual and society and social institutions in rebuilding the collective identity. The authors are members of the Medical-Psychiatric Program of the Christian Churches Social Aid Foundation (FASIC), an ecumenical institution that has worked since 1975 to provide legal, social, and psychological assistance to persons whose human rights have been violated by the military regime.

State Terrorism as a Phantom

Juan Jorge Fariña

The forced disappearance of Argentines from 1976 to 1983 constitutes a relevant fact for both quantitative analysis (a virtual epidemiology of genocide) and qualitative analysis (methodological sophistication and perversion). Over the real categories of repression, the dictatorship superimposed a more subtle dimension aimed at fostering mechanisms of denial in the population. Propaganda and manipulation of information were used to generate psychoticizing mechanisms in the victims' relatives. The phenomenon thus becomes a "phantom," an imaginary mise en scène representing the desired return of the absent member. Thus, the therapeutic space in which one deconstructs these fantasies that complements the political space; this is a process that occurs when the family decides to confront its own history.

Memory, Exile, and Return: An Uruguayan Experience

Marcelo Viñar

This articles describes from a psychoanalytical perspective the life history and political experience of the author and his family in their own historical context, exile in France for more than ten years, and their recent decision to return to Uruguay.

The Struggle for Human Rights in Latin America: Some Obstacles to its Perception in Europe

Wilhelm Kempf

In spite of the existence of a reasonably strong human rights movement in Europe, for the most part public opinion in many Western European countries (such as Germany) takes rather little notice of the persisting violation of human rights in many countries of Latin America. On the contrary, the resistance to organized violence (especially when it takes revolutionary forms) is often viewed as "political terrorism," or is merely discussed in terms of the East-West conflict, while the political and social causes of the struggle for human rights and emancipation are expelled from consciousness. This is not by chance. The distortion of our perception is systematically produced by the mass media and serves political purposes. Nonetheless, it is not just the result of manipulation, but is based on fundamental difficulties of intercultural empathy, some of which are discussed in this paper.

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Foundation for Children

Objectives

The Foundation for Children was established in 1986 in Freiburg i. Br., Germany, by private persons as a civil-law foundation. It is a non-stock, non-profit organization based in Freiburg.

Leitmotivs of the foundation are:

- It intends to make children in the so-called Third World learn and experience new forms of living together after their basic needs have been met.
- The founders want to set an example of sharing in the so-called First World where they live. They believe that changes as a possibility in the life of every individual can be made conscious and turned into reality. Therefore, structures once formed both in personal and social life should not be accepted as unalterable.

The main concern of the foundation is the priority use of its resources for eliminating the causes of misery. The foundation strives for solutions which enable self-determination on the basis of partnership while simultaneously respecting grown relationships and cultural peculiarities.

In this context, special attention is directed to children who, being the weakest members of society, need utmost care. Such important questions should always be kept in mind: What are the decisive factors that cause misery? How can people be enabled to use their own strength to ameliorate their situation?

The foundation's central idea is to overcome social, economic, political and cultural domination/power structures by means of cooperating with respective project partners on a reciprocal basis.

Conceptions

Despite three decades of public and national development aid the gap between the rich and the poor has significantly widened worldwide. In concrete terms, this has a far-reaching impact on most of the Third World countries: Increasing misery and mass poverty, especially in rural areas; political oppression and militarization; destruction of traditional ways of life including the outright annihilation of indigenous peoples; narrowing the margins for indi-

vidual and collective initiatives.

Such developments are largely due to the fact that development aid is still lopsided, primarily favoring industrial nations and the internationalization of capital (relations). Intrinsically, the very term "development" is highly questionable as it reinforces the values of the donors and serves to impose their will on the recipients.

Consequently, mainly elites in the developing countries benefit from this kind of development aid in the sense that, besides being strengthened politically and economically, they further alienate themselves from their own people and culture.

The FOUNDATION FOR CHILDREN, on the other hand, considers development as a process which enhances economic self-determination, political democracy, social emancipation, protection of cultural independence and national sovereignty.

For this purpose the FOUNDATION FOR CHILDREN links up with democratic organizations, groups and initiatives which work towards the realization of viable counter-structures.

Projects

Due to intensive personal ties in and attachment to the Philippines, the FOUNDATION FOR CHILDREN has decided, for the time being, to cooperate with project partners in this Southeast Asian country according to its objectives and conceptions.

The many-faceted efforts and potentials of grass-roots movements in the Philippines, all determined in building up counter-structures to the existing political conditions as a process of liberation, complement the reasons for this choice.

Based on the idea of solidarity which includes changes in perceptions among all partners involved, the FOUNDATION FOR CHILDREN shares with them common project experiences while documenting the cooperation in appropriate form both in Germany as well as in the Philippines.

Upon request further information including the constitution of the foundation will be furnished. Donations and other financial contribution are tax-deductible.

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ERA IN TWILIGHT

This book documents the effort of one Uruguayan writer and several European and Latin American professionals working in the area of psychosocial health to gain intellectual and emotional understanding of this Era in Twilight they experienced, determined to transcend its virtual opacity and incommunicability.

The book has two parts, one focused on theory and psychotherapeutic practice in the face of organized violence, and another on culture under state terrorism. In recent South American history a certain simultaneity can be observed in the processes of coercive destruction by state power, on the one hand, and cultural and psychosocial reparation from the grass-roots, on the other.

The general participation of society is needed in this task of recovery and restructuring of social ethics in the wake of the experience of state terrorism. Based on recent experiences in South America, there is a clear need to reflect upon the psychosocial aspects of this period in order to make it possible to grow and overcome this Era in Twilight.

If it arouses the reader's interest and spurs new questions about the experiences of this period and its after-effects in a post-dictatorial society, it will have achieved its purpose, insofar as it contributes to broadening the social and cultural base so that the cry of "Never again!" may be a living proposition, not just a motto of good intentions but with little impact in South America, or wherever state terrorism threatens peace and civility.

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